Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / Server-side request forgery
Server-side request forgery
21 records in MCP and Tool Server Flaws.
- Model Context Protocol Python SDK: Client fetched server-chosen $ref URLs while validating tool results against output schemas
- PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass The crawl4ai browser backend re-resolves DNS and follows redirects without the per-connection SSRF guard, letting requests reach internal addresses.
- rmcp OAuth client fetches server-controlled resource_metadata URLs An MCP OAuth client fetches a resource metadata URL taken from a server's WWW-Authenticate header without checking whether it points to internal addresses.
- MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow The header-based auth flow validates a Jira URL's DNS result, then the later request resolves again, so a rebinding host reaches internal addresses.
- mcp-atlassian has an incomplete SSRF remediation The MCP middleware accepts Jira and Confluence base URLs from request headers without validation, so the server fetches attacker-chosen internal hosts.
- MCP Atlassian: SSRF redirect protection missing for basic-auth and OAuth authentication branches The SSRF redirect check is attached only to the header token auth branch, so basic-auth and OAuth requests follow redirects to internal addresses such as cloud metadata.
- MCP Atlassian: SSRF Protection Bypass
- MCP Atlassian: Incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: redirect-based SSRF via unhooked requests session in Jira user-permission lookup
- Chainlist has SSRF via MCP SSE and streamable-http transports that allows unauthenticated internal network access
- praisonaiagents has a `web_crawl` SSRF protection bypass via unchecked redirect targets The crawler checks only the first URL, then follows redirects unchecked, letting a public address send requests to internal or metadata endpoints.
- n8n: SSRF Protection Bypass via MCP Client Node
- MCP Atlassian: DNS-rebinding TOCTOU bypass of the SSRF fix (CVE-2026-27826) The MCP server validates a header-supplied host's DNS result but later re-resolves it at connect time, so a rebinding name reaches internal addresses.
- BerriAI litellm has SSRF via Unvalidated spec_path URL in MCP OpenAPI Spec Loader An attacker-supplied spec path makes the MCP OpenAPI loader fetch arbitrary URLs from the server without restricting the destination.
- PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass Redirects are followed without validating the target, so a public URL can redirect the scraper to internal or metadata addresses.
- Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)
- PraisonAI Has SSRF in FileTools.download_file() via Unvalidated URL An agent file download tool passes an arbitrary URL to an HTTP client that follows redirects, so requests can reach internal metadata services and hosts.
- FastMCP OpenAPI Provider has an SSRF & Path Traversal Vulnerability
- MCP Atlassian has SSRF via unvalidated X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers Unauthenticated requests carrying custom URL headers make the MCP server send requests to attacker-chosen URLs, including internal metadata services.
- Azure MCP Server has Server-Side Request Forgery issue that allows authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network
- composio allows Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in BROWSERTOOL Browser tool actions pass attacker-supplied URLs to the server-side fetcher, which can be pointed at local resources such as file paths to read arbitrary files.
- DNS Rebinding SSRF in Burp Suite MCP Server Enables Internal Network Access via send_http1_request Tool