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MCP Atlassian: SSRF redirect protection missing for basic-auth and OAuth authentication branches

CVE-2026-77261 · 2026-09-22 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The SSRF redirect check is attached only to the header token auth branch, so basic-auth and OAuth requests follow redirects to internal addresses such as cloud metadata. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

_make_ssrf_safe_hook() blocks HTTP redirects to private/internal IPs by validating the Location header before the client follows a 3xx response. The problem is that this hook is only attached in one of three authentication branches — the header-PAT path. Basic auth and OAuth branches skip it entirely, so if the connected Atlassian server returns a redirect to something like http://169.254.169.254/, the requests session follows it without complaint.

This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9. The hook works fine when it's there — it just isn't there for most production auth configurations.

Details

In src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py, three branches construct a fetcher and call _create_and_validate(). Only Branch 1 passes attach_ssrf_hook=True:

# Branch 1 (header PAT) — hook attached
return _create_and_validate(request, spec, header_config, "header_pat",
                             attach_ssrf_hook=True)

# Branch 2 (basic auth) — hook missing
return _create_and_validate(request, spec, user_config, "basic",
                             user_email=user_email)

# Branch 3 (OAuth/PAT) — hook missing
return _create_and_validate(request, spec, user_config, "oauth_pat",
                             user_email=user_email)

attach_ssrf_hook defaults to False, so branches 2 and 3 silently skip the protection. The hook itself (_make_ssrf_safe_hook) is straightforward — it checks response.is_redirect, grabs the Location header, and calls validate_url_for_ssrf() to reject private IPs. It works correctly when present.

Typical attack flow:

PoC

Tested on commit d8bc786 (v0.21.1). No real credentials needed.

from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import requests

from mcp_atlassian.servers.dependencies import _make_ssrf_safe_hook
from mcp_atlassian.utils.urls import validate_url_for_ssrf
from mcp_atlassian.jira import JiraFetcher
from mcp_atlassian.jira.config import JiraConfig

config = JiraConfig(
    url="https://attacker.atlassian.net",
    auth_type="basic",
    username="victim@example.com",
    api_token="victim-token",
)
fetcher = JiraFetcher(config=config)
session = fetcher.jira._session

hooks = session.hooks.get("response", [])
print("hooks on basic-auth session:", [h.__name__ for h in hooks] or "none")

fake_redirect = MagicMock(spec=requests.Response)
fake_redirect.is_redirect = True
fake_redirect.headers = {"Location": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}

blocked = False
for h in hooks:
    try:
        h(fake_redirect)
    except ValueError as e:
        blocked = True
        print("blocked:", e)

if not blocked:
    print("redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session")

# show header-PAT branch does block it
hook = _make_ssrf_safe_hook(validate_url_for_ssrf)
try:
    hook(fake_redirect)
except ValueError as e:
    print("header-PAT branch blocks:", e)

Output:

<img width="2490" height="214" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7d9d7e2-4c37-4abd-95a3-4ddd9f6bd735" />

$ uv run python3 /tmp/test.py
hooks on basic-auth session: none
redirect to 169.254.169.254 not blocked on basic-auth session
header-PAT branch blocks: Redirect blocked (SSRF): Blocked IP address: 169.254.169.254 (non-global)

Impact

Basic auth and OAuth cover most production Atlassian Cloud deployments, so this affects the majority of HTTP-mode multi-user setups. An attacker with control over the Atlassian server can redirect MCP server requests to internal infrastructure — cloud metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API, databases, or any service reachable from the MCP server's network.

The fix is one line per affected branch: pass attach_ssrf_hook=True to _create_and_validate() in branches 2 and 3, the same way branch 1 already does.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.