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mcp-atlassian has an incomplete SSRF remediation

CVE-2026-77267 ยท 2026-09-22 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The MCP middleware accepts Jira and Confluence base URLs from request headers without validation, so the server fetches attacker-chosen internal hosts. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The UserTokenMiddleware extracts URLs from X-Atlassian-Jira-Url and X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url HTTP headers and passes them directly to API client constructors without any SSRF validation.

Affected Package

Details

In main.py, _process_authentication_headers() extracts URLs from ASGI headers without validation. In dependencies.py, get_jira_fetcher() creates JiraConfig with url=jira_url_header directly. There is no validate_url call, no IP range check, no hostname validation.

The fix adds URL validation to some paths but the header-based URL extraction in _process_authentication_headers() still passes raw URLs through. The derived config objects use the header URL directly and the fetcher makes HTTP requests to that URL.

PoC

jira_url_header = headers.get(b"x-atlassian-jira-url")
jira_url_str = jira_url_header.decode("latin-1") if jira_url_header else None
service_headers["X-Atlassian-Jira-Url"] = jira_url_str

Steps to reproduce:
1. git clone https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian /tmp/mcp-atlassian_test
2. cd /tmp/mcp-atlassian_test && git checkout 5cd697dfce91~1
3. pip install -e .
4. python3 poc.py

Expected output:

VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED
User-supplied URLs from HTTP headers passed directly to JiraConfig/JiraFetcher with no SSRF validation

Impact

An attacker can set X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ to access AWS instance metadata, or target any internal service. The server makes authenticated HTTP requests to the attacker-specified URL.

Suggested Remediation

Validate all user-supplied URLs against an allowlist of permitted hostnames or reject private/loopback/link-local IP ranges. Consider requiring server-side configuration of allowed Atlassian instance URLs.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.