INCIDENT MAP

Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-77265

MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow

CVE-2026-77265 ยท 2026-09-22 moderate

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The header-based auth flow validates a Jira URL's DNS result, then the later request resolves again, so a rebinding host reaches internal addresses. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The SSRF protection for header-based authentication uses a validate-then-use pattern vulnerable to DNS rebinding. validate_url_for_ssrf resolves the hostname via DNS and checks that the resolved IP is globally routable. However, the actual HTTP request happens later, during which the DNS record may have changed to point to an internal IP (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.). The SSRF redirect hook only validates redirect targets, not the initial connection.

Details

The vulnerability spans main.py (validation) and dependencies.py (use).

Step 1 -- URL validation at middleware time:

In src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:524-531, the URL from X-Atlassian-Jira-Url is validated:

if jira_url_str:
ssrf_error = validate_url_for_ssrf(jira_url_str)
if ssrf_error:
# blocked

validate_url_for_ssrf (src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py:113-116) resolves DNS and checks is_global:

dns_error = _check_dns_resolution(hostname)
if dns_error:
return dns_error

Step 2 -- HTTP request happens later with a separate DNS resolution:

In src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:544-562, a JiraFetcher is created with the attacker URL and makes HTTP requests to it. The SSRF redirect hook (attach_ssrf_hook=True) is applied but only checks redirect Location headers, not the initial connection target.

DNS rebinding timeline:

PoC

Use a DNS rebinding service like rbndr.us. Send a request with X-Atlassian-Jira-Url set to a rebinding hostname (e.g., rebind-169.254.169.254-1.2.3.4.rbndr.us) and X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token set to any value. With approximately 50% probability per attempt, the request reaches the internal metadata service.

Impact

Recommended Fix

Pin DNS resolution: resolve the hostname once during validation, then connect to the resolved IP directly (with the original hostname in the Host header). This eliminates the TOCTOU gap between validation and use.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.