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Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure)

CVE-2026-43995 · 2026-04-16 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Also involves
MCP and Tool Server Flaws
Affected
flowise-components, flowise (npm)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Several tools call raw HTTP clients directly instead of the centralised SSRF wrapper, so requests to internal addresses still succeed. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

Flowise introduced SSRF protections through a centralized HTTP security wrapper (httpSecurity.ts) that implements deny-list validation and IP pinning logic.

However, multiple tool implementations directly import and invoke raw HTTP clients (node-fetch, axiosInstead of using the secured wrapper.

Because enforcement is neither mandatory nor centralized, these tools bypass SSRF mitigation entirely, restoring full SSRF capability even after the patch.

This issue is distinct from specification trust issues and represents incomplete mitigation of previously addressed SSRF vulnerabilities.

Details

Intended Security Model:

All outbound HTTP requests should pass through the centralized validation layer implemented in:

packages/components/src/httpSecurity.ts

This layer performs:

Observed Implementation Gap:

Multiple tools bypass this layer and import HTTP libraries directly.

Examples include:

These files directly execute:

importfetchfrom'node-fetch'

or invoke axios without passing through the centralized validation wrapper.

Because there is no global interceptor or enforcement mechanism, outbound requests in these components are executed without SSRF validation.

This renders the mitigation introduced in GHSA-2x8m-83vc-6wv4 incomplete.

Root Cause

Security enforcement is not centralized.

Outbound request validation depends on voluntary usage of a wrapper function rather than being structurally enforced.

Because direct imports of HTTP clients are allowed, the mitigation is easily bypassed.

This is an architectural enforcement failure rather than a single implementation bug.

PoC

Even when an administrator configures:

HTTP_DENY_LIST=169.254.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8

The following attack succeeds if a vulnerable tool is enabled:

Chat Prompt:

Use the Web Scraper tool to retrieve:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Execution flow:

This demonstrates that SSRF protection is opt-in rather than enforced.
### Impact

Severity: Critical (CVSS v3.1: 9.1 – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)

This issue:

Any deployment enabling affected tools remains vulnerable.

Recommended Remediation

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.