Products / praisonai
praisonai
105 records.
- PraisonAI recipe.run_stream skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement The streaming recipe path skips the dangerous-tool policy check, so a recipe declaring a shell execution tool runs it without the required explicit opt-in.
- PraisonAI ToolsMCPServer legacy SSE transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools The legacy SSE MCP server exposes its tools without checking Host, Origin, or authentication, so a DNS-rebinding page can list and invoke them.
- PraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection File-tool path arguments from the agent are inserted into shell strings inside quotes, so a crafted path breaks out and runs arbitrary commands.
- PraisonAI: Webhook signature verification skipped (fail-open) when secret unset, allowing forged inbound webhooks (WhatsApp & Linear bots) Webhook adapters skip HMAC signature checks whenever the secret is unset, so an attacker can post forged platform events that are dispatched as trusted.
- PraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode) The AST filter for agent Python execution misses an attribute on built-in functions, letting code reach the builtins module and run OS commands.
- PraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings Alternate spellings of loopback hosts such as 127.1 or 0x7f000001 pass the exact-match blocklist, letting a crawler tool reach loopback-only services.
- PraisonAI CLI automatically resolves @url mentions in prompt text and can read loopback URLs into model context Attacker-written prompt text containing a URL mention makes the CLI fetch local HTTP endpoints and insert the response into the model's context.
- PraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334 Module paths read from YAML configuration are executed through importlib at call sites missed by the earlier environment gate, running attacker-supplied Python code.
- PraisonAI `deploy --type api` emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default A code generator emits a Flask API server with authentication off by default, leaving agent endpoints open to any client that can reach it.
- PraisonAI call server exposes unauthenticated agent listing, invocation, and deletion when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset When the token variable is unset, the auth dependency returns success, leaving agent list, invoke and delete endpoints open to anyone who can reach them.
- PraisonAI vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file read via MCP workflow.show, workflow.validate, deploy.validate An unauthenticated MCP tools/call to workflow.show passes a filename straight to file reads, since the containment fix covered other handlers but not this one.
- PraisonAI has an Arbitrary File Write in Python API Hidden text on a crawled webpage instructs the agent to call a file-writing tool, which writes attacker content to an attacker-chosen path because path validation is skipped.
- PraisonAI's unauthenticated A2A official example can reach real LLM-driven `eval()` tool execution An unauthenticated A2A endpoint forwards messages to an agent that has an eval-based calculator tool, so the model can cause Python code to run.
- PraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries Collection names passed to SQL and CQL knowledge-store backends are concatenated into table and index identifiers without validation, enabling query injection.
- PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution The legacy server ships with authentication disabled, so anyone who can reach it can trigger the configured agent workflow without a token.
- PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection Path-traversing rule names in MCP tool calls write a .pth file into site-packages, so attacker Python code runs on every later Python start.
- PraisonAI's symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir` A tar member symlink points outside the destination and later members write through it, escaping the extraction directory.
- PraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute When a tool name is undeclared, the agent falls back to module globals and __main__ and runs any matching callable, which the permission gate does not stop.
- PraisonAI has unauthenticated RCE via `tool_override.py` (CVE-2026-40287 patch bypass) The recipe runner dynamically executes a tools.py found beside a recipe template, and this loader path lacks the opt-in gate added to other tool loaders.
- PraisonAI has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-34935 - OS Command Injection MCP server command parsing hands arbitrary executables and inline-code flags to subprocesses because the earlier fix added no allowlist or argument checks.
- PraisonAI: SQL Injection via unvalidated `table_prefix` in 9 conversation store backends (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-40315) The table prefix is interpolated into SQL in nine store backends that lack the validation added to the SQLite store, so crafted prefixes inject queries.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Implicit Execution of Arbitrary Code via Automatic `tools.py` Loading PraisonAI executes any tools.py found in the working directory at startup without consent, so planting that file runs attacker code.
- PraisonAI has Unrestricted Upload Size in WSGI Recipe Registry Server that Enables Memory Exhaustion DoS The registry server reads request bodies fully into memory based on the client's Content-Length with no upper limit, so large uploads exhaust memory.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Code Injection and Protection Mechanism Failure Calling type.__getattribute__ with string attribute names evades the AST filter that blocks dangerous dunder attributes, letting agent-run code escape the sandbox.
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Allow-List Manipulation Bypasses Agent Tool Approval Safety Controls An unauthenticated caller can add dangerous tools to the approval allowlist when no token is set, so the agent runs them without human confirmation.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API The jobs API posts completion results to any caller-supplied webhook URL without validation, letting the server reach internal and cloud metadata endpoints.
- PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions An unauthenticated WebSocket client that omits the Origin header can register as a controller and drive automation sessions on other connected browser extensions.
- PraisonAI vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in `praisonai recipe unpack` A malicious .praison archive with ../ entries is extracted with raw tar extraction, letting it write files outside the target directory.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Unsanitized Agent Output in HTML Rendering (nh3 Not a Required Dependency) Agent output is converted to HTML and embedded unescaped, and the optional sanitizer returns it unchanged when missing, so injected scripts run for viewers.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Decompression Bomb DoS via Recipe Bundle Extraction Without Size Limits Recipe archives are extracted with path checks but no limits on member size or count, so a small, highly compressible bundle can fill the victim's disk.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Argument Injection into Cloud Run Environment Variables via Unsanitized Comma in gcloud --set-env-vars Commas in model or key values are not escaped when building the gcloud env-var argument, so attackers can inject extra environment variables into the deployed service.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import The agent framework automatically imports a tools.py file from the working directory, so any planted file runs its code.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution MCP stdio servers launched by the framework inherit the entire host environment, so untrusted server commands can read secrets such as API keys.
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Information Disclosure of Agent Instructions via /api/agents in AgentOS An unauthenticated endpoint lists agents and returns the start of their instructions, because the app registers its routes without any authentication middleware.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable Untrusted Remote Template Code Execution Remote template files are downloaded and their tools.py is executed automatically with no integrity check or user confirmation, so a malicious template runs code.
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated WebSocket Endpoint Proxies to Paid OpenAI Realtime API Without Rate Limits An unauthenticated client can open unlimited WebSocket sessions that each spend the server's OpenAI key with no message or size limits.
- PraisonAI: Hardcoded `approval_mode="auto"` in Chainlit UI Overrides Administrator Configuration, Enabling Unapproved Shell Command Execution A UI module forces auto-approval over the administrator's manual setting, so the agent runs shell commands without the required confirmation.
- PraisonAI has critical RCE via `type: job` workflow YAML A workflow YAML's run and script steps are executed directly on the host, so a malicious file runs arbitrary commands when launched.
- PraisonAI: SQLiteConversationStore didn't validate table_prefix when constructing SQL queries The table prefix from configuration is concatenated into SQL identifiers without validation, letting injected fragments read internal tables.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to OS Command Injection Workflow fields and LLM-generated tool parameters reach a shell-enabled subprocess call, so shell metacharacters run extra commands.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via YAML Deserialization in Agent Definition Loading A crafted agent YAML file uploaded through the API is parsed with an unsafe loader that evaluates embedded JavaScript functions.
- PraisonAI Has Unauthenticated SSE Event Stream that Exposes All Agent Activity in A2U Server Agent event streaming endpoints have no authentication, so anyone can open a subscription and receive live responses, reasoning and tool call arguments.
- PraisonAI has Template Injection in Agent Tool Definitions User text passed unescaped into template-rendering agent tools is evaluated as template code, so injected expressions run system commands.
- PraisonAI Has Arbitrary File Write (Zip Slip) in Templates Extraction Template archive entries with parent-directory segments are extracted without path checks, letting a malicious template overwrite files outside its folder.
- PraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory A recipe bundle whose tar archive contains parent-directory entries makes the client extract files outside the chosen output folder when pulled.
- PraisonAI Has Path Traversal in FileTools The file tool checks for parent-directory sequences only after normalisation has removed them, so the check never fires and any file is reachable.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write / Path Traversal in Action Orchestrator An action step's target path is joined to the workspace without normalisation, so a traversal sequence supplied by an agent can write files outside the workspace.
- PraisonAI recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write The registry writes uploaded bundles using a manifest-supplied name and version before validating them, so traversal sequences write files outside the registry root.
- PraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools() Tool search compiles a caller-supplied string as a regex with no limits, so nested quantifiers backtrack catastrophically and block the thread.
- PraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token() validate_token accepts any bearer token when the token store is empty, so unauthenticated callers reach every MCP tool, including agent execution.