Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-44336
PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Also involves
- Indirect Prompt Injection
- Affected
- praisonai (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Path-traversing rule names in MCP tool calls write a .pth file into site-packages, so attacker Python code runs on every later Python start. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
PraisonAI's MCP (Model Context Protocol) server (praisonai mcp serve) registers four file-handling tools by default — praisonai.rules.create, praisonai.rules.show, praisonai.rules.delete, and praisonai.workflow.show. Each accepts a path or filename string from MCP tools/call arguments and joins it onto ~/.praison/rules/ (or, for workflow.show, accepts an absolute path) with no containment check. The JSON-RPC dispatcher passes params["arguments"] blind to each handler via **kwargs without validating against the advertised input schema.
By setting rule_name="../../<some-path>" an attacker walks out of the rules directory and writes any file the running user can write. Dropping a Python .pth file into the user site-packages directory escalates this primitive to arbitrary code execution in any subsequent Python process the user spawns — the next praisonai CLI invocation, an IDE script run, the user's python REPL, or any background Python service. The same primitive is reachable from:
- An MCP-connected LLM (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue.dev, Claude Code) whose context is poisoned by attacker-controlled web content / documents / emails — no operator click required beyond ordinary "ask the LLM to summarise this page" usage.
praisonai mcp serve --transport http-streamwith no--api-key(default), reachable from any local process / DNS-rebound browser tab / container neighbour sharing loopback.- Stdio MCP from any prompt-injection vector that reaches the connected LLM.
No operator misconfiguration is required. No env var, flag, or config switch disables the vulnerable handlers.
---
Details
1. The dispatcher accepts unvalidated kwargs
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/server.py:281-298:
async def _handle_tools_call(self, params: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Handle tools/call request."""
tool_name = params.get("name")
arguments = params.get("arguments", {})
if not tool_name:
raise ValueError("Tool name required")
tool = self._tool_registry.get(tool_name)
if tool is None:
raise ValueError(f"Tool not found: {tool_name}")
# Execute tool
try:
if asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(tool.handler):
result = await tool.handler(**arguments) # ← no schema enforcement
else:
result = tool.handler(**arguments)
tool.input_schema is built reflectively from the handler signature in registry.py:320-376 and surfaced in tools/list responses — but it is never enforced before dispatch. Whatever JSON shape the MCP client (or an LLM under prompt injection) sends becomes a **kwargs call.
2. The four registered handlers have no containment
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py:
# line 116-128 — rules.create — primary write primitive
@register_tool("praisonai.rules.create")
def rules_create(rule_name: str, content: str) -> str:
"""Create a new rule."""
try:
import os
rules_dir = os.path.expanduser("~/.praison/rules")
os.makedirs(rules_dir, exist_ok=True)
rule_path = os.path.join(rules_dir, rule_name) # ← no realpath/containment
with open(rule_path, 'w') as f:
f.write(content)
return f"Rule created: {rule_name}"
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# line 102-114 — rules.show — read primitive (f-string interpolation, same vuln class)
@register_tool("praisonai.rules.show")
def rules_show(rule_name: str) -> str:
"""Show a specific rule."""
try:
import os
rule_path = os.path.expanduser(f"~/.praison/rules/{rule_name}") # ← `..` works
if not os.path.exists(rule_path):
return f"Rule not found: {rule_name}"
with open(rule_path, 'r') as f:
content = f.read()
return content
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# line 130-141 — rules.delete — delete primitive
@register_tool("praisonai.rules.delete")
def rules_delete(rule_name: str) -> str:
"""Delete a rule."""
try:
import os
rule_path = os.path.expanduser(f"~/.praison/rules/{rule_name}") # ← same pattern
if not os.path.exists(rule_path):
return f"Rule not found: {rule_name}"
os.remove(rule_path)
return f"Rule deleted: {rule_name}"
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# line 63-73 — workflow.show — absolute-path read primitive (no traversal needed)
@register_tool("praisonai.workflow.show")
def workflow_show(file_path: str) -> str:
"""Show workflow configuration."""
try:
with open(file_path, 'r') as f: # ← absolute path, no validation
content = f.read()
return content
except FileNotFoundError:
return f"File not found: {file_path}"
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
os.path.join(rules_dir, "../../somewhere") and os.path.expanduser(f"~/.praison/rules/../../somewhere") both resolve .. segments at open() time, so the on-disk effect escapes the rules directory. workflow.show does not need traversal at all — it open()s an absolute path the LLM supplied.
3. Default registration ships these unconditionally
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py:216-219 (cmd_serve):
from .adapters import register_all
register_all()
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/adapters/__init__.py:33-39:
def _register_all():
register_all_tools()
register_extended_capability_tools()
register_cli_tools() # ← rules.create / rules.show / rules.delete / workflow.show
register_mcp_resources()
register_mcp_prompts()
There is no flag, env var, or config switch that disables the file primitives. praisonai mcp serve registers them on every startup.
4. HTTP-stream transport defaults to no authentication
src/praisonai/praisonai/mcp_server/cli.py:184:
parser.add_argument("--api-key", default=None)
The auth check at mcp_server/transports/http_stream.py:191-198 is wrapped in if self.api_key: — None skips the entire block. Default config: praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream binds 127.0.0.1:8080/mcp unauthenticated.
5. Code-execution escalation via Python .pth
CPython's Lib/site.py (addsitedir / addpackage) imports lines starting with import from every .pth file present in site.getsitepackages() and site.getusersitepackages() at every interpreter startup. The user site-packages directory is always writable without elevation. A single .pth file containing import os; os.system("...") turns the path-traversal write primitive into RCE on the next Python interpreter the user starts — including the user's own python REPL, the next praisonai CLI command, IDE script launchers, and any background Python service.
---
Suggested fix
- Containment in every cli_tools handler. Replace bare
os.path.join/ f-string interpolation with explicit prefix validation:
import re
from pathlib import Path
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9._-]+", rule_name):
return "Error: invalid rule name"
rules_dir = Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.praison/rules")).resolve()
rule_path = (rules_dir / rule_name).resolve()
if not str(rule_path).startswith(str(rules_dir) + os.sep):
return "Error: rule_name escapes rules directory"
Apply identically to praisonai.rules.create, rules.show, rules.delete, workflow.validate. For workflow.show, restrict file_path to a designated workflow directory and reject absolute paths or any value containing ...
- Schema enforcement in the dispatcher. Validate
params["arguments"]againsttool.input_schema(a JSON-Schema validator such asjsonschema) beforetool.handler(**arguments). Reject unknown properties, type mismatches, missing required fields. Return JSON-RPC-32602 Invalid params.
- Reduce the default tool surface. Move
rules.*andworkflow.showbehind an explicit--enable-fs-toolsopt-in. Theregister_allhelper should only register read-only safe tools by default.
- Require auth on non-loopback HTTP-stream binds.
praisonai mcp serve --transport http-streamshould refuse to start withhost != 127.0.0.1if--api-keyis unset (mirror the gateway'sassert_external_bind_safefromsrc/praisonai/praisonai/gateway/auth.py:23-54).
---
PoC
Tested against the PraisonAI repository at HEAD as of 2026-05-02. Verified on Python 3.14 / Windows 11 with both packages installed in editable mode. Each invocation of the RCE chain produced a fresh PID for the spawned Python process — confirmed across four successive runs (PIDs 8172, 23412, 10016, 17912) — proving the payload genuinely runs in a new interpreter, not residual state.
Reproduction prerequisites
- Python ≥ 3.10 (3.14 used during verification).
- A clean clone of the PraisonAI repository: