Products / praisonai
praisonai
105 records.
- PraisonAI vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Broken AST Sandbox An inline Python step in a YAML workflow passes the AST and module checks, letting it import os and run shell commands.
- PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header The localhost-only exemption from auth trusts the request Host header, so a spoofed Host value lets remote callers invoke agents unauthenticated.
- PraisonAI: Prompt-injection defense blocks only when 3+ detector families fire simultaneously; realistic single-vector injections pass through unblocked The prompt-injection scanner blocks only when several detector families fire together, so a single-pattern override instruction passes through unblocked.
- PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF The jobs API is open unless a key variable is set, and the webhook URL is validated once then re-resolved at connection time, allowing rebinding to internal hosts.
- PraisonAI: SecurityPolicy command/path/import restrictions are completely unenforced by the default SubprocessSandbox backend The default subprocess sandbox ignores configured command, path and import restrictions, so model-driven code runs commands and reads protected files as root.
- PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source Host and file path values from a YAML config are pasted unescaped into generated Python source, so injected expressions run when the API server starts.
- PraisonAI: AICoder Arbitrary File Write and Command Execution via LLM Tool Calls Prompt injection in the chat can make the coding assistant call unvalidated file-write and shell tools, writing arbitrary paths and running attacker commands.
- PraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action The find command is allowlisted, and its -exec action runs arbitrary programs without shell metacharacters, bypassing the command filter.
- PraisonAI: MCP HTTP-stream transport is unauthenticated by default, exposing tool enumeration and an unvalidated tool-call surface
- PraisonAI: ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace
- PraisonAI: PGVector and Cassandra knowledge stores interpolate vector dimensions into DDL
- PraisonAI: Project custom command templates can read outside-workspace files into model prompts
- PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook mode accepts forged unsigned message.received events and invokes agents A public webhook endpoint accepts unsigned message events and dispatches them to agents, so anyone can forge inbound messages that trigger agent replies.
- PraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats
- PraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation
- PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing
- PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete The jobs API router has no authentication, so any reachable caller can submit, read, cancel and delete agent jobs.
- PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92) An unanchored regex lets forged WebSocket Origin headers pass the extension check, so the attacker can drive browser automation sessions.
- PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution The configured API key is never checked on the agent invocation endpoints, so unauthenticated network callers can run agents.
- PraisonAI: [Path Traversal] agent tools escape the configured workspace via symlinks Agent file and command tools check the workspace boundary with abspath, so in-workspace symlinks and relative paths let prompt-driven calls reach files outside it.
- PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret
- PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
- PraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code
- PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
- PraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced
- PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unauthenticated
- PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
- PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server
- PraisonAI MCP HTTP server has unauthenticated unbounded session accumulation (memory exhaustion; session TTL never enforced)
- PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal Agent-callable history and terminal tools join caller-supplied identifiers into file paths without rejecting absolute paths or traversal sequences, exposing files outside the storage directory.
- PraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read/Write via `multiedit` Tool Without Path Validation The multiedit tool reads and writes any path an agent supplies because it skips the traversal and workspace checks used elsewhere, so prompts can reach sensitive files.
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated RCE via Jobs API + Approval Bypass An unauthenticated job endpoint accepts workflow YAML whose top-level approve field disables the approval gate, letting the agent run dangerous shell tools.
- PraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard The deprecated Typer command starts the recipe server on any interface without attaching auth middleware, skipping the non-localhost guard.
- PraisonAI: HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools Attacker-influenced tool arguments are inserted unescaped into the HTTP approval dashboard, so a script there can approve a dangerous pending tool call.
- PraisonAI SandlockSandbox falls back to unrestricted subprocess execution when Landlock is unavailable When Landlock is unavailable, the sandbox silently runs submitted code through an unrestricted subprocess, ignoring file and network limits.
- PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml A recipe can declare a dangerous shell tool in its workflow file and self-approve it, skipping the policy check so untrusted commands run.
- PraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals Any non-bot message in the approval channel reading yes counts as approval for a pending dangerous tool call, since replies and approvers are not bound.
- PraisonAI: AgentOS remains unauthenticated after incomplete fix version and allows remote agent invocation Agent API routes accept requests without authentication, so any caller can invoke deployed agents, including tool-enabled ones, through the chat endpoint.
- PraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication Setting an environment variable to disabled makes the token verification function return early, so agent invocation requests need no credentials.
- PraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion Crafted GitHub template ref values escape the cache directory, letting the loader write files and delete arbitrary outside directories.
- PraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
- PraisonAI: Jobs API exposes agent-execution endpoints with no authentication Job submission endpoints for running agents have no authentication, so any network caller can queue agent runs that execute attacker-supplied prompts and YAML.
- PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary
- praisonai: recipe serve auth middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set
- PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
- PraisonAI A2U incomplete authentication fix leaves current serve command unauthenticated by default
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
- PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai
- PraisonAI Slack app_mention bypasses configured user/channel authorization
- PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding