INCIDENT MAP

Browse / Tool and Agent Misuse / CVE-2026-56832

PraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals

CVE-2026-56832 ยท 2026-06-18 high

Class
Tool and Agent Misuse (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
praisonai (PyPI)
Gets past
Approval or confirmation prompt
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Any non-bot message in the approval channel reading yes counts as approval for a pending dangerous tool call, since replies and approvers are not bound. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals

Summary

praisonai.bots.DiscordApproval approves a pending dangerous tool call when it
sees any later non-bot message in the configured Discord channel whose text is
classified as approval, such as yes.

The decision is not bound to:

As a result, any user who can post in the configured approval channel can
approve a pending high-risk tool call by sending yes after the approval
message appears. The same local PoV also shows that the Slack and Telegram
messaging approval backends have no explicit approver allowlist parameter, but
the primary report-grade issue is the Discord backend's unthreaded channel
cross-talk: the approving message does not need to be a reply or otherwise
request-bound.

Affected Product

Suggested affected range:

pip:praisonai >= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.58

Representative local sweep:

4.5.0    Discord approval backend not present
4.5.2    vulnerable
4.5.128  vulnerable
4.6.9    vulnerable
4.6.10   vulnerable
4.6.56   vulnerable
4.6.57   vulnerable
4.6.58   vulnerable

Root Cause

DiscordApproval.request_approval() posts an approval message to the configured
channel and records the returned message id.

_poll_for_response() then polls channel history with:

f"/channels/{channel_id}/messages?after={message_id}&limit=10"

For each later non-bot message, it reads content, classifies the text, and
returns ApprovalDecision(approved=True) when the text is approve/yes.
There is no check that the message is a Discord reply to the approval message,
belongs to a request-specific thread, came from an intended approver, or
contains a request-specific approval token.

Important source evidence from origin/main:

The Slack and Telegram backends are better request-scoped than Discord:

However, both still lack an explicit approver identity parameter. They are
included in the PoV and suggested fix because the authorization model should be
consistent across all messaging approval backends.

Local PoV

Run against the latest local checkout:

python3 poc/pov_prai_cand_029_messaging_approval_channel_member_bypass.py \
  --repo ../../artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \
  --json

The PoV is local-only. It mocks Slack, Telegram, and Discord API helpers
in-process and does not contact those services.

For Discord, the mock sequence is:

Observed output from evidence/pov-v4.6.58.json:

{
  "approval_from_unconfigured_channel_participant": {
    "discord": true,
    "slack": true,
    "telegram": true
  },
  "backends": [
    {
      "backend": "discord",
      "configured_channel_id": "D_APPROVAL_CHANNEL",
      "decision_approved": true,
      "decision_approver": "D_INTRUDER",
      "decision_reason": "Approved via Discord by intruder",
      "intruder_user": "D_INTRUDER"
    }
  ],
  "no_explicit_approver_allowlist_parameters": true,
  "vulnerable": true
}

The command in the approval request is a harmless local sentinel:
touch /tmp/prai-cand-029. The PoV stops at the approval decision; it does not
execute the tool.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

This report does not claim that a deliberately private approval channel with
only trusted approvers is unsafe by itself. The narrower issue is that the
Discord backend treats an unrelated later channel message as the approval
decision for a specific dangerous tool request.

PraisonAI's approval documentation describes approval as a safety control that
pauses before dangerous tools and asks a human or channel to allow or deny the
specific request. A random later yes in the channel is not evidence that an
intended approver reviewed that request.

The existing Slack and Telegram implementations already show request-binding
patterns that Discord lacks:

The Discord backend should provide at least the same request binding and should
also support explicit approver identity checks for deployments where channel
membership is broader than approval authority.

Impact

If an application uses DiscordApproval for dangerous tools such as shell
commands, file writes, deletes, deployments, or other privileged operations, a
low-privileged Discord user with write access to the configured approval channel
can approve pending dangerous tool executions.

This can lead to code execution, file modification, deployment changes, or data
access with the privileges of the PraisonAI process, depending on which tools
the agent exposes behind approval.

The attacker does not need the LLM API key, shell access, repository access, or
PraisonAI process access. They only need to be able to post an approval-looking
message in the configured approval channel after the approval prompt appears.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

Remediation

Recommended fixes:

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.