Browse / Tool and Agent Misuse / Code and command execution
Code and command execution
30 records in Tool and Agent Misuse.
- AG2: Newline injection in SandboxShellTool bypasses allowed=[...] and readonly=True, enabling arbitrary command execution An embedded newline lets a command pass the allowlist and read-only checks, because the shell runs the second line as a separate command.
- PraisonAI vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Broken AST Sandbox An inline Python step in a YAML workflow passes the AST and module checks, letting it import os and run shell commands.
- PraisonAI: SecurityPolicy command/path/import restrictions are completely unenforced by the default SubprocessSandbox backend The default subprocess sandbox ignores configured command, path and import restrictions, so model-driven code runs commands and reads protected files as root.
- PraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action The find command is allowlisted, and its -exec action runs arbitrary programs without shell metacharacters, bypassing the command filter.
- PraisonAI: CodeAgent Executes LLM-Generated Code Without Sandboxing and Leaks All Environment Secrets An agent runs model-generated Python in a subprocess with the full environment and no validation, so injected instructions can run code and read secrets even when sandboxing is enabled.
- PraisonAI: SkillTools Executes Scripts Without Path Containment Validation The script-running tool executes any file path the model supplies with no containment check, and its approval requirement can be disabled through configuration.
- Langflow: PythonREPLComponent executes unsandboxed Python code, enabling authenticated RCE and privilege escalation The Python interpreter components run user or model code in-process without effective sandboxing, so builtins give attackers full host and privilege access.
- Flowise: RCE via CSVAgent csvFile data URI base64 segment is interpolated into Python source without validation Unvalidated CSV file data is spliced into Python code run by an agent sandbox, so a crafted value escapes into Node and runs commands.
- Flowise: CSV Agent Remote Code Execution via Pyodide Code Injection — Root Shell Verified
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated RCE via Jobs API + Approval Bypass An unauthenticated job endpoint accepts workflow YAML whose top-level approve field disables the approval gate, letting the agent run dangerous shell tools.
- PraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml A recipe can declare a dangerous shell tool in its workflow file and self-approve it, skipping the policy check so untrusted commands run.
- MLflow: Improper Origin Validation in MLflow Assistant /ajax-api Endpoints Enables Browser-Mediated Local Command Execution A malicious webpage can send cross-origin requests to MLflow Assistant's local endpoints, change its settings, and then have a Claude Code sub-agent run commands.
- GitHub Copilot CLI: Nested Bare Repository Can Execute Arbitrary Commands via core.fsmonitor A nested bare git repository in a project sets executable config keys, so when the agent runs ordinary git commands it executes attacker commands without asking the user.
- Flowise: CSV Agent Prompt Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability The CSV agent runs Python scripts generated by the LLM without sandboxing, so a crafted prompt makes the server execute attacker-chosen code without authentication.
- AgentScope Vulnerable to Remote Code Injection Agent tool functions for executing Python code and shell commands accept injected input, letting a remote caller run arbitrary code.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to OS Command Injection Workflow fields and LLM-generated tool parameters reach a shell-enabled subprocess call, so shell metacharacters run extra commands.
- Langflow has Authenticated Code Execution in Agentic Assistant Validation
- Ray is vulnerable to Critical RCE via Safari & Firefox Browsers through DNS Rebinding Attack
- n8n: Execute Command Node Allows Authenticated Users to Run Arbitrary Commands on Host Any user who can build workflows can run arbitrary shell commands on the host through the Execute Command node when it is enabled.
- Claude Code can execute commands prior to the startup trust dialog Project code ran at startup before the user accepted the trust dialog when Claude Code was opened in an untrusted directory.
- Claude Code Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via Plugin Autoloading with Specific Yarn Versions Claude Code runs yarn --version in untrusted directories, and malicious Yarn config can execute code before the trust dialog is shown.
- Langflow vulnerable to remote code execution Langflow components run user-supplied code directly on the host rather than in a sandbox, allowing arbitrary command execution.
- LangChain Experimental Eval Injection vulnerability
- langchain-experimental vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution Prompts that steer the SQL chain cause database return values to be passed to eval, so attacker-chosen Python runs on the server.
- RunGptLLM class in LlamaIndex has a command injection
- llama-index-core Command Injection vulnerability
- Code execution in Embedchain
- LangChain vulnerable to arbitrary code execution
- LangChain vulnerable to arbitrary code execution
- langchain Code Injection vulnerability