Products / praisonaiagents
praisonaiagents
50 records.
- PraisonAI: Human-in-the-loop tool approval is cached by tool name and silently reused for all subsequent calls with arbitrary arguments Approval granted once for a tool name is cached and reused for every later call with any arguments, so later file writes skip review.
- PraisonAI: CodeAgent Executes LLM-Generated Code Without Sandboxing and Leaks All Environment Secrets An agent runs model-generated Python in a subprocess with the full environment and no validation, so injected instructions can run code and read secrets even when sandboxing is enabled.
- PraisonAI: Unsafe Dynamic Module Loading Leads to Arbitrary Code Execution via tools.py in AgentFlow A workflow directory containing a malicious tools.py is imported and executed without sandboxing when a step resolves a structured output type, ignoring the tool allow setting.
- PraisonAI: FastContext path resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace Agent file-search tools accept absolute and traversal paths without confining them to the workspace, so model-driven calls read files outside the project.
- PraisonAI: SkillTools Executes Scripts Without Path Containment Validation The script-running tool executes any file path the model supplies with no containment check, and its approval requirement can be disabled through configuration.
- PraisonAI: Plugin Auto-Discovery Executes Arbitrary Python Files Without Verification
- PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypass in `web_crawl` SSRF protection allows internal response disclosure
- PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root
- PraisonAI: Crawl4AI/Chromium backend is also affected by the `web_crawl` SSRF validation bypass The crawl4ai browser backend re-resolves DNS and follows redirects without the per-connection SSRF guard, letting requests reach internal addresses.
- PraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code
- praisonaiagents web_crawl vulnerable to SSRF via redirect-following The agent's web crawl tool checks only the initial URL, then follows attacker-supplied redirects to internal addresses and returns their contents to the model.
- praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route AgentServer stores an auth_token setting but no route checks it, so unauthenticated clients can reach every endpoint.
- praisonaiagents has a `web_crawl` SSRF protection bypass via unchecked redirect targets The crawler checks only the first URL, then follows redirects unchecked, letting a public address send requests to internal or metadata endpoints.
- praisonaiagents: ast_grep_rewrite rewrites arbitrary files without the @require_approval gate enforced on every sibling mutation tool An AI-callable rewrite tool omits the approval decorator used by sibling file-changing tools, so the model can rewrite files without confirmation.
- praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location
- praisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)
- praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`)
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated RCE via Jobs API + Approval Bypass An unauthenticated job endpoint accepts workflow YAML whose top-level approve field disables the approval gate, letting the agent run dangerous shell tools.
- PraisonAI ToolsMCPServer legacy SSE transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools
- PraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read via `@file:` Mention Path Traversal Prompt-level @file mentions fall back to unchecked absolute paths, letting an attacker read any file the agent process can access.
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Event Injection via SSE `/publish` Endpoint An unauthenticated endpoint accepts arbitrary messages and broadcasts them to all SSE clients, and an info endpoint exposes server configuration even though an auth token is defined.
- PraisonAI: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in SearxNG / search_web tools via attacker-controlled searxng_url parameter Instructions in fetched web or file content can steer the agent's search tool to attacker-chosen internal URLs, whose responses are returned.
- PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass Redirects are followed without validating the target, so a public URL can redirect the scraper to internal or metadata addresses.
- PraisonAI: IMAP Command Injection via Unsanitized Email Search Parameters Model-supplied search arguments are concatenated into IMAP SEARCH strings, so quote characters let an attacker add commands that read or alter other mail folders.
- PraisonAI: execute_code sandbox bypass: str.format C-level attribute access reads every blocklisted dunder
- praisonaiagents: SSRF guard validates literal IPs only and never resolves DNS
- PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in
- PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpoints
- PraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode) The AST filter for agent Python execution misses an attribute on built-in functions, letting code reach the builtins module and run OS commands.
- PraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings
- PraisonAI CLI automatically resolves @url mentions in prompt text and can read loopback URLs into model context
- PraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute
- PraisonAI has an SSRF bypass
- PraisonAI: SQL Injection via unvalidated `table_prefix` in 9 conversation store backends (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-40315)
- PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions An unauthenticated WebSocket client that omits the Origin header can register as a controller and drive automation sessions on other connected browser extensions.
- PraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import
- PraisonAI has critical RCE via `type: job` workflow YAML
- PraisonAIAgents: Path Traversal via Unvalidated Glob Pattern in list_files Bypasses Workspace Boundary An agent file-listing tool validates the directory but not the glob pattern, so `..` segments reveal metadata for files outside the workspace.
- PraisonAIAgents has SSRF and Local File Read via Unvalidated URLs in web_crawl Tool The web_crawl agent tool fetches any supplied URL without validation, so injected content can make the agent reach internal hosts or local files.
- PraisonAI: Coarse-Grained Tool Approval Cache Bypasses Per-Invocation Consent for Shell Commands
- PraisonAIAgents: Arbitrary File Read via read_skill_file Missing Workspace Boundary and Approval Gate
- PraisonAIAgents: SSRF via unvalidated URL in `web_crawl` httpx fallback
- PraisonAIAgents has an OS Command Injection via shell=True in Memory Hooks Executor (memory/hooks.py)
- PraisonAIAgents: Environment Variable Secret Exfiltration via os.path.expandvars() Bypassing shell=False in Shell Tool
- PraisonAI: Cross-Origin Agent Execution via Hardcoded Wildcard CORS and Missing Authentication on AGUI Endpoint
- PraisonAI has Memory State Leakage and Path Traversal in MultiAgent Context Handling The monitor builds file paths from agent ids without removing traversal sequences, and agents sharing an id also share one ledger, leaking context between them.
- PraisonAI has sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)
- PraisonAI Has SSRF in FileTools.download_file() via Unvalidated URL An agent file download tool passes an arbitrary URL to an HTTP client that follows redirects, so requests can reach internal metadata services and hosts.
- PraisonAI: Python Sandbox Escape via str Subclass startswith() Override in execute_code A str subclass overriding startswith defeats the underscore guard, letting attacker-supplied Python reach subprocess functions and run OS commands.
- PraisonAI: Shell Injection in run_python() via Unescaped $() Substitution