Browse / Improper Output Handling / CVE-2026-57130
PraisonAI: IMAP Command Injection via Unsanitized Email Search Parameters
- Class
- Improper Output Handling (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- SQL and query injection
- Also involves
- Tool and Agent Misuse
- Affected
- praisonaiagents (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Model-supplied search arguments are concatenated into IMAP SEARCH strings, so quote characters let an attacker add commands that read or alter other mail folders. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The email search tool in src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the search_emails or reply_email tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations.
## Details
Vulnerable code (lines 493–502):
criteria = []
if from_addr:
criteria.append(f'FROM "{from_addr}"')
if subject:
criteria.append(f'SUBJECT "{subject}"')
if query:
criteria.append(f'TEXT "{query}"')
if not criteria:
criteria.append("ALL")
search_str = " ".join(criteria)
status, data = mail.search(None, search_str)
The from_addr, subject, and query parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the search_emails public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (") characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context.
Additional injection points:
- Line 416: mail.search(None, f'HEADER Message-ID "{search_id}"')
- Line 447: Same pattern in _smtp_reply_email
- Line 542: Same pattern in _smtp_archive_email
The search_id / message_id parameter in these functions is also LLM-controlled via the reply_email and archive_email public tool functions.
Reachability: The search_emails, reply_email, and archive_email functions are exposed as agent tools. They are reachable when an agent is configured with email tools (EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD environment variables set). This is a documented deployment scenario for email-capable agents.
PoC
Setup: Requires an IMAP server (not run here — this is a static proof). The vulnerability is demonstrated by tracing the data flow.
Positive trigger — IMAP injection via search_emails:
An LLM agent processing a crafted prompt calls:
search_emails(from_addr='user@example.com" LOGOUT')
This produces the IMAP command:
SEARCH FROM "user@example.com" LOGOUT"
The LOGOUT command is injected after the prematurely closed quoted string, causing the IMAP connection to be terminated.
More severe injection — exfiltrate emails from another folder:
search_emails(query='" SEARCH RETURN (MIN) ALL')
Produces: TEXT "" SEARCH RETURN (MIN) ALL" — injects a secondary SEARCH command.
Negative control — legitimate search:
search_emails(from_addr='user@example.com')
Produces: FROM "user@example.com" — correct, no injection.
Cleanup: No persistent changes for read-only injection. For destructive injection (DELETE, EXPUNGE), impact persists.
Impact
An attacker who can craft prompts that cause an LLM agent to call search_emails with injection payloads can:
- Terminate IMAP connections (denial of service)
- Inject arbitrary IMAP commands — including LIST (enumerate folders), SELECT (switch folders), FETCH (read emails from other mailboxes), STORE (modify flags), COPY/MOVE (move emails), DELETE/EXPUNGE (permanently delete emails)
- Exfiltrate email contents from folders the user did not intend to expose to the agent
- Permanently delete emails via injected DELETE + EXPUNGE commands
The attack requires the IMAP backend to be configured (EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD env vars), which is a documented and common deployment for email-capable agents.
Suggested remediation
- Escape double-quote characters in IMAP parameters. Per RFC 3501, literal strings use
{n}\r\nformat or quoted strings with\escaping:
def _escape_imap_string(s: str) -> str:
"""Escape a string for safe use in IMAP quoted strings."""
# Use IMAP literal syntax for safety: {length}\r\n<data>
encoded = s.encode('utf-8')
return f'{{{len(encoded)}}}\r\n{encoded}'
- Use IMAP literal syntax (
{n}\r\ndata) instead of quoted strings for all user-controlled parameters. This prevents any injection regardless of content.
- Apply the escaping to all IMAP search criteria parameters:
from_addr,subject,query, andsearch_id/message_id.
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-c969-5x3p-vq3v
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.