Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-57123
PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- praisonaiagents (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 0.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The MCP SSE server listens on all interfaces with no authentication or origin checks, so any reachable host can call every registered tool. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
The MCP SSE server started via ToolsMCPServer.run_sse() / launch_tools_mcp_server(transport="sse")
binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and builds its Starlette application with no authentication middleware
and no Origin-header validation. The module mcp/mcp_security.py provides exactly the needed controls
(origin validation, DNS-rebinding detection, auth-header enforcement, a SecurityConfig), but none of
these functions are ever called by any transport — they are dead code. Any host that can reach the
port can list and invoke every registered tool with no credentials, and a victim's browser can drive
the same calls against a localhost instance via DNS rebinding.
Affected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_server.py
- run_sse defaults host to all interfaces (line 245) and builds the app with only debug and routes
- no middleware= and no per-route auth/origin gate (lines ~271-289):
app = Starlette(debug=self._debug, routes=[
Route(sse_path, endpoint=handle_sse), # "/sse"
Mount(messages_path, app=sse_transport.handle_post_message), # "/messages/"
])
uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port)
- launch_tools_mcp_server also defaults host="0.0.0.0" (line 301).
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_security.py defines but the transports never call:
- is_valid_origin (line 30), is_potential_dns_rebinding (line 110), validate_auth_header (line 167),
SecurityConfig.is_origin_allowed (line 236). These symbols are referenced only inside mcp_security.py
and the __init__ re-export. (mcp_websocket.py's auth references are CLIENT-side, not server validation.)
Impact:
launch_tools_mcp_server(transport="sse") is the documented path for exposing tools over MCP. With the
defaults above it is an unauthenticated, network-reachable tool-execution endpoint. Blast radius equals
the capabilities of the registered tools; with file/shell/code-exec tools this is RCE. With no Origin
check, a malicious page the victim merely visits can rebind its hostname to 127.0.0.1 and issue the
JSON-RPC calls cross-origin against a developer's local server.
Proof of concept:
Static proof (AST analysis of unmodified source):
Check 1 - run_sse(host='0.0.0.0'); launch_tools_mcp_server(host='0.0.0.0') -> EXPOSED
Check 2 - Starlette(...) kwargs: ['debug','routes'] -> NO middleware= (no auth/origin gate)
Check 3 - is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding / validate_auth_header / SecurityConfig
never called by any transport -> DEAD CODE
Live exploitation against a running server:
curl -N http://VICTIM:8080/sse
# event: endpoint / data: /messages/?session_id=<sid>
curl -X POST "http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=<sid>" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05",
"capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"x","version":"1"}}}'
curl -X POST "http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=<sid>" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"<tool>","arguments":{...}}}'
No Authorization header anywhere. Browser DNS-rebinding variant drives the same calls cross-origin.
Remediation:
Wire in the existing mcp_security.py controls and fix defaults:
- Default run_sse(host="127.0.0.1"); require explicit opt-in to bind 0.0.0.0.
- Attach Starlette middleware calling is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding; reject bad origins.
- Enforce validate_auth_header when SecurityConfig.require_auth; default require_auth=True (and
allow_missing_origin=False) for any non-loopback bind.
Distinct from prior advisories:
The accepted MCP advisories are tool-handler bugs — tools/call path traversal -> .pth RCE
(GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw) and unauthenticated file read via workflow.show/validate (GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj).
This is a transport-layer missing-auth/exposure: the SSE server never enforces auth or Origin validation
and ignores the security module the codebase ships. Closest in spirit to the default-insecure pattern
(GHSA-8444 / 86qc) but a different server and a different root cause (unwired controls, not an unset env var).
References
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x227-pf99-vffg
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.