Products / open-webui
open-webui
165 records.
- Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion Deleting a knowledge base also deletes its shared admin-owned vector connection without checking the caller's role or other dependent bases.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch The internal-address screen treats the Azure platform channel address as public, so authenticated users can reach it through URL fetches.
- Open WebUI: Unauthenticated requests can stall the server via uncached OIDC fetches in back-channel logout An unauthenticated back-channel logout request triggers uncached, blocking OIDC discovery and key fetches on the event loop, so repeated requests stall the server.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions The chat-completions endpoint saves new chats into a folder named in the request without checking the caller's write permission on that folder.
- Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange The token exchange endpoint skips the email domain allowlist, so users removed from allowed domains still receive working sessions.
- Open WebUI: SSRF into internal services via DNS rebinding in the Playwright web loader The URL check resolves the hostname once but the Playwright browser resolves it again, so a DNS answer that changes between lookups reaches internal addresses.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can start a non-terminating request via a folder parent cycle Re-parenting a folder beneath its own descendant creates a cycle, and the tree walk never tracks visited nodes, so the request never terminates.
- Open WebUI: Channel members can overwrite another member's message via the chat completions endpoint A channel member can rewrite another member's message through the chat completions path, which skips the authorship check that the dedicated edit route applies.
- Open WebUI: Same-origin XSS to account takeover via terminal port-preview iframe hardcoding allow-same-origin A terminal port preview iframe keeps same-origin access, so script served from a previewed port runs in the app origin and steals sessions.
- Open WebUI: A user's session cookies are sent to tool servers configured for bearer authentication A tool call to a bearer-authenticated server can carry the user's session cookies because a shared callable reads a cookie jar built for a different connection.
- Open WebUI: Inaccessible knowledge bases are exposed through the built-in knowledge tool on most vector backends Several vector backends ignore the access filter on search, so the knowledge tool returns matches from knowledge bases the caller cannot read.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can suppress calendar alerts instance-wide via a non-numeric alert value A user stores a non-numeric alert value in calendar event metadata, which breaks the shared scheduler pass for every user.
- Open WebUI: Admin demoted through SSO role sync keeps read and write access to all users' notes Demoting a user through SSO role sync does not close their open Socket.IO connection, so cached admin rights keep working on all users' notes.
- Open WebUI: Sign-in as another user via wildcard characters in the OAuth subject claim on SQLite On SQLite, identity lookup uses substring matching, so a subject containing wildcard characters can sign in as another account, possibly an admin.
- Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange Token exchange issues sessions without re-running role management, so users whose provider role was revoked keep their previous access level.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree A chat whose messages reference each other as children makes the message-deletion walk loop forever, blocking the server's event loop.
- Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets Redirect targets from server-side page fetches skip the blocked-host and private-address checks, so authenticated users can reach internal services.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history A chat history whose messages reference each other in a cycle without ids makes the server's walk loop forever, blocking all users.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can stall a worker via a knowledge-search pattern that backtracks catastrophically A chat user can get the model to run a catastrophic-backtracking regex against knowledge files, and no timeout stops it from pinning a worker.
- Open WebUI: A folder write-collaborator can permanently delete the owner's chats by deleting a shared subfolder Write access on a shared subfolder lets a collaborator delete the owner's chats, because the delete handler checks write access rather than ownership.
- Open WebUI: Tool source code disclosed to read-only users via the tool list and get endpoints Read endpoints for shared tools return the full Python source to non-writer users, exposing any credentials or internal URLs embedded in the code.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can cancel another user's chat generation via the chat delete endpoint The chat delete endpoint cancels another user's in-flight generation tasks before checking whether the caller may delete that chat.
- Open WebUI: Same-origin XSS to account takeover via terminal file-preview iframe hardcoding allow-same-origin Terminal-served HTML previews run in an iframe that grants same-origin access, so scripts in the file run in the app origin and can read the session token.
- Open WebUI: Unapproved accounts can open terminal sessions via a WebSocket auth path missing the role check The terminal WebSocket authenticates its own token and skips the verified-user role check, so pending accounts can open shell sessions.
- Open WebUI: Cross-user file content disclosure via request-scoped direct model knowledge metadata Knowledge attached to an inline model skips the access check, so an authenticated user who knows another user's file ID can retrieve its indexed content.
- Open WebUI: Instance-wide stall via automation recurrence rules that force multi-second parsing Minutely recurrence rules force the parser to enumerate decades of occurrences synchronously on the event loop, stalling the server for every user.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach internal services and cloud metadata via NAT64-encoded URLs A NAT64-wrapped IPv4 literal passes a globally-routable check that only inspects the IPv6 form, letting the server fetch internal and metadata endpoints.
- Open WebUI: Users denied the image-generation permission can still generate images via chat completions Chat completion requests can include an image feature flag that the server honours without rechecking the user's revoked permission, so generation still runs.
- Open WebUI: DNS Rebinding SSRF Bypass URL validation resolves a hostname once, but the HTTP client resolves it again at connect time, so attacker DNS can rebind requests to internal addresses.
- Open WebUI: Deletion of directories and file embeddings in other knowledge bases via sync cleanup A user with write access to one knowledge base can delete directories and embeddings in other knowledge bases because object ids are never checked for ownership.
- Open WebUI: Any member with write access to a standard channel can edit or delete other members' messages On standard channels, the message update and delete handlers never checked authorship, so any member with write access could change or delete others' messages.
- Open WebUI: Stored XSS via unescaped KaTeX render-error fallback in rendered messages Math source in a message is inserted as HTML when KaTeX fails, so a stored message can run script in viewers' browsers.
- Open WebUI: Client-side SSRF via unrestricted external resource loading in Vega/Vega-Lite chart rendering Vega chart blocks in chat content are rendered by the viewer's browser with unrestricted loading, so attacker-chosen GET requests can be sent and responses read back.
- Open WebUI: Account takeover via OAuth token exchange accepting tokens issued to any client The OAuth token exchange accepts provider access tokens issued to other client applications, so tokens from unrelated apps can mint sessions for victims.
- Open WebUI: SSRF into internal services via unvalidated sub-resource requests in the Playwright web loader Address validation runs only on the top-level page, so JavaScript in the loaded page can fetch internal addresses that are then returned to the user.
- Open WebUI: Model meta.knowledge read-only file access can be upgraded to file write/delete A model's knowledge-file metadata lets a read-only grant satisfy later write and delete checks, because an earlier fix validated only read access.
- Open WebUI: Cross-user model-list exposure via static cache key in get_all_models (aiocache key= vs key_builder= misuse) A misused cache key stores per-user permission-filtered model lists under one shared key, so a different user can receive them within the TTL.
- Open WebUI: Stored web worker XSS via Pyodide A chat message carrying Python code runs in a same-origin worker when a victim clicks Run, letting it make authenticated requests as that user.
- Open WebUI: Private channel messages can be disclosed through cross-channel thread parent_id binding A low-privilege user requests a thread in an accessible channel and supplies a message id from a private channel as the root, so the parent message is returned without a channel membership check.
- Open WebUI: Cross-user code-interpreter and tool execution via unvalidated Socket.IO event-caller session_id A user supplies another user's socket session id, so code and tool calls run in the victim's session and can reach admin-only server-side function execution.
- Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add files to KB) An upload carrying a knowledge base ID is linked to that knowledge base before the write-permission check runs, letting read-only users add files.
- Open WebUI: Account enumeration via observable login timing discrepancy Login responses are slower for registered emails because password hashing runs only for existing accounts, revealing which addresses are registered.
- Open WebUI: Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout Realtime socket and terminal endpoints check only JWT signature and expiry, not the revocation store, so signed-out tokens can still connect.
- Open WebUI: ReDoS in skill-mention regexes causes whole-instance DoS on default config Skill-mention regexes backtrack quadratically on a long input with an unclosed tag, blocking the single worker's event loop.
- open-webui terminal proxy path traversal guard bypass via 9x encoded traversal Traversal sequences encoded nine times survive the proxy's limited decoding loop, so requests reach terminal server paths outside the permitted proxy prefix.
- Open WebUI: /api/v1/channels/{id}/members exposes full user model including sensitive credentials The channel members endpoint returns full user records, so any channel member can read other users' settings including tool server keys and webhook URLs.
- Open WebUI: Unauthenticated WebSocket Access to Collaborative Document Handlers (ydoc:awareness:update, ydoc:document:leave) Socket.IO accepts unauthenticated connections, and two collaborative document handlers perform no session or membership checks.
- Open WebUI: Terminal proxy forwards a spoofable, integrity-unbound user identity to the upstream (X-User-Id header and ws_terminal session_id query injection) The terminal proxy forwards an unsigned user ID header and lets injected query characters in session_id override the user identity sent upstream.
- Open WebUI: Arena task endpoints can bypass underlying model access controls Arena task routes call the generator directly, so the access check on a restricted submodel is skipped once the wrapper is authorised.
- Open WebUI: Scheduled automations continue after pending-user deactivation and stored model ACL revocation Scheduled automations keep running for deactivated pending accounts because the scheduler skips owner status checks and model access logic mishandles that role.