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Open WebUI: Private channel messages can be disclosed through cross-channel thread parent_id binding

CVE-2026-59215 · 2026-07-24 low

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Information exposure
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
Gets past
Authorisation check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A low-privilege user requests a thread in an accessible channel and supplies a message id from a private channel as the root, so the parent message is returned without a channel membership check. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

A normal authenticated user can read the content of a message in a private channel they do not belong to. GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{message_id}/thread authorizes the caller against the URL channel, but the underlying thread lookup loads the thread *parent* by id and returns it without verifying the parent belongs to that channel. By requesting a thread in a channel they can access while supplying a victim channel's message id as the thread root, the attacker receives the victim message — content, channel id, and author.

Affected component

Root cause

get_messages_by_parent_id(channel_id, parent_id) filters the thread *replies* by channel_id, but loads the thread *parent* by id alone and appends it without requiring parent.channel_id == channel_id:

message = await db.get(Message, parent_id)     # loaded by id only — no channel binding
if not message:
    return []
# replies are filtered by channel_id ...
if len(all_messages) < limit:
    all_messages.append(message)               # parent appended unconditionally

get_channel_thread_messages() authorizes only the URL channel, then calls get_messages_by_parent_id(id, message_id) with the caller-supplied message_id. The reply insert path (new_message_handler → insert_new_message) also stored a caller-supplied parent_id without binding it to the channel.

Impact

A non-member can disclose the content (plus channel id and author metadata) of a private-channel message whose id they know or obtain. Direct reads of the victim channel/message/thread return 403; the disclosure is via the thread parent of a channel the attacker can access. Read-only, one message per known id.

Proof of Concept

(reporter) Validated on v0.9.6: GET /channels/{attacker_channel}/messages/{victim_message_id}/thread returned the victim's private message — content, victim channel id, and author — although direct reads of the victim channel returned 403.

Fix

Bind the thread parent to the requested channel: get_messages_by_parent_id returns [] unless the parent exists and parent.channel_id == channel_id. Defence-in-depth on the write path: new_message_handler rejects a supplied parent_id/reply_to_id whose message does not belong to the URL channel.

Affected / Patched

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.