Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-59215
Open WebUI: Private channel messages can be disclosed through cross-channel thread parent_id binding
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Information exposure
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Authorisation check
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
A low-privilege user requests a thread in an accessible channel and supplies a message id from a private channel as the root, so the parent message is returned without a channel membership check. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
A normal authenticated user can read the content of a message in a private channel they do not belong to. GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/messages/{message_id}/thread authorizes the caller against the URL channel, but the underlying thread lookup loads the thread *parent* by id and returns it without verifying the parent belongs to that channel. By requesting a thread in a channel they can access while supplying a victim channel's message id as the thread root, the attacker receives the victim message — content, channel id, and author.
Affected component
backend/open_webui/models/messages.py—get_messages_by_parent_id()backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py—get_channel_thread_messages()(read),new_message_handler()(parent/reply binding on write)
Root cause
get_messages_by_parent_id(channel_id, parent_id) filters the thread *replies* by channel_id, but loads the thread *parent* by id alone and appends it without requiring parent.channel_id == channel_id:
message = await db.get(Message, parent_id) # loaded by id only — no channel binding
if not message:
return []
# replies are filtered by channel_id ...
if len(all_messages) < limit:
all_messages.append(message) # parent appended unconditionally
get_channel_thread_messages() authorizes only the URL channel, then calls get_messages_by_parent_id(id, message_id) with the caller-supplied message_id. The reply insert path (new_message_handler → insert_new_message) also stored a caller-supplied parent_id without binding it to the channel.
Impact
A non-member can disclose the content (plus channel id and author metadata) of a private-channel message whose id they know or obtain. Direct reads of the victim channel/message/thread return 403; the disclosure is via the thread parent of a channel the attacker can access. Read-only, one message per known id.
Proof of Concept
(reporter) Validated on v0.9.6: GET /channels/{attacker_channel}/messages/{victim_message_id}/thread returned the victim's private message — content, victim channel id, and author — although direct reads of the victim channel returned 403.
Fix
Bind the thread parent to the requested channel: get_messages_by_parent_id returns [] unless the parent exists and parent.channel_id == channel_id. Defence-in-depth on the write path: new_message_handler rejects a supplied parent_id/reply_to_id whose message does not belong to the URL channel.
Affected / Patched
- Affected:
< 0.10.0(last affected release 0.9.6) - Patched: v0.10.0 (PR #25766).
get_messages_by_parent_idbinds the thread parent to the requested channel (returns[]unlessparent.channel_id == channel_id), andnew_message_handlerrejects a caller-suppliedparent_id/reply_to_idwhose message does not belong to the channel.
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-73x5-h92w-xc2j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59215
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/25766
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/a66477b7104c5d141ce7bffaea424b43e7666ef1
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.