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Open WebUI: Account enumeration via observable login timing discrepancy

CVE-2026-59218 ยท 2026-07-24 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Information exposure
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Login responses are slower for registered emails because password hashing runs only for existing accounts, revealing which addresses are registered. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint leaked whether an email address belonged to a registered account through a response-time side channel. Password verification ran bcrypt only when the email was found in the database; for a non-existent email the request returned early without hashing. The expensive bcrypt comparison therefore made valid-account attempts respond significantly slower (~180 ms) than non-existent ones (~5 ms), so an unauthenticated attacker could enumerate valid accounts by measuring response time.

Details

On signin the backend looked the user up by email and only performed the bcrypt password comparison if a record existed. A missing email short-circuited before any hashing, producing the timing gap. The built-in brute-force throttling did not prevent it: sending one request at a time with a small delay between requests stays under the rate limit while still exposing the difference.

Observed in the reporter's run (HTTP 400 for every attempt, the response time is the signal):

Email                Status   Response time
joe@example.com      400      186 ms   <- valid account
larry@example.com    400        9 ms
jose@example.com     400        6 ms
james@example.com    400        5 ms

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate which email addresses are registered accounts, which enables targeted password-spraying against confirmed accounts. The impact is amplified by MFA not being enabled by default. No data is read or modified; the disclosure is limited to account existence.

Patched

The authentication path now runs a bcrypt verification against a constant placeholder hash whenever the email does not resolve to an active credential, so a real hash comparison executes on every attempt and the response time is the same whether or not the account exists. Fixed in 0.10.0.

Credits

@dievus

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.