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Open WebUI: Terminal proxy forwards a spoofable, integrity-unbound user identity to the upstream (X-User-Id header and ws_terminal session_id query injection)

CVE-2026-59224 · 2026-07-24 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The terminal proxy forwards an unsigned user ID header and lets injected query characters in session_id override the user identity sent upstream. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The terminal proxy in backend/open_webui/routers/terminals.py forwards the Open WebUI user's identity to the upstream terminal server / backend coordinator as an authorization claim, with no cryptographic binding to the session that produced it. The forwarded identity is attacker-influenceable on both proxy paths:

   upstream_url = f'{ws_base}/p/{policy_id}/api/terminals/{session_id}'
   upstream_url += f'?{urllib.parse.urlencode({"user_id": user.id})}'
   

session_id is neither validated nor URL-encoded (the HTTP sibling runs _sanitize_proxy_path; this path runs nothing). An encoded ?/& smuggled through session_id survives Open WebUI's single decode and is re-decoded by the upstream, injecting an attacker-chosen user_id ahead of the appended one. Query parsing binds the first occurrence, so the backend coordinator resolves the spoofed user's terminal scope.

Technical Details

The forwarded terminal identity is a bearer-style authorization claim with no integrity binding, and on the WebSocket path it is additionally injectable because session_id is concatenated into the URL without encoding or delimiter validation.

Impact

A normal authenticated user can make the terminal proxy present another user's identity to the upstream backend coordinator. On backend coordinator-backed (policy_id) servers that scope terminal containers by user_id, this reaches another user's terminal scope; combined with a known active session ID (for example a chat-scoped session ID surfaced through a shared chat), it allows attaching to that user's live PTY. The HTTP-path variant additionally allows identity spoofing at the upstream tier for any deployment whose upstream trusts X-User-Id.

Appendix: Affected code

Appendix: Consolidation

Per the Report Handling policy, this consolidates independent reports of the same root cause (the forwarded terminal identity is spoofable / not integrity-bound) into the earliest filing:

Appendix: Recommended fix

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.