Browse / Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain / Unsafe deserialisation
Unsafe deserialisation
92 records in Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain.
- vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled Forged shared-memory handles in vLLM's multimodal cache reach pickle.loads in the worker, and this works without the insecure-serialisation opt-in.
- NLTK: Unsafe Pickle Deserialization in TransitionParser Allows Remote Code Execution
- NLTK: Allowlisted pickle loaders still permit code execution in current source
- MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION=False safety control bypassed by mlflow.statsmodels flavor — RCE via crafted model artifact
- NLTK AllowlistUnpickler dotted-name validation bypass allows remote code execution
- Feast vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via unsafe deserialization of dill-serialized UDFs
- Keras: TorchModuleWrapper can deserialize unsafe PyTorch pickle data
- Keras: Lambda deserialization can bypass safe mode and execute code
- LangGraph Checkpoint: Unsafe JSON deserialization in checkpoint loading Tampered checkpoint bytes in a persistent store can make the JSON serializer rebuild arbitrary Python objects when a checkpoint is loaded.
- Feast vulnerable to unsafe deserialization RCE in registry server via UDF proto
- MLFlow Creates a Temporary File With Insecure Permissions Model artifact temp directories are created world- or group-writable, so local users can replace cloudpickle files that are later loaded and executed.
- SGLang: Unauthenticated RCE via --enable-custom-logit-processor A custom logit processor sent to the server is deserialised with dill.loads, so an unauthenticated request can run Python code when the option is enabled.
- SGLanG: Multimodal scheduler deserializes untrusted pickle data on 0.0.0.0 ROUTER socket
- LangSmith SDK: Public prompt pull deserializes untrusted manifests without trust boundary warning Pulling a public prompt by owner/name deserialises its manifest as trusted configuration, so attacker-authored constructor arguments and environment-backed secret references can run or leak.
- Ludwig framework is vulnerable to insecure deserialization through its predict() method.
- Ludwig framework is vulnerable to insecure deserialization in its model serving component
- PyTorch Lightning load_from_checkpoint has an insecure checkpoint deserialization load_from_checkpoint calls torch.load without weights_only, so a malicious checkpoint runs pickle-based code when it is loaded.
- LangChain vulnerable to unsafe deserialization of attacker-controlled objects through overly broad `load()` allowlists
- SGLang has an Improper Input Validation/Injection Issue A remotely supplied model or tokenizer reference causes unsafe deserialisation inside the transformers helper that loads the tokenizer.
- HuggingFace Transformers allows for arbitrary code execution in the `Trainer` class A crafted RNG state checkpoint executes code when the Trainer loads it, because torch.load runs without the weights-only restriction.
- SGLangs `replay_request_dump.py` contains an insecure pickle.load() without validation and proper deserialization
- SGLang's encoder parallel disaggregation system is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution through the disaggregation module
- SGLang's multimodal generation module is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution through the ZMQ broker
- LangGraph checkpoint loading has unsafe msgpack deserialization Persisted checkpoints are decoded with msgpack that can rebuild Python objects, so someone who can write to the store can get code run on load.
- PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist The scanner's blocklist omits several standard library modules that can run shell commands, so pickles using them are reported as clean.
- LangGraph: BaseCache Deserialization of Untrusted Data may lead to Remote Code Execution
- picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler
- Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling numpy.f2py.crackfortran.param_eval A pickle payload calls a numpy helper that the scanner does not flag, so scanning passes and loading the file executes attacker-supplied code.
- Picklescan vulnerable to Arbitrary File Writing
- Picklescan missing detection when calling numpy.f2py.crackfortran.getlincoef
- Picklescan missing detection when calling pty.spawn
- Hugging Face smolagents: Unsafe deserialization in Remote Python Executor leads to RCE
- LangGraph Checkpoint affected by RCE in "json" mode of JsonPlusSerializer
- Keras is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery
- Keras framework vulnerable to deserialization of untrusted data A crafted Keras file referencing a TorchModuleWrapper class runs attacker code while loading, even with safe mode enabled, whether the file is local or remote.
- Keras is vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data A crafted .keras archive re-enables unsafe deserialisation from inside its config before layer parsing, then a pickled Lambda layer runs attacker code when the model loads.
- The Keras `Model.load_model` method **silently** ignores `safe_mode=True` and allows arbitrary code execution when a `.h5`/`.hdf5` file is loaded. Loading an .h5 model ignores safe_mode=True, so pickled code inside the file runs on the victim's machine during load.
- SGLang Remote Code Execution Vulnerability via Unsafe Deserialization in update_weights_from_tensor The weight-update endpoint deserialises attacker-supplied tensor payloads unsafely, letting a remote caller run code on the server.
- Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcode A pickle payload calling idlelib's ModifiedInterpreter.runcode is not flagged by picklescan, so loading the malicious model file executes attacker code.
- Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.debugobj.ObjectTreeItem The pickle scanner does not flag calls to idlelib debugobj methods, so a malicious pickle that uses them passes the scan and runs commands when loaded.
- Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python profile.Profile.runctx A pickle whose reduce calls profile.Profile.runctx runs arbitrary code when loaded, and the scanner does not flag that built-in function.
- Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.get_entity A pickle that calls idlelib AutoComplete.get_entity executes attacker code on load, and the scanner misses this built-in callable.
- Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.autocomplete.AutoComplete.fetch_completions A pickle payload calling idlelib's AutoComplete.fetch_completions is not flagged by picklescan, so loading it runs attacker-chosen code.
- Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python library idlelib.calltip.get_entity A pickle payload calls a standard library helper that evaluates strings as Python, and the scanner does not flag that call, so loading the file runs code.
- Picklescan has a missing detection when calling built-in python trace.Trace.runctx A pickle payload calling trace.Trace.runctx during reconstruction runs commands on load, and the scanner fails to flag it as dangerous.
- Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python idlelib.pyshell.ModifiedInterpreter.runcommand
- Picklescan is missing detection when calling built-in python ensurepip._run_pip
- Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils.bottleneck.__main__.run_cprofile A pickle payload calls a torch profiling helper that runs arbitrary code, and the scanner fails to flag that call, so loading the file executes it.
- Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper
- Keras vulnerable to CVE-2025-1550 bypass via reuse of internal functionality Crafted arguments to built-in Keras modules let a malicious saved model trigger file overwrites during loading even with safe mode enabled.