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LangGraph: BaseCache Deserialization of Untrusted Data may lead to Remote Code Execution

CVE-2026-27794 ยท 2026-02-25 moderate

Class
Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Unsafe deserialisation
Affected
langgraph-checkpoint (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

When msgpack fails, LangGraph's default cache serializer falls back to pickle.loads, so anyone able to write the cache backend can run code. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Context

A Remote Code Execution vulnerability exists in LangGraph's caching layer when applications enable cache backends that inherit from BaseCache and opt nodes into caching via CachePolicy. Prior to langgraph-checkpoint 4.0.0, BaseCache defaults to JsonPlusSerializer(pickle_fallback=True). When msgpack serialization fails, cached values can be deserialized via pickle.loads(...).

Who is affected?

Caching is not enabled by default. Applications are affected only when:

Example (enabling a cache backend and opting a node into caching):

from langgraph.cache.memory import InMemoryCache
from langgraph.graph import StateGraph
from langgraph.types import CachePolicy


def my_node(state: dict) -> dict:
    return {"value": state.get("value", 0) + 1}


builder = StateGraph(dict)
builder.add_node("my_node", my_node, cache_policy=CachePolicy(ttl=120))
builder.set_entry_point("my_node")

graph = builder.compile(cache=InMemoryCache())

result = graph.invoke({"value": 1})

With pickle_fallback=True, when msgpack serialization fails, JsonPlusSerializer can fall back to storing values as a ("pickle", <bytes>) tuple and later deserialize them via pickle.loads(...). If an attacker can place a malicious pickle payload into the cache backend such that the LangGraph process reads and deserializes it, this can lead to arbitrary code execution.

Exploitation requires attacker write access to the cache backend. The serializer is not exposed as a network-facing API.

This is fixed in langgraph-checkpoint>=4.0.0 by disabling pickle fallback by default (pickle_fallback=False).

Impact

Arbitrary code execution in the LangGraph process when attacker-controlled cache entries are deserialized.

Root Cause

Attack preconditions

An attacker must be able to write attacker-controlled bytes into the cache backend such that the LangGraph process later reads and deserializes them.

This typically requires write access to a networked cache (for example a network-accessible Redis instance with weak/no auth or shared cache infrastructure reachable by other tenants/services) or write access to local cache storage (for example a writable SQLite cache file via permissive file permissions or a shared writable volume).

Because exploitation requires write access to the cache storage layer, this is a post-compromise / post-access escalation vector.

Remediation

Resources

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.