Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / Authentication and access control
Authentication and access control
39 records in MCP and Tool Server Flaws.
- Model Context Protocol Python SDK: Server bearer-token authentication accepts tokens issued for a different resource server
- FastMCP: Post-transform component authorization is skipped on direct calls A server transform changes component metadata after authorisation, and direct lookups return the transformed component without rechecking policy, so denied tools and resources can be reached.
- FastMCP MCP client wrappers construct M2M OAuth providers without issuer binding — client secret redirectable to attacker-advertised authorization server
- MCP TypeScript SDK: Experimental tasks were not tied to the session that created them The MCP TypeScript SDK's experimental task store did not tie tasks to their creating session, letting other clients list, read and cancel them.
- MCP TypeScript SDK: Server bearer authentication accepted tokens issued for another service
- PraisonAI: MCP HTTP-stream transport is unauthenticated by default, exposing tool enumeration and an unvalidated tool-call surface
- Langflow: IP Spoofing Bypass via `X-Forwarded-For` Allowing Remote Configuration Write A spoofed X-Forwarded-For header makes the MCP install endpoint treat a remote request as local, allowing an MCP client config file to be overwritten.
- Langflow has Authenticated Cross-Project File Disclosure via Unscoped MCP Resource Handlers An authenticated user sends a crafted resource URI to their own project's MCP endpoint and reads another user's flow file, because the read is not authorised.
- MCP Atlassian: ENABLED_TOOLS / Toolset authorization bypass Tool filters are applied only when listing tools, so a direct tools/call request can invoke any registered tool by name, bypassing the configured restriction.
- MCP Atlassian: JIRA_PROJECTS_FILTER / CONFLUENCE_SPACES_FILTER allow forbidden-project content exfiltration (one LIVE-proven on Atlassian Cloud)
- [mcp-atlassian] Authentication bypass in HTTP transport: AtlassianOpaqueTokenVerifier accepts any non-empty token
- RMCP: Missing Resource Field Validation in OAuth Protected Resource Metadata Discovery The MCP client skips checking the resource field in protected resource metadata, so a malicious server can steer OAuth to another authorization server.
- n8n: Agent Workflow Tool Bypasses Sub-Workflow Caller Policy Agent tool invocations skip the sub-workflow caller restriction, letting a user who builds an agent run workflows the owner had locked down and read their output.
- PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92) An unanchored regex lets forged WebSocket Origin headers pass the extension check, so the attacker can drive browser automation sessions.
- PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
- PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unauthenticated
- PraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server
- MCP Ruby SDK: Ruby SSE Session Poisoning The Ruby MCP transport accepts tool calls for any session ID without checking ownership, so a stolen ID runs tools as the victim.
- MCP Ruby SDK: Streamable HTTP transport lacks DNS-rebinding (Host/Origin) protection
- LiteLLM: MCP Authentication Bypass via OAuth2 Passthrough Fallback An unauthenticated caller sends a fabricated Bearer token to the MCP endpoint, and a fallback path substitutes an empty auth object so the session is accepted.
- n8n: Member-Level Users Can Execute Other Users' MCP Server Trigger Workflows via Missing OAuth Authorization Check
- MCP Python SDK: Experimental task handlers allow any client to access and cancel other clients' tasks
- MCP Python SDK: HTTP transports serve session requests without verifying the authenticated principal
- MCP Python SDK: WebSocket server transport does not support Host/Origin validation
- GitHub MCP Server: Lockdown mode singleton in HTTP server causes cross-user GraphQL client confusion
- LiteLLM: MCP Proxy Has Improper Authentication A flaw in the MCP proxy's API key authentication lets a remote caller pass the check without valid credentials.
- PraisonAI ToolsMCPServer legacy SSE transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools
- PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in
- n8n: MCP Browser HTTP Transport Exposes Unauthenticated Browser-Control Sessions
- MCP Server Kubernetes: Tool Access Control Bypass via Presentation-Layer Filtering Without Execution-Layer Enforcement The MCP server filters tools only in the listing step, so a client that knows a tool name can call it directly, ignoring the restriction.
- Open WebUI's chat completion API allows tool restrictions to be bypassed The chat completion endpoint runs any server tool named by ID without checking the caller's permission, using the server's stored credentials.
- PraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions An unauthenticated WebSocket client that omits the Origin header can register as a controller and drive automation sessions on other connected browser extensions.
- PraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token() validate_token accepts any bearer token when the token store is empty, so unauthenticated callers reach every MCP tool, including agent execution.
- FastMCP: Missing Consent Verification in OAuth Proxy Callback Facilitates Confused Deputy Vulnerabilities
- MCP Ruby SDK: Insufficient Session Binding Allows SSE Stream Hijacking via Session ID Replay
- FastMCP OAuth Proxy token reuse across MCP servers
- Microsoft Playwright MCP Server vulnerable to DNS Rebinding Attack; Allows Attackers Access to All Server Tools The MCP server does not validate the Origin header, so a web page using DNS rebinding can invoke its tools from the victim's browser.
- Model Context Protocol (MCP) Python SDK does not enable DNS rebinding protection by default Localhost MCP HTTP servers lack DNS rebinding protection by default, letting a malicious website reach their tools through the browser.
- FastMCP Auth Integration Allows for Confused Deputy Account Takeover The MCP server issues authorization on behalf of an upstream identity provider without binding it to the real user, letting an attacker take over other accounts.