Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-63127
RMCP: Missing Resource Field Validation in OAuth Protected Resource Metadata Discovery
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- rmcp (crates.io)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The MCP client skips checking the resource field in protected resource metadata, so a malicious server can steer OAuth to another authorization server. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The rmcp library does not validate the resource parameter in OAuth Protected Resource metadata (RFC 9728), allowing a malicious MCP server to redirect OAuth flows to a legitimate authorization server and steal the resulting access tokens.
Details
RFC 9728 specifies two MUST requirements for resource parameter validation: - Section 7.3: the client MUST ensure that the resource identifier URL it is using as the prefix for the metadata request exactly matches the resource value in the returned metadata document. - Section 3.3: if the resource value returned is not identical to the URL the client used, the data MUST NOT be used.
In the current implementation (crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs), the ResourceServerMetadata struct (lines 390–394) does not include a resource field:
struct ResourceServerMetadata {
authorization_server: Option<String>,
authorization_servers: Option<Vec<String>>,
scopes_supported: Option<Vec<String>>,
}
And discover_oauth_server_via_resource_metadata() (lines 1446–1465) proceeds without any resource URL validation.
Recommended fix
1. Add the resource field to the struct: 1
- Add validation logic after fetching metadata: