Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws
AI Framework and Platform Flaws
Classic software bugs in the libraries and platforms that run AI: memory corruption, traversal, SSRF, auth. 1,519 records. Reference: CWE.
- Memory corruption 302
- Authentication and access control 261
- Path traversal and file access 209
- Code and command execution 188
- Denial of service 175
- Server-side request forgery 96
- Other weaknesses 77
- Cross-site scripting 65
- Information exposure 62
- Sandbox escape 37
- SQL and query injection 26
- Cross-site request forgery 9
- Unsafe deserialisation 6
- Open redirect 4
- Data exfiltration 2
- NLTK: Path Traversal in save_maxent_params / load_maxent_params Allow Arbitrary File READ/WRITE
- NLTK dot2img runs Graphviz 'dot' without the trusted-exec chokepoint, enabling local code execution via a writable PATH element A partial earlier fix left one Graphviz call resolving dot from PATH without trust checks, so a planted binary in a writable directory runs.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in chat80.sql_query bypasses the pathsec data-root sandbox to read out-of-root SQLite databases
- NLTK: Quadratic-time CPU denial of service in CCG lexicon parser (fromstring) on wide bracket bodies and operator chains A lexicon parser repeatedly copies remaining input while scanning bracket bodies and operators, so long flat inputs cause quadratic CPU consumption.
- NLTK: Unbounded CPU consumption in SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() with ambiguous or self-embedding grammars The stepping recursive descent parser runs without a time or step limit, so an ambiguous grammar with short input can pin a CPU core indefinitely.
- NLTK: BllipParser passes caller-supplied model paths to the bllipparser C extension with no pathsec check, enabling arbitrary read
- NLTK: Symlink escape in YCOECorpusReader lets a psd/pos directory symlink read files outside the corpus root within the data sandbox
- Kubeflow Pipelines: Cross-tenant execution-cache poisoning / output substitution via a namespace-blind cache key in the cache webhook (multi-user) The pipeline step cache key omits the tenant namespace, letting one tenant read or pre-populate cached outputs belonging to another tenant.
- Kubeflow Pipelines — API server fetches a caller-supplied pipelineURL without host validation The pipeline API server fetches a caller-supplied package URL without restricting destinations, letting authorised users make requests from its network position.
- Kubeflow Pipelines: Reflected XSS in the frontend pod information and events error responses Pod name and namespace query values are echoed unescaped into HTML error responses, so a crafted link runs script in the frontend origin.
- Kubeflow Pipelines: RBAC bypass on shared pipelines allows any authenticated user to delete or modify global pipelines
- Kubeflow Pipelines: SQL injection through unvalidated pagination tokens in Kubeflow Pipelines API server
- Kubeflow Pipelines API server lacks authorization for shared pipeline uploads
- Kubeflow Pipelines: Pipeline archive upload allows decompression bomb to exhaust server memory Pipeline archive uploads are decompressed without bounding the expanded size, so a small zip or tar file can exhaust API server memory.
- Kubeflow Pipelines: Run-log endpoint permits unauthorized access to pod logs
- LangGraph: Unencoded identifiers in LangGraph SDK v3 streaming can redirect authenticated GET requests Unencoded thread_id or assistant_id values containing relative segments are normalised into other server paths, so an authenticated GET is sent to a different endpoint than intended.
- ONNX: Out-of-Bounds Read in RNN/GRU/LSTM Shape Inference (Old Opsets, Missing Rank Check) A malformed old-opset RNN node with a short input shape makes shape inference read past array bounds, crashing any process that loads the model.
- vLLM DeepSeek-OCR image processing vulnerable to denial of service
- vLLM: Out-of-vocabulary prompt token id passes input validation and triggers a CUDA device-side assert (engine crash / DoS)
- vLLM: Permissive default CORS origins allow cross-origin requests to the vLLM HTTP server
- Agno: Arbitrary code execution via `eval()` on `field_type` in `FunctionCall`
- LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key Reusing one encryption key for both secret storage and session tokens lets an internal user forge an admin token via a crafted key metadata field.
- LiteLLM vulnerable to reflected XSS in /sso/debug/callback
- MLflow vulnerable to remote code execution on unauthenticated servers via third-party scorer deserialization importing caller-placed artifact modules On an unauthenticated MLflow server, scorer deserialisation imports a request-chosen module from an uploaded artifact and instantiates its class, running attacker code.
- vLLM: Request-controlled mm_processor_kwargs.code_revision allows remote code execution
- LangGraph: Namespace labels containing `.` reach other namespaces in Postgres and SQLite stores Namespace label validation runs only on writes, so dotted labels in reads, deletes and batches reach other namespaces' stored data.
- MLflow: SSRF on unauthenticated MLflow servers via third-party scorer kwargs in the scorer invoke, register, and GenAI evaluate endpoints An unauthenticated endpoint instantiates a class named in JSON whose module allowlist does not constrain the class or its arguments, forcing outbound requests to attacker-chosen hosts.
- vLLM: Forged multimodal UUID + P0/P1 processor-cache eviction drift: unauthenticated remote crash of the whole vLLM engine
- MLflow FileStore trace IDs allow path traversal and arbitrary file writes
- unstructured: Stored XSS via unescaped HTML generation
- Claude Code: Plugin Hash Pin Bypass Allows Bypass of Hash Pinning
- PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header The localhost-only exemption from auth trusts the request Host header, so a spoofed Host value lets remote callers invoke agents unauthenticated.
- PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF The jobs API is open unless a key variable is set, and the webhook URL is validated once then re-resolved at connection time, allowing rebinding to internal hosts.
- PraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source Host and file path values from a YAML config are pasted unescaped into generated Python source, so injected expressions run when the API server starts.
- PraisonAI: ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace
- PraisonAI: Plugin Auto-Discovery Executes Arbitrary Python Files Without Verification
- PraisonAI: DNS rebinding bypass in `web_crawl` SSRF protection allows internal response disclosure
- PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root
- Pydantic AI Web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`): a website visited by the developer can trigger agent runs and server-side tool execution on the local chat endpoint
- Pydantic AI Web chat UI (`Agent.to_web()`, `clai web`): the local chat endpoint does not validate the `Host` header
- Docling: Unbounded table rowspan/colspan in HTML, JATS, ODS and BoxNote backends causes CPU/memory exhaustion A tiny HTML or spreadsheet file with huge span attributes makes the converter loop and allocate oversized tables, exhausting CPU and memory.
- Docling: Configured HTTP headers sent to every remote image host named by a document
- Docling: Crafted DoclingDocument JSON embeds local image files into converted output
- Docling has SSRF guard bypass in remote resource fetching (DNS rebinding / multi-record resolution; no IP validation in HTML render mode)
- Docling has arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine
- Langflow : Cross-user flow access and vertex execution via deprecated /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices endpoints
- PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook mode accepts forged unsigned message.received events and invokes agents A public webhook endpoint accepts unsigned message events and dispatches them to agents, so anyone can forge inbound messages that trigger agent replies.
- PraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation
- Flowise NodeVM sandbox escape via puppeteer allowlist - authenticated RCE and arbitrary file read via Chromium An authenticated user passes executable path and args to puppeteer.launch from the sandboxed custom function, spawning host commands outside the sandbox.
- vm2 contains a sandbox escape vulnerability