Browse / Sensitive Data Disclosure
Sensitive Data Disclosure
Secrets, personal data, chat history or training data exposed through an AI system. 62 records. Reference: OWASP LLM02 · ATLAS Exfiltration.
- Information exposure 23
- Server-side request forgery 9
- Authentication and access control 8
- Path traversal and file access 6
- Unsecured Credentials 5
- Other weaknesses 3
- Data exfiltration 2
- Denial of service 2
- Data from Information Repositories 2
- Code and command execution 1
- LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect 1
- NLTK: Quadratic CPU exhaustion in TreebankWordTokenizer.span_tokenize via list.pop(0) in quote-restore loop
- NLTK: Quadratic CPU exhaustion in LegalitySyllableTokenizer.tokenize via unguarded onset reversal loop
- Mem0: Cross-tenant conversation leak via unescaped delimiter collision in session-scope key (_build_session_scope) Conversation scope keys join caller-supplied identifiers with unescaped delimiters, so a crafted run_id can match another tenant's stored messages.
- LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials`
- MLflow CrewAI autologging records LLM provider API keys in logged trace spans
- MLflow vulnerable to arbitrary file read on unauthenticated servers via prompt model version source
- Pydantic AI OpenTelemetry instrumentation: retry prompt content is not redacted when `include_content=False` Retry prompts without tool calls are written to telemetry spans even when content redaction is enabled, so withheld model content reaches the observability backend.
- Pydantic AI OpenTelemetry instrumentation: exception events on tool and agent run spans include content when `include_content=False` Exception events and error statuses on agent spans carry prompts, tool arguments and provider responses even when content export is disabled.
- Pydantic AI: SSRF cloud-metadata blocklist bypass via IPv6 zone identifiers
- vLLM: Harmony tool continuations drop `cache_salt` — restoring a cross-tenant prefix-cache membership oracle Tool continuation turns are cached without the tenant's cache salt, so another tenant can infer guessed prompts from exact cached-token counts.
- vm2 exposes host HTTPS credentials and TLS traffic through globalAgent
- Open WebUI: A user's session cookies are sent to tool servers configured for bearer authentication
- NLTK: Corpus readers follow symlinks outside trusted roots despite pathsec enforcement
- MLflow AI Gateway permits SSRF through an unvalidated api_base
- Open WebUI: DNS Rebinding SSRF Bypass
- Flowise: Information Disclosure in GET /api/v1/upsert-history returns the entire server-wide upsert history The upsert history endpoint returns every workspace's ingestion records without scoping, exposing vector store endpoints and collection names.
- Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration
- Flowise: Incomplete Credential Redaction Exposes Secrets via API
- Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): DNS-rebinding SSRF filter bypass in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (nltk.download / nltk.data.load) defeats ENFORCE mode
- Open WebUI: /api/v1/channels/{id}/members exposes full user model including sensitive credentials
- Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission
- n8n: Bypass "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" Credential Restriction in Multiple AI and LLM Nodes A workflow editor with use-only access to a shared AI credential points an LLM node at an attacker host, causing the credential secret to be sent there.
- n8n: Custom Header Credential Values Leaked in Plaintext into LLM Node Execution Data Custom header values from LLM node credentials are stored in plaintext in workflow execution data, where users with execution access can read them.
- n8n: Google Service Account Private Key Exposed in JWT Header The full service account private key was written into the JWT header's key ID field, so anyone who can read those headers can recover it.
- n8n: External Secrets Permission Bypass via Expression Parser Mismatch
- Autonomous OpenAI Evaluation Agents Compromise Hugging Face Infrastructure
- Multi-Agent Framework Compromises Taiwanese Government Systems
- PraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
- n8n: SecurityScorecard Node Leaks API Token to User-Controlled Host
- MLflow: Environment variable injection in AI Gateway secrets enables server-side credential exfiltration The gateway resolves environment variable references in API key fields and sends the resulting cloud credentials to an attacker-chosen upstream base URL.
- MLflow: Any authenticated user can enumerate all gateway secrets, endpoints, and model definitions
- FlowiseAI Vulnerable to Credential Data Leak Credential lookups with a name filter return the encrypted data field, which the unfiltered path strips, exposing stored API secrets.
- FlowiseAI Exposes Basic Auth Credentials via API
- BentoML has Information Disclosure in `bentoml build` via symlink traversal in the build context
- Flowise: Bcrypt Password Hash Exposure The Flowise login handler returns bcrypt password hashes in its response, so a remote caller can obtain other users' hashes.
- LiteLLM: Server-Side Template Injection in /prompts/test endpoint
- Langflow has an Information Leak through Incomplete API Key Redaction API key redaction in flow handling misses some cases, so stored credentials are returned to remote callers.
- Flowise: Public chatflow endpoints return unsanitized flowData including plaintext API keys, passwords, and credential IDs
- Flowise: Sensitive Data Leak in public-chatbotConfig An unauthenticated endpoint returns full chatflow configuration, including stored API keys and authorization headers, to anyone who knows a chatflow ID.
- Autonomous Claude Agents Compromise Three Real Organizations During Cyber Evaluations
- Flowise Missing Authentication on NVIDIA NIM Endpoints
- Gradio: Mocked OAuth Login Exposes Server Credentials and Uses Hardcoded Session Secret
- LangChain Community: redirect chaining can lead to SSRF bypass via RecursiveUrlLoader
- @langchain/community affected by SSRF Bypass in RecursiveUrlLoader via insufficient URL origin validation
- Exposed ClawdBot Control Interfaces Leads to Credential Access and Execution
- Claude Code Leaks Data via Malicious Environment Configuration Before Trust Confirmation
- Keras Directory Traversal Vulnerability
- Lobe Chat vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery with native web fetch module
- FlowiseAI/Flowise has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability
- Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover