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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-72770

n8n: Git Node fetch/pull/pushTags Operations Bypass Sandbox Path Restriction

CVE-2026-72770 ยท 2026-07-22 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Path traversal and file access
Affected
n8n (npm)
Gets past
Path restriction
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A workflow author can point an allowlisted git remote at a local repository outside the sandbox, fetch it into the workspace, and read its files. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Impact

Authenticated n8n users with workflow create/execute rights could use the Git node's fetch, pull, or push-tags operations to bypass the repository-path containment checks that already protected clone and push. By pointing an allowlisted remote configuration value at a local path outside the intended sandbox, an attacker could pull an arbitrary local git repository into the workspace and subsequently read its files and history.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5, and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
- Disable the Git node by adding n8n-nodes-base.git to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.