Products / n8n
n8n
156 records.
- n8n: Domain-Restriction Bypass via Unguarded Model-Search Endpoint in OpenAI Chat Model Node The model-search path skips the allowed-domains check, so a custom base URL sends the stored API credential to any host.
- n8n: Anonymous Approval-Gate Bypass via Reused resumeToken over the Chat WebSocket A reused resume token from a public form lets an anonymous party resume a paused workflow through the chat route, bypassing the approval gate that should hold it.
- n8n: GitHub Trigger 422 Reuse Path Skips Webhook Secret Storage, Causing Signature Verification to Fail-Open After a 422 reuse path the stored webhook signing secret is discarded, so signature verification accepts unsigned deliveries.
- n8n: Cross-User Active Workflow ID and Lifecycle Event Disclosure via Missing userId Filter n8n's active-workflows endpoint and push events skip the per-user sharing filter, so members can see workflow IDs and activity they should not access.
- n8n: Prototype Pollution via Workflow Structure Summary Can Lead to Denial of Service Posting a workflow with a reserved key such as __proto__ directly to the REST API pollutes Object.prototype, because the editor's client-side name check is skipped.
- n8n: Expression Sandbox Escape via Shared Builtin Tampering and Code-Printer Injection Leads to Code Execution Replacing the global JSON.stringify changes the source generated by the legacy expression engine at runtime, so a crafted expression escapes the sandbox and executes code.
- n8n: Cross-Tenant Project-Member PII Disclosure via Missing Per-Project Scope Check on Role Assignment Endpoints Role assignment endpoints check role permission but not project visibility, so a user can read members of any project by naming it.
- n8n: Per-Resource OAuth Consent Bypass via Unbound Refresh Token Resource Substitution Refresh requests were checked only for a registered resource, not against the resource in the original grant, so a token could be refreshed for a different protected workflow.
- n8n: Path Injection in Elasticsearch and ElasticSecurity Nodes via Unencoded Identifiers Identifiers are placed unencoded into REST paths, so separators or dot segments redirect requests to other Elasticsearch endpoints using the stored credential.
- n8n: Unauthenticated Persistent Storage Exhaustion via OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint
- n8n: Expression Sandbox Escape via Class-Field Sanitizer Rebinding Can Lead to Code Execution
- n8n: Regular Expression Denial of Service in the Default Blocked-File-Pattern Match via a Git Node Clone Path
- n8n: Disabled OIDC SSO Endpoints Remain Active and Issue Valid Sessions
- n8n: Log Streaming Event Destinations Decrypt Generic-Auth Credentials Without Ownership Check
- n8n: Instance AI Credential Setup Accepts Unvalidated Probe URL from Fetched Content
- n8n: Git Node branch.<name>.remote Config Key Bypasses Sandbox Path Restriction, Enabling Local Git Repository Read
- n8n: Agent Workflow Tool Bypasses Sub-Workflow Caller Policy Agent tool invocations skip the sub-workflow caller restriction, letting a user who builds an agent run workflows the owner had locked down and read their output.
- n8n: External Secrets Accessible via Workflow Expressions Outside Credentials Workflow node expressions resolve external secrets, letting project editors read their plaintext values without holding secrets permissions.
- n8n: Send Email Node Arbitrary File Read and SSRF via Nodemailer Content-Object Type Confusion Non-string values reaching a mail node's body fields are treated by the mail library as file paths or URLs, exposing local files from the host.
- n8n: Improper Authorization Allows Authenticated Users to Assign Workflows to Folders in Other Projects A crafted creation request links a new workflow to a folder in another project because the server does not verify folder ownership.
- n8n: Unauthenticated Endpoint Allows Cancellation of Any User's Active Test Webhook A route registered before auth middleware lets unauthenticated callers cancel active test webhooks by workflow ID.
- n8n: SSO Instance-Role Provisioning Allows Privilege Escalation to Instance Owner An SSO user whose identity provider sends an owner role claim is provisioned as instance owner, because the provisioning path skips the owner-role check.
- n8n: Bypass "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" Credential Restriction in Multiple AI and LLM Nodes A workflow editor with use-only access to a shared AI credential points an LLM node at an attacker host, causing the credential secret to be sent there.
- n8n: Snowflake Node executeQuery Operation Allows SQL Injection via Unparameterized Expression Interpolation Expression values from workflow data are concatenated into a raw Snowflake SQL string instead of bound as parameters, so attacker data can alter the query.
- n8n: Credential Authorization Bypass via Expression in HTTP Request Node `genericAuthType` A workflow editor supplies the HTTP node credential type through an expression, so the permission check misses and another user's credential loads.
- n8n: Prototype Pollution via Workflow Credentials Leads to Unauthenticated User and Project Enumeration A user with workflow create rights saves a workflow with prototype-polluting keys, so later unauthenticated requests are treated as privileged and user data is exposed.
- n8n: Privilege Escalation and Code Execution via Full Public API Key Scope Assignment to Token Exchange JWTs Tokens minted by the token exchange flow received every Public API scope regardless of the user's role, letting low-privileged callers perform administrator operations.
- n8n: Account Takeover via Unverified Email Claim in Token Exchange Embed Login A validly signed token is matched to a local account by email without checking the key's role ceiling or that the email is verified, enabling account takeover.
- n8n: Custom Header Credential Values Leaked in Plaintext into LLM Node Execution Data Custom header values from LLM node credentials are stored in plaintext in workflow execution data, where users with execution access can read them.
- n8n: Cross-Tenant Module-Cache Poisoning in the JS Task Runner Code-node users poison a shared JavaScript module cache, altering other tenants' later Code-node executions on the same task runner.
- n8n: Google Service Account Private Key Exposed in JWT Header The full service account private key was written into the JWT header's key ID field, so anyone who can read those headers can recover it.
- n8n: Authenticated SSRF via Dynamic Node Parameters Endpoints Allows Internal Network Access Dynamic node parameter routes lack scope checks and accept absolute URLs that override the node base URL, letting users make the server call internal targets.
- n8n: Stored DOM XSS via Resource Locator `cachedResultUrl` A workflow's cachedResultUrl is passed to window.open without scheme checks, so a javascript URL runs script when a victim opens it.
- n8n: Shared-Workflow Editor Can Exfiltrate Credentials via Inline Sub-Workflow JSON Credential checks inspect only top-level node credentials, so an editor can reference other credentials inside a sub-workflow's inline JSON and use them.
- n8n: computer-use Shell Sandbox Not Enforced on Linux and Windows The shell tool's sandbox was only applied on macOS, so on Linux and Windows commands ran with unrestricted host filesystem and network access.
- n8n: Race Condition in Git Clone Node Allows Authenticated Users to Achieve Remote Code Execution A race between validating the clone path and running it lets a user swap in a symlink, planting a repository where the server loads custom nodes as code.
- n8n: Git Node fetch/pull/pushTags Operations Bypass Sandbox Path Restriction
- n8n: GraphQL Node Bypasses "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" Restriction
- n8n: Expression sandbox escape via arrow-function bodies enabling command execution
- n8n: "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" Restriction Bypass via AI Agents MCP Connector
- n8n: MySQL v1 Node executeQuery Operation Allows SQL Injection via Unparameterized Expression Interpolation
- n8n: Prototype Pollution via VM Expression Engine Sandbox Escape Leads to Denial of Service
- n8n: External Secrets Permission Bypass via Expression Parser Mismatch
- n8n: PostgresTrigger Node SQL Injection Allows Authenticated Users to Execute Arbitrary SQL on Connected PostgreSQL Instances
- n8n: Cross-Issuer Token Exchange Account Binding via Subject-Only Identity Resolution
- n8n: DOM-Based XSS via Unsandboxed iframe srcdoc in HTML Preview
- n8n: Path-Confinement Bypass in computer-use search_files Allows Reading Files Outside the Base Directory
- n8n: Legacy Expression Evaluator Sanitizer Bypass Leads to Authenticated Code Execution
- n8n: Shared Credential Header Leak via HTTP Request Pagination Expression
- n8n: Member-Level Users Can Execute Other Users' MCP Server Trigger Workflows via Missing OAuth Authorization Check