Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / CVE-2026-77259
MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read via confluence_upload_attachment allows exfiltration of server credentials
- Class
- MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Path traversal and file access
- Also involves
- Sensitive Data Disclosure
- Affected
- mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The Confluence upload tool opens any caller-supplied local path without checks, letting a client attach server files such as credentials to a page. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
Missing path validation in confluence_upload_attachment allows any authenticated MCP client to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and exfiltrate their contents to Confluence. On Linux deployments, /proc/self/environ yields all runtime secrets in a single call.
---
### Details
AttachmentsMixin.upload_attachment() in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py opens the caller-supplied file_path with no boundary check:
# line 477
files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))}
The download path was correctly hardened in GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 via validate_safe_path() (lines 223, 272). That fix was not applied to the upload path, leaving it completely unguarded. The MCP tool layer (servers/confluence.py:1295) passes file_path verbatim with no additional sanitization.
---
### PoC
# 1. Prepare target file (macOS demo; on Linux use /proc/self/environ directly)
cp ~/.aws/credentials /tmp/diagram.png
# 2. Call the MCP tool
confluence_upload_attachment(
content_id = "<any page attacker can edit>",
file_path = "/tmp/diagram.png"
)
# 3. Download attachment from Confluence โ contains raw credentials
Tested on mcp-atlassian 0.21.1 against live Confluence Cloud. Attachment confirmed uploaded and retrieved with full credential content intact.
---
### Impact
Any MCP client with edit access to one Confluence page can read arbitrary files from the server process. On shared/Docker deployments, /proc/self/environ exposes all users' API tokens in a single request. Exfiltrated Atlassian tokens provide persistent API access independent of MCP, surviving server shutdown or patching.
Incomplete fix of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 โ arbitrary file read on upload mirrors the arbitrary file write on download fixed in that advisory.
---
### Suggested Fix
# src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py โ upload_attachment()
# Add after abspath conversion, before open():
try:
validate_safe_path(file_path)
except ValueError as e:
return {"success": False, "error": str(e)}
Same fix required in upload_attachments() and src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py.
References
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-6cr4-ccf3-x7h4
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian
- https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.