Browse / MCP and Tool Server Flaws / Path traversal and file access
Path traversal and file access
27 records in MCP and Tool Server Flaws.
- PraisonAI: Project custom command templates can read outside-workspace files into model prompts
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read & Exfiltration (Confused Deputy) in JIRA update_issue An MCP tool passes agent-supplied absolute paths straight to an upload call, so the privileged server reads restricted host files and attaches them to a ticket.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read via confluence_upload_attachment allows exfiltration of server credentials The Confluence upload tool opens any caller-supplied local path without checks, letting a client attach server files such as credentials to a page.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary file read/exfiltration via upload_attachment missing validate_safe_path() The MCP attachment upload tool sends local files to Confluence without the path check its download methods use, so an agent can be steered to read any file.
- MCP Atlassian: Unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via upload_attachment file_path, chained with missing auth on streamable-http transport Omitting the Authorization header lets unauthenticated clients call MCP tools, and an upload tool then reads any server file path and exposes its contents.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary File Read via Upload Attachment Tools The upload attachment tools accept arbitrary server file paths without the safe-path check, letting an MCP client or an assistant steered by injected content exfiltrate files.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary local file READ via unconstrained file_path in upload_attachment (Confluence + Jira) The Confluence and Jira attachment upload tools open any local path supplied to them and upload its contents, with no base-directory restriction.
- MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary server-local file upload to Jira/Confluence attachments via unrestricted file_path parameters MCP attachment upload tools take caller-supplied local paths, read those files from the server, and upload them to Jira or Confluence without restriction.
- MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27825)
- MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read and exfiltration via MCP tool call
- MCP Atlassian: HTTP upload tools accept arbitrary server-local file paths
- MCP Atlassian: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read in confluence_upload_attachment MCP tool (incomplete fix of GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4)
- MCP Atlassian: Jira and Confluence attachment upload tools can read arbitrary server-local files
- MCP Atlassian: MCP HTTP Client Server-Local File Exfiltration via Unvalidated Attachment Upload Path
- chrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots The workspace check compares unresolved paths, so an in-root symlink pointing outside the workspace passes and is then read or overwritten.
- mcp-atlassian: Arbitrary file read via missing path validation in confluence_upload_attachment
- mcp-atlassian: Arbitrary server-side file read via attachment upload
- PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
- Chrome DevTools for agents: daemon.pid write follows symlinks in /tmp fallback runtime directory The MCP daemon writes its PID file without O_NOFOLLOW, so a local user can plant a symlink in the fallback temp path and truncate a victim-writable file.
- PraisonAI vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file read via MCP workflow.show, workflow.validate, deploy.validate An unauthenticated MCP tools/call to workflow.show passes a filename straight to file reads, since the containment fix covered other handlers but not this one.
- PraisonAIAgents: Path Traversal via Unvalidated Glob Pattern in list_files Bypasses Workspace Boundary An agent file-listing tool validates the directory but not the glob pattern, so `..` segments reveal metadata for files outside the workspace.
- PraisonAI Has Path Traversal in FileTools The file tool checks for parent-directory sequences only after normalisation has removed them, so the check never fires and any file is reachable.
- MCP Atlassian has an arbitrary file write leading to arbitrary code execution via unconstrained download_path in confluence_download_attachment
- mcp-server-git : Path traversal in git_add allows staging files outside repository boundaries
- mcp-server-git's unrestricted git_init tool allows repository creation at arbitrary filesystem locations
- mcp-server-git argument injection in git_diff and git_checkout functions allows overwriting local files Tool arguments starting with a dash are passed straight to git, so a crafted value is read as an option that writes output to an attacker-chosen file.
- mcp-server-git has missing path validation when using --repository flag