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@anthropic-ai/claude-code has an Insecure Temporary File in /copy Command that Enables Response Disclosure and Symlink-Based File Write

CVE-2026-46406 ยท 2026-06-25 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Information exposure
Also involves
Sensitive Data Disclosure
Affected
@anthropic-ai/claude-code (npm)
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The copy command writes responses to a predictable, world-readable temp path, so local users can read them or redirect the write through a planted symlink. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

The Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the expected file path, causing the privileged process to follow the symlink and overwrite an attacker-chosen file with the response text. Exploiting this required a local unprivileged user on the same system and a privileged user to run the /copy command.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.