Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-56360
n8n has Webhook Forgery on Zendesk Trigger Node
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Authentication and access control
- Affected
- n8n (npm)
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
Requests to a Zendesk trigger webhook URL are accepted without verifying the HMAC signature, so anyone knowing the URL can start the workflow with forged data. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Impact
An attacker who knows the webhook URL of a workflow using the ZendeskTrigger node could send unsigned POST requests and trigger the workflow with arbitrary data. The node does not verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature that Zendesk attaches to every outbound webhook, allowing any party to inject crafted payloads into the connected workflow.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.6.2 and 1.123.18. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Restrict network access to the n8n webhook endpoint to known Zendesk IP ranges.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
References
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-38c7-23hj-2wgq
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/3839e310bd4c3002c646c363d1411916fa195151
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/c6520e4e87614fa60c9433e93019e211f19f65f9
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.