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MCP Atlassian: Arbitrary local file READ via unconstrained file_path in upload_attachment (Confluence + Jira)

CVE-2026-77260 · 2026-09-22 high

Class
MCP and Tool Server Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Path traversal and file access
Affected
mcp-atlassian (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The Confluence and Jira attachment upload tools open any local path supplied to them and upload its contents, with no base-directory restriction. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

This is an arbitrary local file READ vulnerability on the Confluence and Jira upload_attachment tool paths. It's the symmetric counterpart of the file-write vulnerability you patched as CVE-2026-27825. The write direction was fixed; the read direction was left open.

Reporter: Sean Valentine
Severity: High (Critical in LLM-driven / prompt-injection deployments)
Affected versions: main branch as of 2026-04-21. Both Confluence and Jira upload paths.

Details

File: src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py lines 62-78 and 477

try:
    if not os.path.isabs(file_path):
        file_path = os.path.abspath(file_path)
    if not os.path.exists(file_path):
        return {"success": False, "error": f"File not found: {file_path}"}
    ...
    attachment = self._upload_attachment_direct(content_id, file_path, filename, comment, minor_edit)

# attachments.py L477
files = {"file": (filename, open(file_path, "rb"))}

Same shape in src/mcp_atlassian/jira/attachments.py around lines 374-386.

validate_safe_path() was added to the download paths as the CVE-2026-27825 fix, but the symmetric upload paths were never updated. os.path.abspath() alone does not restrict the result to any safe base directory, so absolute paths like /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, or ~/.aws/credentials are opened and uploaded verbatim. The Jira update_issue tool exposes the same primitive via its attachments parameter.

PoC

Two reachable paths:

Impact

Exfiltrate any file readable by the MCP server process — /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, .env, cloud credential files, Python venv source — by having the server upload it as an attachment to an attacker-controlled destination.

Preconditions: Attacker reaches the MCP HTTP endpoint OR plants prompt-inject content in Jira/Confluence that the agent reads; has write access to any Atlassian page or issue they can re-read to collect the exfiltrated file.

Suggested fix

Wrap file_path through validate_safe_path(file_path, base_dir=<configured_uploads_dir>) before opening. Require an opt-in env var MCP_ATLASSIAN_UPLOAD_ALLOWED_DIR with a default that rejects absolute paths outside of it.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.