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MLflow AI Gateway permits SSRF through an unvalidated api_base

CVE-2026-71211 · 2026-08-05 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
mlflow (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Gateway secrets accept an unvalidated base URL that the proxy later requests, letting any authenticated user reach internal addresses and metadata services. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

MLflow's AI Gateway accepts an auth_config.api_base value when creating a gateway secret (mlflow/server/handlers.py, _create_gateway_secret) with no validation of scheme, host, or IP range; the value is stored verbatim. The gateway proxy endpoint (mlflow/server/gateway_api.py, raw_proxy) subsequently issues an HTTP request to that stored api_base plus a caller-supplied path and returns the full response body. MLflow's existing SSRF guard, _validate_webhook_url (which blocks non-global and metadata IPs), is never invoked anywhere in this gateway secret/proxy code path. The CreateGatewaySecret action additionally has no entry in the permission-validator map, so it requires only basic authentication rather than any specific scope, meaning any authenticated user — including read-only accounts — can create a secret pointing at an internal address and reach it via the proxy endpoint, potentially exposing cloud-instance IAM credentials via metadata services. This is related to CVE-2026-4035, which addresses a distinct mechanism in the same gateway-secret feature (server-side $ENV_VAR resolution inside the api_key field leaking credentials to the configured upstream); the finding here is an independent missing-validation gap in the api_base destination itself, unaffected by that fix.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.