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Path traversal and file access
192 records in AI Framework and Platform Flaws.
- NLTK: Path Traversal in save_maxent_params / load_maxent_params Allow Arbitrary File READ/WRITE The maxent save and load functions open files under a caller-supplied directory without the library's path restriction check, allowing reads and writes elsewhere.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in chat80.sql_query bypasses the pathsec data-root sandbox to read out-of-root SQLite databases Symlinks inside a trusted data root are followed by sqlite3 because lookup never resolves real paths, letting queries reach databases outside the sandboxed roots.
- NLTK: BllipParser passes caller-supplied model paths to the bllipparser C extension with no pathsec check, enabling arbitrary read BllipParser passes caller-chosen paths straight to a native extension, skipping NLTK's path validation, so arbitrary readable files can be opened.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in YCOECorpusReader lets a psd/pos directory symlink read files outside the corpus root within the data sandbox A directory symlink inside a corpus lets nested readers escape the corpus root and read files elsewhere in the data sandbox.
- LangGraph: Unencoded identifiers in LangGraph SDK v3 streaming can redirect authenticated GET requests Unencoded thread_id or assistant_id values containing relative segments are normalised into other server paths, so an authenticated GET is sent to a different endpoint than intended.
- LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials` An authenticated viewer sends an alias of a credentials field that the request blocklist misses, so a local file is read and sent out.
- MLflow vulnerable to arbitrary file read on unauthenticated servers via prompt model version source Prompt model version sources without a URL scheme skip path validation, so artifact requests can read arbitrary server files, including the auth database.
- NLTK: WekaClassifier passes an unvalidated caller-controlled model path to the weka JVM, bypassing nltk.pathsec containment The WekaClassifier wrapper passes caller-supplied model paths to the Java tool unchecked, skipping the containment checks that other NLTK loaders apply.
- MLflow FileStore trace IDs allow path traversal and arbitrary file writes A crafted trace ID with traversal sequences, sent unauthenticated to the trace endpoint, makes the FileStore backend write metadata files outside the experiment directory.
- PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root A repository config can set an absolute or traversal output path, so agent responses are written to files outside the project root.
- Docling: Crafted DoclingDocument JSON embeds local image files into converted output A crafted serialized document sets an image reference to a local path, and the converter reads that file and embeds it in exported output.
- Docling has arbitrary file read/write (and command execution when shell-escape is enabled) when rendering untrusted TikZ with the opt-in Tectonic engine A crafted LaTeX/TikZ input rendered via Tectonic can read and write arbitrary files, and run shell commands when shell escape is on.
- Docling: Arbitrary local file read via draw:image xlink:href in the OpenDocument backend A crafted ODF file makes the backend read an absolute path named in an image reference, embedding the file contents in the converted output.
- khoj has an unauthenticated path traversal in /home/ endpoint that allows file read from server filesystem An unauthenticated request to the home static-file route uses ../ sequences in the path, which are joined to the base directory and resolve to arbitrary server files.
- n8n: Path Injection in Elasticsearch and ElasticSecurity Nodes via Unencoded Identifiers Identifiers are placed unencoded into REST paths, so separators or dot segments redirect requests to other Elasticsearch endpoints using the stored credential.
- n8n: Git Node branch.<name>.remote Config Key Bypasses Sandbox Path Restriction, Enabling Local Git Repository Read A branch remote value written into a repository's config bypasses the Git node's repository check, so a fetch can read any local repository.
- NLTK: Corpus Reader Sandbox Bypass Two NLTK corpus reader constructors open files and databases from outside the root before the pathsec sandbox check runs, letting callers read arbitrary paths.
- NLTK: Symlink-based arbitrary file read in IPIPANCorpusReader, bypasses nltk.pathsec entirely A symlink inside the corpus root passes traversal checks, and the IPIPAN reader opens it with builtin open, reading arbitrary files the process can access.
- NLTK: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML NLTK reader functions build XML file paths from unvalidated selectors or index values, letting traversal read files outside the corpus root.
- NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code — arbitrary file read via file:// protocol A logic error makes the absolute-path check in the file pointer's open method never trigger, so any file the process can read is loaded through a file URL.
- NLTK: Symlink-based sandbox bypass in FramenetCorpusReader (bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-54292) A symlink with a separator-free name inside the corpus directory passes the name check, so reads resolve to files outside the corpus root.
- NLTK: Corpus readers follow symlinks outside trusted roots despite pathsec enforcement Symlinks inside a trusted corpus root point outside it, and corpus readers open those targets with plain open(), skipping NLTK's path security check.
- NLTK: Symlink escape in CorpusReader allows arbitrary local file read outside the corpus root A symlink inside the corpus root points outside it; the lexical path check passes, so reads follow the link to arbitrary local files.
- NLTK: StreamBackedCorpusView Bypasses pathsec.ENFORCE - Arbitrary Local File Read A corpus reader opens files directly without the enforced path check, so attacker-chosen file IDs can read any local file.
- NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots Model import and export functions call plain open() on caller-supplied paths, skipping the path guard that sibling helpers apply and reading or writing outside allowed roots.
- NLTK: Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files The downloader blocks symlink escapes but not pre-existing hardlinks, so extracting a package writes through a hardlink and modifies a file outside the install root.
- praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` — path traversal to any writable location The user_id parameter is joined into a base path without sanitisation, so traversal sequences let callers write memory files to arbitrary writable locations.
- NLTK CrubadanCorpusReader path traversal allows arbitrary file disclosure A corpus mapping value that is an absolute path makes the reader open files outside the corpus, skipping the containment check.
- nltk: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in nltk.data.load() through Percent-Encoded Sequences Percent-encoded dot segments pass path checks that run before url2pathname decodes them, letting resource lookups escape the NLTK data directory.
- Flowise: Authenticated arbitrary file write in the `S3 Directory` document loader via unsanitized S3 object keys Attacker-chosen S3 object keys are joined into local paths without stripping traversal sequences, so files are written outside the temporary directory.
- Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): Path Traversal in NKJPCorpusReader leads to Arbitrary File Read and bypasses the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True) The corpus reader joins attacker-supplied file IDs to the root without containment checks, reading files outside the corpus while skipping the library's path validation.
- Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) has path traversal in FramenetCorpusReader.frame() that allows arbitrary XML file read, bypassing the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True) A name containing parent-directory sequences is joined into a corpus XML path read with plain open, skipping the pathsec check and reading files outside the corpus.
- Hugging Face Datasets folder-based builders allow path traversal through file_name metadata Folder-based dataset builders join an unvalidated file_name metadata value to the dataset directory, so traversal sequences read arbitrary local files.
- open-webui terminal proxy path traversal guard bypass via 9x encoded traversal Traversal sequences encoded nine times survive the proxy's limited decoding loop, so requests reach terminal server paths outside the permitted proxy prefix.
- LiteLLM: Local file read via request-supplied OIDC file references A health test endpoint resolves request-supplied OIDC file references, letting a privileged caller make the server read arbitrary local files.
- LiteLLM: Arbitrary file write via path traversal in Skills archive extraction Skill ZIP entries containing traversal sequences are written outside the staging directory when the skill is processed.
- n8n: Send Email Node Arbitrary File Read and SSRF via Nodemailer Content-Object Type Confusion Non-string values reaching a mail node's body fields are treated by the mail library as file paths or URLs, exposing local files from the host.
- n8n: Git Node fetch/pull/pushTags Operations Bypass Sandbox Path Restriction A workflow author can point an allowlisted git remote at a local repository outside the sandbox, fetch it into the workspace, and read its files.
- n8n: Edit Image Node Format Injection Allows Arbitrary File Write The Edit Image node passes its output format unvalidated to the image library, letting a crafted value write bytes outside the node's working directory.
- Keras: tar extraction permits symlink-based path traversal Symlink entries in a crafted tar archive skip the directory containment check, so they can point outside the extraction folder and enable reads and overwrites.
- Gradio FileExplorer preprocess path traversal allows files outside root_dir to reach callbacks Crafted path segments make the FileExplorer preprocess step discard the root directory prefix, letting unauthenticated callers read files outside it.
- LangSmith SDK TracingMiddleware: Arbitrary server-side file read Header-supplied fields inject file attachments, and a broken type check fails to stop the tracing thread reading any server file the attacker names.
- PraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion Crafted GitHub template ref values escape the cache directory, letting the loader write files and delete arbitrary outside directories.
- PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API An unauthenticated caller submits an absolute filesystem path to the Jobs API, and the server reads that file without any path validation.
- Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path} A prefix-only directory check lacks a trailing separator, so sibling directories sharing the cache name prefix can be read by authenticated users.
- Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal Double-encoded dot segments slip past the proxy's path sanitiser, letting an authenticated user reach files and endpoints outside the intended scope on the terminal server.
- Langflow: Path Traversal in Knowledge Bases API via Creation Endpoint The knowledge base name in the create endpoint is joined into a filesystem path without sanitisation, letting an authenticated user create directories and write files outside their area.
- Langflow: Unauthenticated Shareable Playground arbitrary local or S3 file read The unauthenticated public flow endpoint accepts a files list whose paths are read without restriction, so anyone with the link can read local or S3 files.
- Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): URL-Encoded Path Traversal in nltk.data.load() Allows Arbitrary Local File Read The traversal check runs on the raw resource name before percent-decoding, so encoded separators and dot segments reach the filesystem and read arbitrary files.
- n8n: Git Node Clone and Push Operations Bypass File Sandbox The Git node accepts local filesystem paths as clone or push sources, letting workflows copy repositories that the file sandbox would block.