Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / Authentication and access control
Authentication and access control
256 records in AI Framework and Platform Flaws.
- Kubeflow Pipelines: Cross-tenant execution-cache poisoning / output substitution via a namespace-blind cache key in the cache webhook (multi-user) The pipeline step cache key omits the tenant namespace, letting one tenant read or pre-populate cached outputs belonging to another tenant.
- Kubeflow Pipelines: RBAC bypass on shared pipelines allows any authenticated user to delete or modify global pipelines Multi-user mode skips authorisation for shared pipelines with an empty namespace on write and delete, letting any user modify or remove them.
- Kubeflow Pipelines API server lacks authorization for shared pipeline uploads Upload endpoints skip the access check when the namespace is empty, letting callers create or replace shared pipeline versions.
- LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key Reusing one encryption key for both secret storage and session tokens lets an internal user forge an admin token via a crafted key metadata field.
- LangGraph: Namespace labels containing `.` reach other namespaces in Postgres and SQLite stores Namespace label validation runs only on writes, so dotted labels in reads, deletes and batches reach other namespaces' stored data.
- PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header The localhost-only exemption from auth trusts the request Host header, so a spoofed Host value lets remote callers invoke agents unauthenticated.
- Langflow : Cross-user flow access and vertex execution via deprecated /api/v1/build/{flow_id}/vertices endpoints Deprecated chat routes accept a flow ID without checking ownership, so any logged-in user can read and execute another user's flow vertices.
- PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook mode accepts forged unsigned message.received events and invokes agents A public webhook endpoint accepts unsigned message events and dispatches them to agents, so anyone can forge inbound messages that trigger agent replies.
- PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing The AgentMail webhook accepts unsigned requests and trusts the sender field in the body, so anyone can inject messages as any address.
- Langflow: Unauthenticated Flow Execution via Webhook Authentication Bypass When a config flag is off, webhook calls skip API key checks, so anyone who knows a flow UUID can run that flow as its owner.
- Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion Deleting a knowledge base also deletes its shared admin-owned vector connection without checking the caller's role or other dependent bases.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions The chat-completions endpoint saves new chats into a folder named in the request without checking the caller's write permission on that folder.
- Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange The token exchange endpoint skips the email domain allowlist, so users removed from allowed domains still receive working sessions.
- Open WebUI: Channel members can overwrite another member's message via the chat completions endpoint A channel member can rewrite another member's message through the chat completions path, which skips the authorship check that the dedicated edit route applies.
- Open WebUI: Admin demoted through SSO role sync keeps read and write access to all users' notes Demoting a user through SSO role sync does not close their open Socket.IO connection, so cached admin rights keep working on all users' notes.
- Open WebUI: Sign-in as another user via wildcard characters in the OAuth subject claim on SQLite On SQLite, identity lookup uses substring matching, so a subject containing wildcard characters can sign in as another account, possibly an admin.
- Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange Token exchange issues sessions without re-running role management, so users whose provider role was revoked keep their previous access level.
- n8n: Anonymous Approval-Gate Bypass via Reused resumeToken over the Chat WebSocket A reused resume token from a public form lets an anonymous party resume a paused workflow through the chat route, bypassing the approval gate that should hold it.
- n8n: GitHub Trigger 422 Reuse Path Skips Webhook Secret Storage, Causing Signature Verification to Fail-Open After a 422 reuse path the stored webhook signing secret is discarded, so signature verification accepts unsigned deliveries.
- n8n: Cross-User Active Workflow ID and Lifecycle Event Disclosure via Missing userId Filter n8n's active-workflows endpoint and push events skip the per-user sharing filter, so members can see workflow IDs and activity they should not access.
- n8n: Cross-Tenant Project-Member PII Disclosure via Missing Per-Project Scope Check on Role Assignment Endpoints Role assignment endpoints check role permission but not project visibility, so a user can read members of any project by naming it.
- n8n: Per-Resource OAuth Consent Bypass via Unbound Refresh Token Resource Substitution Refresh requests were checked only for a registered resource, not against the resource in the original grant, so a token could be refreshed for a different protected workflow.
- n8n: Disabled OIDC SSO Endpoints Remain Active and Issue Valid Sessions OIDC login and callback endpoints keep issuing sessions after the provider is disabled because they do not check whether OIDC is the active method.
- n8n: Log Streaming Event Destinations Decrypt Generic-Auth Credentials Without Ownership Check Log streaming destinations decrypt any referenced generic credential without checking the caller's access, so a user can send another project's secret to an endpoint they control.
- PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete The jobs API router has no authentication, so any reachable caller can submit, read, cancel and delete agent jobs.
- PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution The configured API key is never checked on the agent invocation endpoints, so unauthenticated network callers can run agents.
- PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret The recipe server skips API key and JWT verification when no secret is configured, so requests are accepted without credentials even on non-local interfaces.
- PraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced The serve command's --api-key option is parsed but never applied to the FastAPI app, so agent endpoints accept unauthenticated requests.
- PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unauthenticated Agent invocation routes never check the configured API key or call the existing token verifier, so unauthenticated callers can run registered agents.
- praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route AgentServer stores an auth_token setting but no route checks it, so unauthenticated clients can reach every endpoint.
- New API: Admin can reset passkeys for same-level or higher-privileged users A lower-privileged admin can reset passkeys of same-level or higher accounts because the reset endpoint skips the role comparison used by sibling endpoints.
- Open WebUI: A folder write-collaborator can permanently delete the owner's chats by deleting a shared subfolder Write access on a shared subfolder lets a collaborator delete the owner's chats, because the delete handler checks write access rather than ownership.
- Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can cancel another user's chat generation via the chat delete endpoint The chat delete endpoint cancels another user's in-flight generation tasks before checking whether the caller may delete that chat.
- Open WebUI: Unapproved accounts can open terminal sessions via a WebSocket auth path missing the role check The terminal WebSocket authenticates its own token and skips the verified-user role check, so pending accounts can open shell sessions.
- Open WebUI: Users denied the image-generation permission can still generate images via chat completions Chat completion requests can include an image feature flag that the server honours without rechecking the user's revoked permission, so generation still runs.
- Open WebUI: Deletion of directories and file embeddings in other knowledge bases via sync cleanup A user with write access to one knowledge base can delete directories and embeddings in other knowledge bases because object ids are never checked for ownership.
- Open WebUI: Any member with write access to a standard channel can edit or delete other members' messages On standard channels, the message update and delete handlers never checked authorship, so any member with write access could change or delete others' messages.
- Open WebUI: Account takeover via OAuth token exchange accepting tokens issued to any client The OAuth token exchange accepts provider access tokens issued to other client applications, so tokens from unrelated apps can mint sessions for victims.
- Flowise: IDOR vulnerability exists at the GET /api/v1/organization/customer-default-source endpoint An authenticated user can request another customer's payment and profile data by changing the customerId parameter, because object-level ownership is not checked.
- Flowise: Unauthenticated Property Injection into Flow Execution Context via Ungated `overrideConfig` Spread in Prediction API The unauthenticated prediction endpoint spreads caller-supplied overrideConfig into flow context without the override gate, letting attackers inject session and chat-related properties.
- Flowise: Unauthenticated Credential Abuse via Text-to-Speech Endpoint Allows Unauthorized Use of Private Chatflow TTS Credentials An unauthenticated caller can use a private chatflow's text-to-speech credentials by supplying its ID, because the route skips the public-access check.
- Flowise: Cross-workspace credential IDOR in openai-assistants-vector-store A client-supplied credential ID is used without checking that it belongs to the caller's workspace, letting one tenant use another tenant's OpenAI key.
- Flowise: Missing Authorization on Execution Update Endpoint A PUT route on execution records skips the permission middleware that sibling routes use, letting any authenticated user change any execution.
- Flowise: Broken Access Control in Stripe Subscription Endpoints Allows Cross-Tenant Billing Manipulation Billing routes accept a client-supplied Stripe subscription ID without checking it belongs to the caller's organisation, enabling changes to other tenants.
- Flowise: `DELETE /api/v1/chatflows/:id` does not validate resource type, allowing `agentflows:delete` and `chatflows:delete` to delete each other’s flow type The delete route accepts either permission but never checks flow type, so a key scoped to one flow kind can delete the other kind.
- Flowise: Cross-Workspace OAuth2 Credential Metadata Leak Flowise OAuth2 endpoints look up credentials by ID alone, so authenticated users reach other workspaces' credentials and unauthenticated callers can overwrite tokens.
- Flowise: Missing authorization on `/api/v1/files` allows low-privileged API keys to list and delete files across workspaces within the same organization The files API checks only a feature flag, not per-permission authorisation, so any API key in an organisation can list and delete other workspaces' files.
- Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add files to KB) An upload carrying a knowledge base ID is linked to that knowledge base before the write-permission check runs, letting read-only users add files.
- Open WebUI: Realtime endpoints accept Redis-revoked JWTs after signout/backchannel logout Realtime socket and terminal endpoints check only JWT signature and expiry, not the revocation store, so signed-out tokens can still connect.
- Open WebUI: Unauthenticated WebSocket Access to Collaborative Document Handlers (ydoc:awareness:update, ydoc:document:leave) Socket.IO accepts unauthenticated connections, and two collaborative document handlers perform no session or membership checks.