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vLLM: Request-controlled mm_processor_kwargs.code_revision allows remote code execution

CVE-2026-114053 ยท 2026-10-27 high

Class
Unsafe Model Loading and Supply Chain (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Code and command execution
Affected
vllm (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

A client request field selects another repository revision for processor code, so Transformers imports attacker-chosen Python when trust_remote_code is enabled. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

An untrusted multimodal request can set mm_processor_kwargs.code_revision. When vLLM serves a model whose Hugging Face processor uses dynamic auto_map code and the operator enabled --trust-remote-code, this request value reaches AutoProcessor.from_pretrained and selects the Python revision imported by Transformers.

This lets a client replace the operator-reviewed processor module with code from another revision of the same model repository. The operator-selected model/data revision remains pinned; only the executed processor code changes.

Importing a Python module is arbitrary code execution in the vLLM API/renderer process. The PoC below demonstrates this with an import-time filesystem write. It is fully offline and does not require a GPU, model weights, or changes to a real Hub repository.

Affected snapshot

Affected configuration

The vulnerable path exists when all of the following are true:

The default trust_remote_code=False configuration is not affected.

Attack surface

mm_processor_kwargs is accepted directly by public request models:

/tokenize is particularly relevant because vLLM's authentication middleware guards only /v1, /v2, /inference, and /cohere prefixes:

Consequently, /tokenize remains unauthenticated even when --api-key is configured, unless an external proxy protects it. The vLLM Security Guide documents /tokenize as an unprotected endpoint.

Root cause

The request value follows this path:

Request-time processor arguments are not separated from processor-construction arguments, and code_revision is not reserved.

Suggested remediation

Expected safe behavior is either a 4xx response for reserved request keys or silently ignoring them before processor construction. Rejection is preferable because it makes attempted misuse visible.

A patch for this was merged here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/58830

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.