INCIDENT MAP

Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-126303

NLTK: Unbounded CPU consumption in SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() with ambiguous or self-embedding grammars

CVE-2026-126303 ยท 2026-11-13 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Denial of service
Affected
nltk (PyPI)
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

The stepping recursive descent parser runs without a time or step limit, so an ambiguous grammar with short input can pin a CPU core indefinitely. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() performs an unbounded top-down search over ambiguous or self-embedding context-free grammars with no wall-clock or step limit. An actor who can influence the grammar and supply a short input to a caller that uses this parser can force a single parse() call to pin a CPU core indefinitely, producing a denial of service. The related base class RecursiveDescentParser gained a max_time wall-clock deadline, but the stepping subclass drives its own step loop and never arms or consults that deadline, and its constructor does not accept a max_time parameter, so the guard cannot be enabled on this path.

Root Cause

RecursiveDescentParser bounds its recursive search inside _parse: it arms a wall-clock deadline on the first step and raises TimeoutError once max_time (default 5.0 seconds) is exceeded. SteppingRecursiveDescentParser was designed for interactive single-stepping and overrides both parse() and _parse. Its parse() runs initialize() followed by a while self.step() is not None loop that never enters the guarded base _parse. Its _parse override is a state-capturing stub that records history and returns a sentinel, and it never references the inherited self._parse_deadline or self._max_time. Its __init__ signature omits max_time entirely, so a caller cannot enable or tighten a bound. The security invariant that a single parse must terminate within a bounded time is therefore never enforced on this parser.

Affected component: nltk.parse.recursivedescent.SteppingRecursiveDescentParser
- parse()      nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:428-433  (drives its own step loop, no bound armed or checked)
- _parse()     nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:643-668  (stub override; never consults self._parse_deadline / self._max_time)
- __init__()   nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:410-418  (signature (self, grammar, trace=0); no max_time parameter)
Base guard for comparison: RecursiveDescentParser._parse nltk/parse/recursivedescent.py:141-150

Impact

An actor who controls or influences the grammar passed to SteppingRecursiveDescentParser and can supply a short token sequence to a caller that invokes parse() can cause that call to never return. The top-down search enumerates a derivation space that grows on the order of the Catalan numbers with no memoization of the search and no deadline, so one crafted grammar plus a short input deterministically consumes a CPU core. In a deployment that parses attacker-influenced input on a bounded worker pool, repeated requests exhaust the pool and deny service to legitimate users. No authentication, privilege, or user interaction is required in that worst-credible deployment. Exploitation requires that the target actually use this parser on untrusted input; because the stepping parser is primarily a debugging or interactive-stepping component that backs a GUI, real-world exposure is narrower than for the base parser, though parse() is a supported public method that behaves as a full parser.

Proof of Concept

Requires only the nltk package (3.10.3) and standard library; no data downloads or network access.

Reproduction steps:
1. Build an ambiguous, self-embedding grammar such as S -> 'a' S S | 'a'.
2. Confirm the base parser self-terminates: RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a']*17) raises TimeoutError at about 2 seconds.
3. Run the stepping parser on the same grammar and input and observe it never returns.

import time, inspect
from nltk import CFG
from nltk.parse.recursivedescent import RecursiveDescentParser, SteppingRecursiveDescentParser

g = CFG.fromstring("S -> 'a' S S | 'a'")

# Base parser is bounded and self-terminates.
try:
    list(RecursiveDescentParser(g, max_time=2.0).parse(['a'] * 17))
except TimeoutError:
    print("base: TimeoutError (guarded)")

# Stepping subclass cannot be bounded: no max_time parameter.
print("stepping __init__ sig:", inspect.signature(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.__init__))

# Stepping parser runs unbounded on the same input.
t0 = time.perf_counter()
list(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser(g).parse(['a'] * 17))  # does not return
print("stepping: returned after", time.perf_counter() - t0)
base: TimeoutError (guarded)
stepping __init__ sig: (self, grammar, trace=0)
# stepping len3: 1 parse in 0.001s ; len7: 5 in 0.017s ; len9: 14 in 0.075s ; len11: 42 in 0.36s
# stepping len17: still running past a 10s watchdog, process alive, no RecursionError

Attack Chain

Bypass Evidence

The prior fix for this class of issue added a max_time wall-clock deadline to the base RecursiveDescentParser._parse (recursivedescent.py:141-150, default 5.0 seconds). This report demonstrates that the fix does not cover the sibling SteppingRecursiveDescentParser entry point, and the maintainers separately hardened other parsers (chart, earley chart, viterbi, shift-reduce, non-projective dependency) with max_time while leaving this subclass unbounded.

Challenges attempted and their outcomes:
- Hypothesis that the inherited self._max_time value (observed at 5.0) makes the path guarded: refuted; the value is inherited but never read on the stepping path, and the parser runs unbounded despite it being set.
- Hypothesis that a caller can bound the parser via the constructor: refuted; inspect.signature(SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.__init__) is (self, grammar, trace=0), with no max_time parameter.
- Hypothesis that the failure is merely an early RecursionError rather than CPU exhaustion: refuted; the step loop is iterative over an explicit history stack, so no exception is raised within a 10 second watchdog, CPU time grows exponentially with input length, and a small negative control input returns in about 0.001 seconds.
- Hypothesis that the _tried_e/_tried_m records collapse the search: refuted; those records are keyed by the frozen full partial tree, so they deduplicate only identical productions at identical states and do not prevent the exponential enumeration.

Affected Versions

The stepping subclass has never carried a time or step bound in any released version; the prior fix added the guard only to the base class. The vulnerable methods were verified present in the exact published PyPI 3.10.3 source distribution (parse() at lines 428-433, stub _parse at 643-668 with no deadline reference, and __init__ without max_time). Because the class predates the prior fix and no specific historical introduction tag was pinned, the lower bound is left open rather than invented; the upper bound is verified against the current published artifact (3.10.3). No released fix exists.

Suggested Fix

Enforce a bounded parse on the stepping parser: give SteppingRecursiveDescentParser its own wall-clock or step-count budget that is checked inside its step loop (for example in parse() and/or the _parse/step path), and add a max_time (or equivalent step-limit) parameter to __init__ that is propagated and honored, mirroring the base RecursiveDescentParser and the other hardened sibling parsers. As an interim mitigation without a code change, callers should avoid invoking SteppingRecursiveDescentParser.parse() on grammars or input derived from untrusted sources, run any such parsing under an external timeout or a separate resource-limited process, and prefer a chart parser for untrusted input.

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Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).

Fix status (2026-09-28)

PR: #3895 "[WIP] Bound algorithmic-DoS and uncontrolled-recursion vectors (CWE-400/407/674/1333)", open, head b22ebe144.

Fix commit: e20c40e26 "Bound tokenizer/parser algorithmic DoS (ffr9/gpwc/8fx7)" (SteppingRecursiveDescentParser gains the max_time parameter, default 5.0 s, and honours the parse deadline).

No probe. The advisory PoC re-run (grammar S -> 'a' S S | 'a', 17 tokens): on the PR head the parse raises TimeoutError after 5.0 s and the constructor signature is (self, grammar, trace=0, max_time=5.0); on develop 2fa3f48fe the same parse ran past a 45 s watchdog, so develop is still VULNERABLE.

Release: none.

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.