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Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-25960

vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass

CVE-2026-25960 · 2026-03-09 moderate

Class
AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
Technique
Server-side request forgery
Affected
vllm (PyPI)
Gets past
SSRF protection
CVSS
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days

How it works, in short

vLLM's URL check parses backslash-containing URLs differently from the aiohttp client that fetches them, letting a request reach an attacker host. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)

Details

Summary

The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.

Affected Component

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.

These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:

| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
|--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| urllib3.parse_url() | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | httpbin.org | /%5C@evil.com/ | URL-encodes \ as %5C, treats \@evil.com/ as part of the path |
| yarl (via aiohttp) | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | evil.com | / | Treats \ as part of userinfo (user: httpbin.org\), the @ acts as the userinfo/host separator |

Attack Scenario

# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"

# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org"  ✅ Passes validation

# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
    async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
        # Request actually goes to evil.com!  ❌ Bypass!

Why This Happens

This inconsistency allows an attacker to:
- Bypass the hostname allowlist check
- Access arbitrary internal/external services
- Perform full SSRF attacks

Fixes

References

Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.